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RAYMOND J. CHAMBERS’
CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACCOUNTING THOUGHT
Abstract: Raymond J. Chambers was an internationally recognized
scholar, influential theorist, as well as an important contributor to
the study of the history of accounting thought. He was an advocate
of the needs of financial statement users. He investigated what us-
ers, not accountants, considered important and what in fact was
relevant to their decision-making. He challenged existing theoretical
propositions which he believed were only rationalization of current
practices. He argued that the lack of a rigorously developed theory
of accounting led to contradictory and less relevant accounting
practices. In his theory of continuously contemporary accounting
(CoCoA), he demonstrated with logic and evidence that only an ac-
counting system based on market selling prices is relevant to users’
evaluation and decision-making process. Chambers dedicated a sig-
nificant amount of his most recent work to his Thesaurus [1995] and
to the origins and developments of conventional accounting. He en-
deavored to refute the widely held assumption that cost-based ac-
counting is a superior rule. Besides launching Abacus in 1965, his
works, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior [1966] and
An Accounting Thesaurus [1995] are among Chambers’ notable con-
tributions to the accounting literature.
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tory Conference, Cardiff, U.K., September 2000. We appreciate the valuable
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A PERSONAL PROFILE
Raymond John Chambers was born on November 16, 1917
in Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia. He was a very pri-
vate person devoted to his wife of 60 years, Margaret Scott
Brown, and to his two daughters, Margaret and Rosemary, and
son, Kevin, who graduated from the University of Sydney in
languages, social work and medicine. Chambers had early inter-
ests in the study of the English language and literature, math-
ematics, and physics. He also shared similar interests in sociol-
ogy, psychology, and the history and philosophy of science. His
hobbies were once listed as reading, writing and arithmetic. He
was known for his endless effort to help and support his col-
leagues and students and to encourage young academics and
writers to produce high quality research and progress in their
careers.
Chambers’ journey in accountancy education commenced
when he was awarded the University of Sydney Exhibition
(scholarship) to study economics, whereafter he completed his
undergraduate studies in 1939. After graduation, he undertook
several professional examinations to qualify for membership in
the Commonwealth Institute of Accountants and the Australian
Institute of Cost Accountants. Chambers started his work expe-
rience as a junior clerk in the New South Wales’ Attorney
General’s Office and later as a stock clerk with Shell Oil Com-
pany and as a materials controls supervisor and statistical of-
ficer at the Electricity Meter and Allied Industries Company.
Next, he worked with the Australian Prices Commission during
the period from 1943 to 1945. He also provided consultation to
various companies and governmental and professional bodies.
Chambers’ first academic assignment came in 1945 when
he was appointed as a teacher in the School of Management of
Sydney Technical College. In 1953, Chambers became the first
full-time appointed senior accounting lecturer in the Faculty of
Economics at the University of Sydney. He was later appointed
as the University’s Foundation Professor of Accounting when
the Department of Accounting was established as a unit sepa-
rate from the Department of Economics. During his long aca-
demic career, Chambers accepted various fellowships and invi-
tations to teach and present lectures and seminars in numerous
prestigious universities throughout the world including the
United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Europe, Canada,
Southeast Asia and South Africa. Chambers retired officially on
December 31, 1982. He continued his academic work as an
11
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Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney and as an Ad-
junct Professor at Deakin University for over a decade.
After facing several episodes of challenge and frustration
[Wells, 2000], Chambers launched in 1965 Abacus, a scholarly
publication, to fill a gap that resulted from the discontinuance
of Accounting Research in the U.K. which ceased publication in
1958. His main goal was to promote high quality research in
accounting from a variety of perspectives. His commitment to
Abacus and to accounting research resulted in worldwide recog-
nition of this publication. He served as the founding editor
from 1965 until 1975 and as an active consulting editor, there-
after.
In spite of his decision to devote himself to academic work,
Chambers identified himself with the practicing accounting
profession and sought to foster relationships between academ-
ics and practicing accountants. He accepted numerous invita-
tions to address professional associations and served in profes-
sional and governmental committees as well as in advisory and
editorial boards. He also served as a State, and later as a
National, President of the Australian Society of Certified Prac-
ticing Accountants (formerly known as the Australian Society
of Accountants).
During his career, Chambers received many honors and
awards. In 1967, he was awarded the American Institute of
CPA’s Gold Medal for his contributions to accounting literature.
He was also the first overseas invitee to be the American Ac-
counting Association’s Distinguished International Lecturer. In
1991, Chambers was awarded the American Accounting
Association’s prestigious Outstanding Accounting Educator
Award and was also the first inductee into the Accounting Hall
of Fame from Austral-Asia. He also earned three Citations from
the Australian Society of CPAs and was elected as a Fellow of
the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. Chambers was
made a life member of many accounting organizations and was
granted several honorary doctorates by various universities. He
was named an Officer of the Order of Australia for his services
and contributions to research and education.
Chambers’ valuable contributions to accounting literature
took the form of several books, numerous monographs, and
more than 200 articles, conference papers, and submissions to
governmental and professional bodies. His works were selec-
tively published in Spanish, Italian and Japanese. His first
publication was a book titled, Financial Management [1947],
which was the outcome of the first two years of his teaching
12
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experience. His last published paper, “The Poverty of Account-
ing Disclosure,” appeared in Abacus in October 1999. Chambers
died in Sydney on September 13, 1999 at the age of 81.
He has been described as ‘inspirational and visionary’
[Wolnizer, 1999]; a ‘philosopher’ and ‘reformer’ [Barton, 1982];
‘one of the most influential theorists of his time’ and ‘a man for
all seasons’ [Lee, 1987]; an ‘intellectual giant’ [Mathews, 1982];
a ‘determined seeker of truth and fairness’ [Gaffikin, 1994]; and
‘informal, gentle and a bit lonely’ [Moonitz, 1982].
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
the paper highlights the early influences on Chambers which
led to his criticism of conventional accounting practices. Next,
major phases in the development of Chambers’ theory are out-
lined and its key characteristics are identified. Then, the paper
reviews Chambers’ effort to promote acceptance for his propos-
als and examines the criticism that his theory faced. In the next
section, the paper considers Chambers’ work as an historian
and how he employed accounting history to explain and sup-
port his theory. The paper concludes with a summary and gen-
eral comments on Chambers’ significance and contribution to
accounting literature and development of thought.
EARLY INFLUENCES
Prior to becoming intellectually committed to the account-
ing discipline as a field of knowledge, Chambers had the oppor-
tunity to view accounting from outside the profession and
assess its value from the viewpoint of its jury, its users. During
his undergraduate study of economics, Chambers’ exposure to
accounting was limited to two introductory classes of account-
ing and, thus, his knowledge of accounting when he com-
menced working was not substantial nor was he trained enough
to absorb the obscurity of some conventional accounting prac-
tices, as he viewed them later. His early positions as a clerk
accountant and materials controls supervisor provided him
with a real world sense of how conventional accounting was
performed. He was in a backstage position that enabled him to
observe how actual financial reports were prepared using flex-
ible methods that could be based on inconsistent assumptions,
particularly where the issue of asset valuation was involved. He
noted first hand that financial statements could, in fact, be
misleading.
A later, and more significant, experience was with the
Australian Prices Commission. Different from his previous
13
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involvement as a processor or transmitter of information,
Chambers’ responsibility at the Commission resembled the
users of financial statements. Similar to that of a financial
analyst, his task was to evaluate companies’ financial state-
ments and assess the appropriateness of their cost allocation
methods and eventually to ensure the fairness of the calculated
prices to consumers, especially during the critical period of
war. During his years with the Commission, Chambers identi-
fied the inconsistency and incomparability of financial state-
ments that he had to analyze to support his decisions. To him,
such financial statements were incapable of producing the
relevant financial view that he, as an analyst, needed. Com-
bined with his brief educational background of what account-
ing was expected to provide and his experience of how account-
ing was actually practiced, his Commission experience led him
to the view that accounting was far short of what it was pre-
sumed to be and what it was capable of providing.
As noted, Chambers’ academic career started in 1945 when
he was appointed to the Faculty of the School of Management
of Sydney Technical College. Chambers’ teaching responsibili-
ties were not limited to accounting; in fact, he taught nearly all
the subjects offered by this school, particularly those required
in a special diploma program that he had designed. This influ-
ential experience had encouraged Chambers to explore the
other disciplines of management, economics, and finance, thus,
making him more acquainted with business behavior and deci-
sion-making process. With this broader view of the business
world, Chambers was able to identify further limitations of ac-
counting to meet the expectations of those users it was expected
to serve. His teaching experience had indeed motivated Cham-
bers to reconsider, more in depth, the value of accounting in-
formation, not from the narrowed traditional view of accoun-
tants, but from the viewpoint of users whose satisfaction is
presumably the ultimate goal of accountants. He investigated
the behavior of management as well as other users of financial
statements. His focal point was on the economic behavior of
businesses and especially how they made their decisions and
what financial information was deemed necessary to make their
decision-making process more effective.
In summary, Chambers became an advocate of those who
use financial statements. He noticed the insufficiency and irrel-
evance of accounting information contained in financial state-
ments and realized the resultant gap between what accounting
was providing and what users actually needed.
14
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Chambers’ approach to theoretical investigation was to
define the actual problem, identify its real causes, and then
attempt to find an appropriate solution. His thorough under-
standing of the shortcomings in existing practices and identifi-
cation of the underlying factors responsible for such deficien-
cies represented an important phase in the development of his
accounting theory.
Criticism of Conventional Accounting: Based on his personal
experiences, Chambers detected anomalies in accounting prac-
tices. Accounting’s function was perceived to serve its users; yet
the reality of Chambers’ experience suggested otherwise. He
believed that the information accountants provided fell short of
fulfilling this function. Users expected certain relevant informa-
tion, while accountants followed their self-prescribed proce-
dures and supplied other information regardless of its actual
relevance to users’ evaluation and decision-making process.
Sharing similar concerns to those of MacNeal [1939] with
regard to small investors, Chambers argued that the average
user cannot fully understand the actual differences in income
that might result from the application of different acceptable
accounting methods. Conventional accounting practices had
unjustifiably combined results from past, present, and
future values leading to inconsistency which lacked any defense
but custom. This explains why Chambers [1989] preferred to
describe this system as ‘higgledy-piggledy’ accounting. He
wondered if [1999b, p. 246] even accountants would think that
Robert Sterling, for example, could manage to come up with
“2,971,332,000 different book values that could be reported for
inventory.” He argued that, in many cases, some financial infor-
mation was not only irrelevant, but also misleading. This phe-
nomenon could have a serious impact on capital markets that
were consequently composed of poorly informed participants.
As he characterized it, “that today’s securities markets are well
informed is a myth” [1973, p. i]. In short, accounting practices
involved too many anomalies and irregularities making the con-
ventional accounting system flawed and unacceptable.
Several issues confronted Chambers. For example, if the
failure to fulfill users’ information needs is as serious a problem
as Chambers viewed it, could existing accounting practices
overcome such a challenge? Also, if this failure continued to
exist despite the effort to overcome it, what was the proper
15
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remedy? Seeking answers to these questions dominated Cham-
bers’ work during the rest of his career. The obscurity of con-
ventional accounting practices caused Chambers to investigate
accounting literature and examine the theoretical grounds, if
any, for such flawed practices.
He critiqued and challenged existing theoretical proposi-
tions as being poorly developed. In his view, they did not
qualify to be considered a theory. They were rationalization and
justification for current practices and were based on a set of
inconsistent assumptions. This view provided Chambers a basis
to attack misleading practices, their legitimacy, and their appli-
cation. The fact that current practices did not conform to theo-
retically sound bases explains the increasing complexity in ac-
counting rules and widening differences in acceptable methods.
The basic conclusion of Chambers’ own experience and
inquiry was that the lack of a sound, well developed theory of
accounting had led to the contradictory and controversial
accounting customs and procedures that distorted accounting
information and made it less useful. This conclusion com-
pelled him to find a solution to the problem and replace theo-
retically inconsistent propositions with a more dependable, self-
defending theory of accounting.
Approach to Theory Development: An important characteristic of
Chambers’ work is his freedom from association with pre-
existing conventional accounting schools of thought. Chambers
was not committed to any single method or research com-
munity for developing and promoting his ideas. His approach
was based on his exploration of the history and philosophy of
science and his investigation of related and more developed
fields. When Chambers’ work is examined, his main arguments
are remarkably consistent. This consistency is difficult to find
in other scholars whose writings had been constructed over a
period of five decades. Thus, when a new issue is brought up in
a contemporaneous paper, one finds the underlying ideas con-
sistent with the arguments presented decades earlier.
Chambers had great confidence in his orthodoxy and em-
ployed great energy to achieve its recognition. He avoided asso-
ciation to any particular school of thought that might limit his
ability to accomplish his objectives. Instead, he would be
“guided by what seemed to be practical problems and what
seemed to be practicable and technically feasible ways of
resolving them” [1991a, p. 24]. One observation by Zeff notes
that Chambers “deserves to be known amongst his many
16
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achievements as the only accounting academic who includes in
his bibliography, his own bibliography” [1982, p. 181]. Thus, it
is not a surprise that Chambers also was described as a ‘loner’
and a ‘his own man’ [Stamp, 1982].
Chambers’ next task was to explore the accounting litera-
ture, the literature of related disciplines and carefully investi-
gate accounting practices and their actual role in the society,
particularly their function in the business world. His attention
was focused on theories of economics, language, communica-
tions, psychology, sociology, mathematics, and measurement.
For example, he needed to better understand how general
economic decisions were theoretically and practically made and
to understand how users of financial statements actually be-
haved in the real world. He studied what users, not account-
ants, considered important and what in fact was relevant to
their decision-making. He searched the literature of communi-
cations to determine how such information, once obtained,
could be disseminated effectively to users.
Having determined his goal of fulfilling the function of
accounting in terms of providing what users actually expected,
Chambers attempted to discover the best methodology of
constructing a system of accounting that would achieve this
objective. He believed his approach should follow a successful,
effective pattern which might replicate other well-developed
disciplines. During this time, Chambers’ work was directed to-
wards methodological evaluation of current academic work
and, eventually, the proposal of a more appropriate approach
for developing a sound theory. This direction is clearly seen in a
series of Chambers’ articles beginning in 1955 with “Blueprint
for a Theory of Accounting.” In this article, he asserted what
should be expected of theories in general, and of accounting in
particular. Drawn from his management teaching experience
and exploration of economics and social sciences, general and
straightforward propositions necessary for developing a theory
of accounting were outlined and justified. Further discussion of
methods of theory construction was provided in another article,
“Details for the Blueprint” [1957].
Chambers was very confident about the validity of his argu-
ments and his determination and persistence led to an aggres-
sive debating style. This not only strongly ‘annoyed’ [Gaffikin,
2000, p. 285] his opponents who held established, orthodox
views, but also set up personality conflicts between the two
camps. Whittington and Zeff [2001] observe that “Aged 39 and
not yet a professor, Chambers had bearded one of the lions of
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US academic accounting [Littleton . . . who] never came to
terms with Chambers’ criticism, which he took as an affront”
[p. 212].
Chambers’ ultimate goal was not simply to criticize the
work of others. After describing how theories ought to be scien-
tifically constructed based on his exploration of other well-
developed fields of knowledge, Chambers’ next step was to offer
a theory of his own. In 1961, he introduced a proposal of his
theory in “Towards a General Theory of Accounting.” He fol-
lowed the scientific approach that he previously outlined in his
“Blueprint” to provide a system of accounting thought which
was rigorously and consistently developed. He dedicated this
paper to developing a set of postulates and assumptions that
would later be used to derive his theory. His appeal for the
employment of rigor, reasoning, and structure in developing
accounting theory was indeed among Chambers’ most signifi-
cant contribution to the development of accounting thought.
Further, his “Towards a General Theory of Accounting” was
considered as the “watershed between the old style of prag-
matic accounting and the new theoretically based accounting in
which Chambers was to play such a dominant role in develop-
ing it during ensuing years” [Mathews, 1982, p. 177]. The com-
plete version, except for few minor issues, of Chambers’ solu-
tion to the deficiencies of conventional accounting was offered
in his major work, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Be-
havior (AEEB), published in 1966. AEEB has been considered
by many as his magnum opus (e.g., [Brown, 1982]), a work for
which he was awarded the AICPA’s Gold Medal in 1967. The
book demonstrates his thesis and reasonable premises which
conformed to commonsense and intuition as well as his rigor-
ous and logical development of propositions and foundations
supporting his final conclusions.
It is important to note that the significance of AEEB stems
not only from its conclusions, but also from how such conclu-
sions were derived. Recognizing Chambers’ significant contri-
bution to the methodology of accounting research, Gaffikin
[2000] states that “There is little doubt . . . that Chambers was
the first in the English accounting literature to fully explicate
such a rigorous scientific method and then consciously employ
it in developing a theory” [p. 288].
In 1967, Chambers theory came to be popularized as “Con-
tinuously Contemporary Accounting”, later identified by the
acronym, CoCoA. Chambers initially used the abbreviation
(CCA) to refer to this theory until 1975 when the Sandilands
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Committee proposed its Current Cost Accounting system, and
the same abbreviation (CCA) was used to refer to that particu-
lar system. As a result, Chambers preferred to use the new
acronym (COCOA) and later (CoCoA) [1976].
CONTINUOUSLY CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING (COCOA)
A unique characteristic of CoCoA lies in its approach to the
subsequent measurement of assets. Measurement is an essen-
tial task of accounting and thus considered a cornerstone of the
development of any theory of accounting. Many of the deficien-
cies in accounting practices and reports, according to Cham-
bers, relate to the application of inappropriate measurement
approaches. Therefore, dealing with measurement issues, in ad-
dition to epistemic and methodological concerns, comprised
the major and most critical component of Chambers’ work.
In his theory, Chambers made an important distinction be-
tween measurement and valuation. Measurement is a function
of accounting: accountants are to relate facts and communicate
them to users. Valuation, on the other hand, is concerned more
with expectations of future benefits that could be generated by
the underlying asset; i.e., how such facts discovered by account-
ants are perceived by the user. While a specific asset should be
measured equally by different accountants, it might as well be
valued differently by two different users based on their unique
perceptions of the utility of that asset. In short, while valuation
by definition is subjective, measurement should be objective
and independent from the influence of accountants or any
group of users. The question then became: how to measure
accurately?
During the early years of 1960s, Chambers addressed this
question by exploring the literature of measurement, especially
in physical sciences. He concluded that accurate measurement
requires the observation of both the initial state and terminal
state of the object under examination as well as the consider-
ation of any necessary adjustments for changes in conditions
during that period. Given this description of measurement,
Chambers’ criticism of conventional accounting practices
focused on two issues. First, values at certain points of time
were derived rather than observed. Accounting rules prescribed
that measurement of assets at the end of the period be based on
cost allocations and other calculations rather than on real ob-
servations and actual discoveries of the true and fair values of
such assets. Chambers argued that accounting should use only
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factual or observable values and that the only scales of value
that are discoverable and can be observed are market prices.
Second, changes in the purchasing power of monetary units
were not taken into consideration by current accounting rules.
To measure the distance between two points, they both must
share the same measurement unit; if not, the initial state must
be adjusted to have the same common unit of the terminal
state, i.e., share the same ‘standardized’ condition. It is gener-
ally accepted that adding U.S. $100 to D.M. 220 would be inap-
propriate for they do not share the same measuring unit. Corre-
spondingly, an Y2K dollar should not be added to a 1973 dollar
since they do not represent equivalent measurement units.
Chambers [1965], therefore, argued that if a true and fair
view of the changes in financial position is to be obtained, mar-
ket prices and changes in the general price levels should be
reflected in financial statements and calculations of net income.
Based on this extensive exploration and examination, Cham-
bers reached the conclusion that “informed economic action is
a derivative of a periodical accounting, based on the current
cash equivalents of assets from time to time, periodical income
calculations in dated real terms, and the authenticity of finan-
cial statements established by direct observation of prices from
time to time” [Chambers and Dean, 1986, p. i].
Three major departures from conventional accounting
identify Chambers’ alternative system, continuously contempo-
rary accounting, or CoCoA. First, assets should be stated at
their monetary or money-equivalent values. Second, the value
of non-monetary assets should reflect any changes in value
specific to these assets. Only contemporary values are capable
of reflecting the specific changes in asset values and, as a result,
all other measures of value become irrelevant. Third, changes
in the general purchasing power of money should be taken into
consideration for they have impact on financial positions and
results of operations.
An important question remained. What market values
should be used: entry prices or exit prices? Chambers’ view was
that a firm exists within an environment that includes many
constituents—related either contractually or socially to the
firm. Based on economic theory and adaptive behavior, Cham-
bers argued that firms typically have unlimited wants, possess
limited resources, and exist in volatile environments. The extent
to which a firm can grow and survive in such environments is
influenced by its ability and readiness to adapt to the new
changes in business conditions [1947]. Chambers observed that
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the entity’s financial position should reflect its capacity at a
specific point in time for engaging in exchange within its envi-
ronment. A firm’s financial position is based on its ability to
adapt to the new environment and either maintain or alter its
operations; that is, its capacity for buying new assets or paying
off its current debts, when necessary. According to Chambers,
buying or entry prices, although relevant to the decision of
selecting new assets, are not capable of showing such adaptive
ability. When a firm, for any reason, needs to generate a sum of
money, i.e., adapt to a new environment, its ability to operate
would be limited to the sum of the monetary assets that it
possesses and what its other assets could bring in to the firm,
e.g., selling or exit prices. Therefore, Chambers concluded that
non-monetary assets should be restated to contemporary values
using their net realizable value, what he classified as ‘money
equivalent.’
It is important to note that Chambers did not deny the
significance of other valuation methods, but he always argued
that a firm’s adaptive capacity to change to a new environment
could not be reflected in financial statements except when
using contemporary, net realizable values. For accounting in-
formation to be useful and functional, it needs to be relevant;
and for information to be relevant, it has to be current—that is,
contemporary. Historical costs are relevant only at the time of
initial transactions. Their relevance as indicators cannot be
relied upon in subsequent periods. Likewise, discounted values
are important and widely used as a method for choosing from
certain projections of profitability for different alternatives. Yet
they are still hypothetical in nature and are greatly influenced
by their underlying assumptions and expectations that might
vary broadly from one person to another [1979].
Chambers’ premise was that accounting has to provide us-
ers, not with assumptions or hopes, but with facts—its function
is fact-finding not decision-making [1966]. Accountants are to
provide users with facts and information corresponding to real-
ity, free from distortion. Such information may in turn be pro-
cessed differently by users based on their varying needs and
expectations. In short, Chambers demonstrated with logic and
evidence that only market selling prices are relevant to users’
evaluation and decision-making process.
Clarity, Simplicity, and Effective Communications: Chambers
campaigned for a useful accounting system that was also
straightforward. He called for simplicity in accounting
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methods, clarity in the forms of distributed information and
argued that a clear and simple message is easier to communi-
cate, comprehend, and be utilized. This emphasis persisted
throughout Chambers’ work and the title of one of his very last
published papers, “The Case for Simplicity in Accounting”
[1999a] confirms this view.
Clarity, simplicity and effective communication are among
the key qualities of his theory. Chambers believed that the func-
tion of accounting information is to increase the knowledge of
users and reduce their doubt [1966, p. 144]. He affirmed that
the value and relevance of accounting information depends on
the effective dissemination of such information. For various
reasons, users practically are unable to observe all events and
transactions of the firm. They rely on other specialists with
certain skills, e.g., accountants, to process transactions and pro-
vide summarized, valuable information. The processor is an
intermediary between the financial statement users and the
transactions, with a responsibility of providing a substitute for
a direct experience by users/decision makers. Chambers identi-
fied several qualities which should be satisfied to ensure the
utility of the messages communicated to the user/decision
maker. For example, a message should correspond objectively
to the actual experience or object without any deliberate or
unintentional biased influence by the processor. Other criteria
include reliability, consistency, and comprehensibility (see
[Lee, 1982] for further discussion). A message that fails to stand
such a test and meet these qualities would lose some or all of its
effectiveness and render the communication process unreliable.
Therefore, these characteristics should be represented in the
accounting information, which is the message, in order to
maintain the perceived value and credibility of the accounting
profession, that is the processor.
To ensure the effectiveness of the process, it is important to
use signs that bear the same meaning to the processor as well
as to the user/decision maker. To Chambers, clarity in the terms
used in financial statements is a necessary condition required
for effective communication between users and accountants.
When signs are interpreted differently, the message loses its
effectiveness and, hence, its value. In Chambers’ view, the lack
of mutual agreement on sign interpretation seems to persist
openly in current practice. He noted that “Accounting is widely
said to be a form of communication; yet the prime condition of
communication—shared understanding between source and re-
ceiver—is nowhere considered” [1996, p. 129]. He argued that
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present accounting communication lacks effectiveness as a re-
sult of users/decision makers not receiving clear, undistorted
messages that should resemble responses from direct involve-
ment. For example, the unsophisticated recipient expects the
value of an asset shown in the balance sheet to reflect its fair
and true value on the date stated on such a report, yet this is
not conventionally what the processor has in mind when pre-
paring such a statement. With the continuing use of confusing
technical jargon found in current financial statements com-
bined with complicated, inconsistent accounting methods,
Chambers identified further concerns about the declining
utility and reliability of accounting information.
He observed directly many flawed practices that hindered
the effectiveness of accounting communication. He argued
against the use of supplementary statements with different
valuation methods because that would confuse users and
reduce the creditability of all reported information. He dis-
agreed with the use of specialized accounting rules for different
industries, noting that comparability of results across indus-
tries was vital for investors and for the efficiency of capital
markets. Chambers also opposed the application of conserva-
tive rules in income calculations that were distorting facts,
favoring future users at the expense of current ones. Some us-
ers, for various reasons, might prefer to understate the value of
reported financial figures when making conservative decisions,
while others would like to be more optimistic and place more
values in these numbers. But accounting has a fact-finding
function and is not to be directed by varying users’ tastes or
reactions to certain types of information. Chambers saw a
double standard or ‘doublethinking’ with the treatment of cer-
tain transactions where overestimation of income was not
allowed while overestimation of expenses was not only per-
missible, but also encouraged. Thus, he argued against the
merit of the doctrine of conservatism. He believed that con-
servatism has no place in accounting as conservatism should be
a quality of users and not a quality of facts or information. He
disputed the validity of certain tax allocation practices which
lead to the inclusion of artificial liabilities, resulting in mis-
leading financial statements. Further, he rejected the practice
of mixing facts with fiction where certain costs reflecting hopes
for success, e.g., goodwill and deferred research and develop-
ment costs, are treated as if they were actual assets contribut-
ing to the firm’s current financial capacity. He never considered
the various arbitrary cost allocation-depreciation methods as
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worthy approximations of any asset value, especially when they
claimed to provide a true and fair view of a firm’s financial
position.
Chambers confidently argued that CoCoA would provide a
far simpler and more useful message. It is the message that he
believed would correspond to economic reality; be easily com-
prehended; be free from distortion; and be general and relevant
to all users. It is easier for an individual, unsophisticated user
to understand the actual current market price of an asset than
to accept, for example, that the value of an asset might legiti-
mately vary depending on the method of calculation, which
after all would not necessarily have to correspond to the actual
value of this particular asset. In short, Chambers’ objective was
to provide a simple message that is easier to understand and to
be acted upon.
The previous discussion was constructed as a summary of
Chambers’ theory and its key qualities. He recognized the im-
portance of these qualities when he developed CoCoA and be-
lieved that their relevance and importance would play a key
role in his effort to sell his theory.
THEORY PROMOTION AND CRITICISM
Chambers was determined and fully confident about the
soundness of his theory and validity of its arguments. After
developing CoCoA, his next task was to seek its endorsement by
others. A major opportunity to promote CoCoA and influence
public policy occurred during the inflationary period of the
1970s. Inflation led to discomfort with existing financial state-
ments. Serious doubt was cast on the usefulness of conven-
tional accounting. As a result, many valuation alternatives were
proposed. Chambers believed this was a great opportunity to
demonstrate the superiority of CoCoA over all other valuation
systems and gain its acceptance. To achieve this goal, he stud-
ied extensively other recommendations, wrote numerous papers
and made several proposals to various governmental and pro-
fessional bodies in Australia, the U.K. and the U.S., comparing
all alternatives and demonstrating how all competing systems
provided only partial solutions to the problem (see Appendix 1).
There were several episodes in his effort to influence public
policy including the 1975 Sandilands Committee. As noted ear-
lier, this Committee favored a Current Cost Accounting system
and recommended an approach identified with the acronym
‘CCA,’ which Chambers had previously used for his theory. This
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‘theft’ [Clarke, 2000, p. 279] of his CCA nomenclature and rejec-
tion of his proposal did not stop Chambers from continuing to
promote his theory at official levels. Another public policy op-
portunity occurred in 1978 when Chambers, as the head of
Accounting Standards Review Committee, proposed changes to
accounting standards in Australia, following from his theory.
However, ease of application and cost-benefit tradeoffs favored
the selection of other means, such as indexing. Chambers’
somewhat indulgent analysis of this is found in an acronym
made from the latter portion of the title words of his paper
“NOD, COG, AND PUPU-See How Inflation Teases” [1975].
However, the superior rationality of CoCoA did not seem to be
the deciding factor in determining policy applications by regu-
lators and standard setters during this period.
Subsequent to the inflationary period of the 1970s, public
and professional interest in CoCoA and in inflation accounting
declined among many academics and professionals. So as to
understand the reasons behind the lack of official support for
CoCoA, one must understand the criticism that the theory faced
and the concerns that were raised about its validity.
Criticism Of CoCoA: One sign of a worthy theory is an abun-
dance of critics and CoCoA drew its fair share. Critics asserted
chiefly that CoCoA was inconsistent by allowing for different
valuation measures; contradicted the assumption of going con-
cern; underestimated the problem of limited availability of mar-
ket prices; and ignored the ‘other side’ of the balance sheet.
Chambers argued for the superiority of market selling
prices as the only appropriate means of measuring asset values.
However, in the early stages of his theory development, he had
accepted the use of current replacement costs for inventories
and index prices for some durables, due to his recognition of
the unavailability of market selling prices. It was never in-
tended to be a change of principle but only as an accommo-
dation. From the outset, Chambers made it clear that these
substitutes were approximations allowed only temporarily to
overcome practical difficulties [1966]. Shortly thereafter in
“Second Thoughts,” he clarified this issue and retracted support
for the use of all such approximations [1970].
Other critics of Chambers argued that his ideas contra-
dicted the going concern assumption. Given such an assump-
tion, changes in prices of assets, critics argued, should be dis-
regarded since assets are bought to be held over time and not
resold. They claimed that his accounting system was based on a
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liquidation value orientation, which would undervalue the
firm as an entity whose sum value is greater than its parts.
Chambers, on the other hand, argued that the going concern
assumption was widely misunderstood [1981]. Regardless of
the original intentions that firms have when acquiring new as-
sets, changes in technological and economic environments
would definitely influence the decision of keeping, discontinu-
ing, or replacing such assets. There is no acceptable justifica-
tion for assuming that when an asset is acquired, it must be
kept for its entire life. Assets are changed because business
plans are also changed in response to shifts in the environment.
To Chambers, a going concern assumption was based on the
firm’s ability to adapt to new environments and to survive in a
dynamic future. Such a concept implies that the firm will not
cease operations immediately, but that it may transform its
operations. Its future is not necessarily aligned with the prop-
erty or service life of assets, but with their usefulness to con-
temporary market needs. Further, Chambers pointed out that
there is a difference between market selling prices under duress
by creditors, e.g., in the case of liquidation, and market prices
under normal, day-to-day business conditions [1973]. CoCoA
does not assume that liquidation values are identical to current
market prices. Market prices can be, and normally are, ob-
tained from various sources during the normal course of busi-
ness. CoCoA requires periodic updates of assets’ values by con-
sulting newly obtained market information and the current
values of such assets.
Operating the CoCoA model in the face of unavailability of
market selling prices was, and continues to be, another area for
criticism. Chambers maintained and attempted to demonstrate
that market prices for most assets are discoverable [1971,
1973]. While some prices might be more easily obtainable than
others, he argued that firms have always been successful in
finding the prices of their assets when they persisted. Yet,
where CoCoA had failed to demonstrate itself effectively was in
the ability to make operational sufficient sources of market
value information to readily and inexpensively facilitate acces-
sion of exit values across a broad spectrum of asset classes
other than traded investment securities. Even with current ad-
vancements in information technology, it remains difficult to
immediately obtain market prices for, say, uniquely constructed
assets. Nonetheless, CoCoA, as a theory, Chambers insisted,
does not concern itself per se with how market prices are dis-
covered and thus should not be rejected on theoretical grounds,
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simply because issues of application are being developed or
resolved [1974].
While Chambers might have fully presented his case for the
‘left-side’ of the balance sheet, some critics argue that the right-
side received less attention and justification from Chambers.
Critics’ claims of possible inconsistency in Chambers’ treatment
of liabilities overlook basic assumptions of CoCoA. Assets and
liabilities should be stated at their monetary values. When such
values are not immediately available, they are approximated by
their money-equivalent values, i.e., market values. Liabilities
already have contractually stated monetary values and the
amounts that the firm owes to its vendors or bankers are imme-
diately determined. The firm does not have to revaluate the
cash it has on hand nor does it need to revaluate the loan it has
borrowed from the bank. Given that liabilities almost always
have explicit contractual monetary values, the explanation of
their treatment did not exhaust as much effort as the treatment
of non-monetary assets required.
Judging CoCoA: The fact that policy makers withheld official
support should not lead to the conclusion that CoCoA is logi-
cally invalid or irrelevant. Gaffikin’s [1989] analysis of Cham-
bers’ work concludes that that CoCoA’s rejection was the result
of other behavioral, political, philosophical and sociological
factors. The history of science suggests that paradigm shifts
and advancements of knowledge take extended periods of time
in overcoming the extant habits of thoughts. To fully under-
stand and appreciate Chambers’ significant contribution to the
accounting discipline may require us to admit for now that a
“lack of recognition seems to be the fate of the academic ahead
of his or her time” [Bedford, 1982, p. 113]. Also, our “history
might be too young” to provide for the understanding and ap-
preciation needed [Gaffikin, 1994, p. 1].
Despite evidence indicating general agreement on the rel-
evance of money equivalents for valuing non-monetary assets
[e.g., Chambers et al., 1987], Chambers knew that, ‘old habits
die hard’ [1970]. This difficulty had been well anticipated by
Chambers in the very early stages of the development of CoCoA.
He argued that, as in the case of medicine, advancements in
accounting might take time before they could be actually used
[1966, p. 3]. He never lost faith in the validity and future of his
theory. For instance, following the inflationary experience of
the 1970s he was asked if CoCoA would have a future. Cham-
bers replied, “Certainly” [English, 1989, p. 15]. However, his
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confidence about the future of his theory does not deny his
disappointment with how his ideas were received by others. He
appreciated that the logic presented in an argument does not
always guarantee its acceptance. For example, when comment-
ing on his experience with the Australian Society of Account-
ants, Chambers noted that “Over the sixteen years I served as a
councillor, I proposed many changes in the technical, educa-
tional and research business of the society; I can’t recall that
any one of them became adopted” [2000, p. 323].
From the analysis of Chambers’ work over the course of
five decades, one can observe two major themes. In the first,
Chambers used observations as a way to discover anomalies in
accounting theory and practice and then he introduced his
solution to such anomalies by the formulation and refinement
of CoCoA. This theme can be clearly seen in the subject matter
of his outputs during the first half of his career. In the second
half, another theme was reflected in his effort to gain accep-
tance for his position as well as to explore accounting history to
explain the development and persistence of conventional cost-
based accounting systems. Obviously, these two efforts overlap
and represent a natural transition in focus and emphasis. After
Chambers developed and refined his theory to his satisfaction,
he employed history not only to explain and justify the rational-
ity and legitimacy of CoCoA, but also to understand the reasons
behind its lack of endorsement. This major theme of Chambers’
work suggests a move in this analysis from Chambers the
theorist to Chambers the historian.
CHAMBERS THE HISTORIAN
Chambers has been internationally recognized as an emi-
nent theorist and dedicated researcher. However, his work as
an historian does not always receive similar attention. A signifi-
cant portion of Chambers’ work was devoted to employing case
study and historical material to demonstrate the validity of his
arguments.
Some of CoCoA’s critics accused Chambers of being ab-
stract, normative, and lacking empirical support. His first de-
fense argued that CoCoA was developed based on observations
of real world behavior and its objective was to solve actual day-
to-day problems. Chambers’ attempts to satisfactorily refute
such accusations included first “Evidence for a Market Selling
Price Accounting System” [1971] and then Securities and Ob-
scurities [1973], later republished under the title of Accounting
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in Disarray. Chambers provided ample evidence supporting the
conclusions of AEEB based on large collections of court cases,
governmental and professional inquiries, and reports of finan-
cially troubled companies in Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. A
common theme that Chambers found in these data was that
companies published financial statements that were “seriously
deficient in quality” and were based on accounting practices
that were “inadequate, uninformative, and obscurantist” [1973,
p. i]. He showed how cases of financial distress and corporate
failure were linked to misleading accounting practices and in-
sufficient financial reports. This was used to illustrate the dis-
satisfaction with the products of conventional accounting prac-
tices as well as to demonstrate the validity of his arguments and
the superiority of CoCoA over all alternative systems.
In more recent writings, Chambers used a great number of
references to textbook authors who over hundreds of years had
‘endorsed’ the use of current selling prices as the basis of valua-
tion [1989]. His investigation led him to conclude that “from
the time of Pacioli onwards there are bookkeeping manuals,
constitutive documents of partnerships and companies, and
judicial dicta, to the effect that assets were or were expected to
be presented by the currently dated market prices or selling
prices” [1991b, p. 14]. For example, in a 19th century case,
Chambers and Wolnizer [1991] found evidence that banking
partnership deeds for the period 1827-1843 either required the
use of current values or clearly proscribed asset’s valuation
based on original costs.
More importantly, Chambers dedicated a significant
amount of his most recent work to exploring the accounting
literature and investigating the development of conventional
cost-based accounting. During the early years of accounting
and well before the separation of ownership from management,
owners had shown a tendency towards keeping their financial
affairs secret from outsiders as well as from their employees.
This secrecy was presumed to enable owners to obtain a better
position in business negotiations. Chambers described this phe-
nomenon as the ‘cult of privacy’ [1987, p. 98]. Consequently,
owners used a dual system of accounting where two sets of
financial records were usually carried. First, a nominal ledger
was responsible for keeping track of all business transactions
with other merchants. Second, there was also concurrent un-
disclosed libro segreto, secret or private ledger, occasionally
containing locks and keys. The latter type of records had very
limited access and contained confidential information such as
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partners’ capital contributions and real or current values of the
business’ assets. Owners were able to extract a real and com-
plete view of their actual financial affairs by combining these
two sources of information. Therefore, Chambers argued that
current prices were in fact used, although not always explicitly,
as the basis for assessing the financial position of businesses
and their results of operation.
However, when the widely used form of public incorpo-
rated ownership emerged in the 19th century, this dual system
was abrogated and an intrusion to the traditional privacy of
owners occurred because of public ownership and information
rights related thereto. In order to meet the reporting require-
ments of public companies laws, only the available nominal
ledgers were used to produce published financial statements.
This was also the case given that, as businesses continued to
grow in size and complexity of operations, there was an in-
creasing reliance by managers and outsiders upon large
amounts of processed information. Accountants were not well
prepared for this fast shift from a dual system of accounting to
a more comprehensive one that would include the type of infor-
mation found in private ledgers. Perhaps for reasons of facility
alone, historical information became the dominant if not the
sole source of information used to prepare external financial
statements, whereas the information needed to extract the true
and fair view of the firm’s financial affairs became less com-
plete.
While accountants continued to keep nominal ledgers,
Chambers asserted that contemporary information that once
appeared in private ledgers became available only to one group
of users: professional management and other insiders. Given
that accounting is not intended to exclusively serve one group
of users, other users of accounting information deserve similar
contemporary information. This can be accomplished, Cham-
bers argued, through the use and disclosure of market selling
prices in the accounting system. Stated differently, a fair and
equal treatment of users requires that access to private infor-
mation which owners used to have and managers and other
insiders continue to have as to the contemporary aspects of an
accounting system should be provided to a broader set of users
to provide such a true and fair view of the business.
Furthermore, the laws of the 19th century which allowed
for the limited liability form of corporations demanded a price
for trading under this legal privilege by requiring the dis-
closure of all relevant information. The purpose was to provide
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additional protection to creditors whose risk increased greatly
with this new form of business. Such provisions, however, com-
pelled accountants and managers to become more conservative
when reporting financial statements in order to protect
themselves against possible lawsuits by creditors and share-
holders. Consequently, a tendency towards undervaluation of
assets resulted and was increasingly implied if not endorsed,
occasionally by judicial opinions. An example could be found
in the following court decision: “The purpose of the balance
sheet is primarily to show that the financial position of the
company is at least as good as there stated, not to show that it
is not or may not be better” [Buckley as cited in Chambers,
1989, p. 18].
Similarly, tax laws clearly influenced accounting practices
and how income was determined based on multiple arbitrary
methods that favored the convenience of cost-based valuation
at the expense of contemporary values. Also, rapid development
at the turn of the 19th century coupled with the increasing
complexity in business operations resulted in the limited
availability of market prices for unique capital-intensive, spe-
cialized assets especially in industries such as railroads. As a
result, U.K. companies legislation allowed companies in those
cases to use cost allocations in the determination of net income.
This provision was subsequently used to justify the application
of the same treatment to all other types of expenditures and
eventuated the increasing application of the cost doctrine
[1999a].
Chambers also identified ‘debt supposition’ as a contribut-
ing factor to the conventional use of cost-based accounting.
‘Personification’ of the accounts was practiced in early centu-
ries when accounting instructors illustrated the double entry
system by describing different ledger accounts as if they were
different persons having interrelationships among themselves
as accounts. As a result, the business was seen to be composed
of different persons: a cash person, an inventories person, a
stock person and so on. Collier illustrated this idea saying,
“These clerks mind their own business and do not interfere in
another’s department. Thus, if perchance ‘Goods’ received some
money, he instantly hands it over to ‘Cash’ because he himself
has no business with money” [cited in Chambers, 1994, p. 78].
Chambers argued that this approach, however, was later used
to associate asset valuation with their original costs. Later in
the eighteenth century, Donn, a mathematician, expanded this
approach in the following logic: “As I may expect to make of my
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goods as much as they cost me, they are in effect the same to
me as if their value was due to me from some person; and, as in
such case, that person would be debtor, so I may make the
goods in my possession debtor for their first cost” [cited in
Chambers, 1994, p. 78]. Therefore, subsequent valuation of as-
sets based on their original costs was followed based on the
assumption that assets could be valued as such ‘first costs.’ This
notion was later used to endorse the use of the cost doctrine in
accounting practices, especially with the official endorsement
of this approach by the company law, as discussed earlier. Also,
additional support for the cost-based accounting came from the
regulated accounting practices in utilities companies. A double
accounting system was prescribed for such companies where
capital was required to be kept at cost for monitoring and rate
setting purposes. Subsequently, this notion of valuing capital
expenditures at cost was further applied to other unregulated
companies, based on the authoritative support of such prac-
tices.
In sum, to Chambers the unambiguous message of this ex-
tensive investigation of accounting history refuted the widely
held assumption that cost-based accounting is a superior rule,
while accounting based on market selling prices was nothing
but an anomalous departure from this norm. Hence, Chambers
argued that conventional accounting practices based on the
cost-based doctrine should not be considered the only method
of traditional accounting. According to him, the term ‘conven-
tional accounting’ rather than ‘traditional accounting’ is more
descriptive to cost-based accounting systems. He also argued
that until relatively recently the cost doctrine did not actually
constitute an accepted accounting practice. For example, he
believed that:
It seems highly probable that the realization and cost
doctrines became entrenched in the pedagogical litera-
ture, and thence in practice, through the Tentative
Statement of Accounting Principles of the American
Accounting Association (1936), reinforced by the pro-
scription of upward revaluation by the SEC shortly
thereafter [1989, p. 13].
Further, Chambers’ work as an historian includes his im-
portant recent contribution to accounting literature, An Ac-
counting Thesaurus: 500 Years of Accounting [1995]. This semi-
nal work can be fairly described as his second magnum opus,
after his Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior. This
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‘Treasury of Accounting Thought,’ as Clarke [1996] appro-
priately prefers to describe it, represents a comprehensive
literature review of the development of accounting thought over
more than five centuries delivered in a well-designed, easy-to-
access structure. It also provides a valuable reference for ex-
ploring the historical development of meanings and the usage
of terms and concepts that are part of the existing accounting
literature. This collection of varying perspectives on a wide
variety of issues also provides a rich background that can en-
hance our appreciation of how accounting thought has devel-
oped. Indeed, this significant contribution to the accounting
literature is “a necessary aid to an intellectually curious and
inquiring mind in our discipline” [Previts, 1996, p. 115]. A peer-
less study, which has been less than a decade in print, it has
only begun to enter the employment of contemporary theorists
and historians.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Raymond J. Chambers was an eminent scholar, influential
theorist, prominent educator, dedicated researcher, and an im-
portant contributor to the study of the history of accounting
thought. His compassion for and commitment to his view of
our discipline led him to seek a more relevant theory of ac-
counting. His seminal contributions to accounting thought
stem from his effort to introduce a systematic approach to con-
struct a sound and consistent theory of accounting and replace
the popular dominant explanation which he demonstrated
against for providing less relevant accounting. In addition to his
criticism of conventional thinking of accounting, he sought to
understand and explain accounting in a multidisciplinary con-
text that recognizes the links between accounting and other
social disciplines.
We have argued that Chambers should be recognized not
only for his notable contributions to accounting thought but
also for his important contributions to accounting history. The
majority of non-historian accountants may perceive that the
demands for incorporating current values into accounting are a
relatively recent phenomenon. Chambers’ research established
evidence from centuries of accounting practices and a consider-
able number of references to refute this notion. This evidence
clearly shows the use of current prices to have been acceptable
business practice in much earlier times. He also explored ac-
counting history to better understand and explain the origins
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and development of cost-based accounting. Chambers showed
original cost-based valuation to be basically the product of
certain legal developments, tax laws, regulatory influences, and
recent corporate traditions. He was critical of describing the
cost-based accounting system as the traditional system of
accounting for it represents only one of several traditional
methods, including current value accounting.
In addition, we have argued that as the study of the history
of science would suggest, the validity and relevance of CoCoA
should not be considered disproved because of limited initial
acceptance. The rigorous development of this theory and its
conformity to real needs and decision values will continue to
warrant support and experimentation, and potentially will en-
sure greater understanding and then acceptance. The failure to
achieve official endorsement of CoCoA may be understood in
terms of three dimensions: its nature, timing, and misconcep-
tion. First, Chambers’ theory seemed revolutionary in nature
and required establishing a basis of support not easily won
from the dominant practice approach, especially from regula-
tors. For to adopt CoCoA would require gradual acceptance in a
discipline known for its reluctance to change, and an evolution-
ary approach conducive to incrementalism. Second, CoCoA
came into the literature in the late 1960s, a period that wit-
nessed the advent of market-based accounting research. This
new stream of research did not relate to Chambers’ work, and
consequently created a form of resistance to his ideas, espe-
cially as the former became increasingly dominant in academic
research in ‘leading’ U.S. scholarly journals and institutions.
Third, many misunderstood CoCoA thinking that it was merely
another inflation accounting alternative; hence, they believed
that once inflation abated, so did the need for CoCoA. However,
Chambers never intended CoCoA to be solely a solution to the
inflation issue. CoCoA is a comprehensive accounting system
and inflation was simply one of the many deficiencies that
CoCoA was capable of overcoming.
For now, the future of Chambers’ theory is unsettled-so
soon after the death of its principal advocate. It could be main-
tained that Chambers’ arguments in CoCoA are logically supe-
rior to those of other alternative systems and that its major
deficiency is that it lacks the facility of application. Yet one of
the aspects of his work that requires attention is the need to
continue a level awareness as advances in technology improve
the information base from which relevant contemporary data
are made available on global terms. The speed, ease, and low
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cost of more market price data will lead to increased opera-
tional application.
Another key issue is CoCoA’s treatment of knowledge assets
or intellectual capital. Chambers’ focus was on the valuation of
intangible assets, not simply additional descriptive disclosures
about them, as supported for example in the recent writings of
Arthur Levitt (e.g., [Levitt, 2001]). There is a fundamental
difference between making disclosures and performing valua-
tions. On the latter, Chambers’ views continue to be a valid
expression about the problem associated with current valuation
attempts for such asset items. Chambers’ theory recognizes the
value of assets only when they have obtainable market values;
thus, intellectual assets do not qualify as assets until their mar-
ket values can be established. He argued that intangible assets
are based on assumptions and hopes, rather than facts, and
thus should not be recognized in the balance sheet. While this
argument might have been less controversial in an industrial
economy during the 1950s and 1960s when CoCoA was devel-
oped, the role of intellectual capital and other intangibles has
become increasingly significant in the information-based, tech-
nology-oriented economy of the 21st century, and therefore
bodes well for overcoming objections based on such assets’ pri-
macy.
Finally, it is important to forestall Lee’s [2000] observation
that “To the large [number] of the accounting community . . .
[Chambers] was and is unknown except, perhaps, as a name
listed in a library index” [p. 71]. While our paper seeks to pro-
vide scholars and researchers with a survey discussion of
Chambers’ contributions to accounting literature as well as a
summary of several high points of accomplishment, a full study
of such contributions cannot, of course, be satisfied in a single
essay. It is hoped that with the newly established Chambers’
Archives at the University of Sydney, scholars will be attracted
to consider the manuscripts and materials now available at this
facility. For it will not be sufficient merely if Chambers is re-
called, but rather that his work is emulated and his contribu-
tions are understood. His significant work merits this well de-
served place as a fundamental theory, and as an important
element and contribution in our discipline’s history of thought.
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APPENDIX 1
Comparison of Five Accounting Systems
Dis- Replace-
Original Price counted ment CoCoA
Cost Level Value Cost
A1
Is it, in principle, a
double entry system? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A2
Are its transaction
inputs, in principle, facts? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Are its transformations
A3
(depreciation, inventory
valuations, etc.), in No No No Yes Yes
principle, facts?
A4
Are its transformed
magnitudes measures? No No No Yes Yes
A5
Are its transformed
magnitudes contemporary? No No Yes Yes Yes
Do its transformations
A6 give prompt effect to relative No No No Yes Yes
price changes?
Does it give a comprehensive
A7
history of relationships and
transactions of the firm? No No No No Yes
(Is it isomorphic?)
A8
Is aggregation of measures
of items logically possible? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Is it a representation of
facts, or, alternatively, does
A9 its theory provide for other No No No No Yes
ways of getting
contemporary facts?
. . . / continued
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B1
Are the results neutral as to
specific future actions? Yes Yes No No Yes
Are individual measures
B2 relevant at stated dates to No No No No Yes
choice or adaptation?
Is income a measure of
B3 general command of goods  No No No No Yes
and services?
Do magnitudes provide a
B4
basis for comparison of
present operations with No No No No Yes
future potential variants?
B5
Is a valid current ratio
given? No No No No Yes
B6
Is a valid debt to equity
ratio given? No No No No Yes
Is a valid rate of return
given? (Is rate of return
B7
comparable with rates of
return on pure money No No No No Yes
contracts and other
opportunities?)
B8
Are interfirm comparisons
of ratios valid? No No No Yes Yes
Do balance sheets and
income accounts fairly
B9 present positions at stated No No No No Yes
dates and changes between
those dates?
Source: Chambers, R. (1967), “Foundations of Financial Accounting,” Berkeley
Symposium on the Foundations of Financial Accounting (Berkeley:
University of California): 26-44.
Comparison of Five Accounting Systems / . . . continued
Dis- Replace-
Original Price counted ment CoCoA
Cost Level Value Cost
39
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2001, Vol. 28, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2001
Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 28, No. 2
December 2001
Richard K. Fleischman
JOHN CARROLL UNIVERSITY
and
David Oldroyd
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE
AN IMPERIAL CONNECTION?
CONTRASTING ACCOUNTING
PRACTICES IN THE COAL MINES OF
NORTH-EAST ENGLAND AND NOVA
SCOTIA, 1825-1900
Abstract: The archives of the General Mining Association (GMA), a
London-based enterprise with substantial holdings in the Nova
Scotian coal-mining industry during the 19th century, are investi-
gated in this paper. The historical record was examined with par-
ticular reference to the degree to which industrial costing tech-
niques were transplanted via engineers/managers within the British
Empire. The findings support the hypothesis that linkages to
Newcastle were evident in Canadian coal mining, but that the ac-
counting emphases differed somewhat between the two locales. In
Nova Scotia, there was a great attention to day-to-day expense con-
trol. A similar concern was apparent also in the North-East of En-
gland, but here there appeared the additional sophistications of
costing capital improvement projects and estimating the profitabil-
ity of new workings. With regard to labor, the managers of the
GMA’s Canadian operations, like their counterparts in the North-
East Coalfield, seemed disinterested in tracking the efficiency and
productivity of individual miners. We hypothesize that this inatten-
tion typified an environment wherein labor was scarce and employ-
ment alternatives existed for the work force.
Acknowledgments: The authors express gratitude for funding support
from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and
Andersen, LLP without which this research could not have been undertaken.
We would also acknowledge the generous help provided by the archival staffs
at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia (Halifax) and the Beaton Institute
(Sydney, Cape Breton Island). Helpful comments from AHJ reviewers, Stephen
Walker, and Trevor Boyns have focused this paper significantly.
Submitted July 2000
Revised January 2001
Revised March 2001
Accepted March 2001
40
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/12
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200132
INTRODUCTION
The types of costing information utilized by the General
Mining Association (GMA) in the Nova Scotian coal industry
during the 19th century are detailed in this paper. As an absen-
tee owner situated in London, the GMA required a flow of ac-
counting information in order to manage its substantial proper-
ties, particularly the Sydney Colliery on Cape Breton Island,
Nova Scotia.1 Comparisons were made to findings, both pub-
lished and unpublished, which the authors have advanced from
earlier archival research into north-east coal mining during the
industrial revolution in Britain [Fleischman and Parker, 1997;
Fleischman and Macve, 2001; Oldroyd, 1996, 1999]. The GMA
archive was examined with reference to the additional question
of whether or not costing methods were exported across the
Atlantic because of the imperial connection resulting from
Canada’s position within the British Empire.
A DEVELOPING LITERATURE
Our study of the transfer of accounting techniques within
an empire is explored through the example of the coal industry.
From the British perspective, there is a rapidly emerging litera-
ture on coal-mining accounting during the 19th century. Stud-
ies focused on the first half-century during which the industrial
revolution in Britain was running its course include Edwards et
al. [1995], Edwards and Newell [1994], Fleischman and Macve
[2001], Fleischman and Parker [1997], McLean [1997], and
Wale [1989a]. Works by Boyns [1993], Boyns and Edwards
[1997], Boyns and Wale [1996], Edwards et al. [1995], and Wale
[1989a, b] have commenced the process by which the second
half-century is now under the scrutiny of accounting historians.
These investigations complement earlier work by economic his-
torians, including Bulman and Redmagne [1951], Church
[1986], Flinn [1984], Harris [1976], Hirsch and Hausman
[1983], Mendlicott [1981], Rowe [1923], and Walters [1975].
The above-mentioned works run the gamut from limited
investigations of individual coal-mining enterprises, to regional
studies of various U.K. locales, to national surveys. For the pur-
1All Canadian collieries mentioned are located in Nova Scotia. Sydney,
Low Point Barrasois, Bridgeport, Lingan, Cornhill, Point Aconi, Spanish River,
and Victoria are all situated on Cape Breton Island. Albion in the Pictou
Coalfield and Joggins and Springhill in the Cumberland Coalfield are on the
Nova Scotian peninsula.
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poses of the comparison to Nova Scotian mining undertaken
here, the authors propose to concentrate on Tyneside2  opera-
tions, in the Great North Coalfield centered on Newcastle. Cost-
ing at the collieries of the Great North coal measures stood at
the forefront of practice in Britain. Access to London via the
sea made Northumberland, Durham, and Newcastle the largest
and best-developed coalfield in Britain from the 17th century
[Ashton and Sykes, 1964, p. 194; McCord, 1979, p. 36]. Accord-
ing to Flinn and Stoker [1984, p. 18], the north-east’s collieries
enjoyed a high reputation for technical progress and business
organization, techniques that mine owners elsewhere copied.
Potentially the greatest contribution of the region to the histori-
cal development of costing practice was in the dissemination of
knowledge by Tyneside viewers (mining engineers/managers).
Among the tasks they performed was the provision of cost data
for forecasting the profitability of mine workings and for evalu-
ating the relative advantages of capital improvement projects. A
body of costing practice was already well developed on
Tyneside by the 1730s [Oldroyd, 1996]. As the 18th and 19th
centuries progressed, the notability and expertise of particular
viewers caused them to be surrounded by schools of appren-
tices, who in turn moved out from Tyneside to other regions,
countries, and related industries, such as iron and lead [Flinn
and Stoker, 1984, pp. 57-59; Hiskey, 1979, pp. 8-9]. Tyneside
viewers were, for example, employed on the Duke of Norfolk’s
estates in South Yorkshire [Medlicott, 1981, pp. 183-188]. They
also prepared costings for the Bowes family’s lead-smelting
operations in County Durham [Oldroyd, 1999, p. 191].
Recent studies of Tyneside accounting techniques include
those of McLean [1997], who examined the costing records of
the Tanfield Moor Colliery in County Durham, 1800-1850, and
Oldroyd [1996, 1999], who looked at the earlier records of the
aristocratic coal cartel in the north-east known as the “Grand
Allies.” Both authors found evidence of sophisticated costing
practice, which directly assisted management in a range of
activities, including decision making. Fleischman and Parker’s
[1997, p. 115] subsequent research revealed a level of sophisti-
cation in north-east colliery costings during the industrial
2One reviewer has noted that “Tyneside” as used in this paper is not geo-
graphically accurate since County Durham does not front the River Tyne.
However, we have maintained the term to be consistent with the labeling in
Fleischman and Parker [1997] and Fleischman and Macve [2001].
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revolution that transcended what they had found in other Brit-
ish industries, such as textiles and iron.
Given the volume of research on British coal mining in the
second half of the 19th century, the issue might be raised that
these materials would afford a better contrast to Nova Scotian
developments because of a greater chronological correspon-
dence, notwithstanding the overlap between the formative
period prior to 1850 and previous research on Tyneside. How-
ever, there are numerous reasons why somewhat earlier
Tyneside methods are more directly pertinent even apart from
the obvious perspective that the authors’ expertise in this region
is derived from primary source material. As Fleischman and
Parker [1997, ch. 5] and Fleischman and Macve [2001] have
endeavored to demonstrate, mining techniques in North-East
England were quite different from other U.K. venues. These
differences, not to be restated here in great detail, include the
use of the “bord and pillar” method of mining as distinct from
the “longwall,” the utilization of direct hire rather than the
“butty system” (subcontracting) for labor recruitment, and the
managerialism of the “viewers” to a much greater extent than
elsewhere. These inheritances were reflected in Nova Scotian
mining operations as the following pages will attempt to detail.
Aside from these aspects of the industry’s basic structure, there
were a number of other similarities between north-eastern and
Nova Scotian coal mining. As Brown [1871, p. 82] pointed out,
the coal mined in Nova Scotia was closer to the Tyneside prod-
uct in terms of combustibility, carbon content, and ash residue.
Mining depths were great at both venues, at least post-1854 in
the case of Sydney, mandating large capital expenditure. Coal
mining in the Newcastle vicinity and Nova Scotia was not
linked to a native iron industry as elsewhere in the U.K., giving
rise to the expectation that greater attention would be paid to
distribution networks, particularly overseas transport.3  In both
North-East England and Nova Scotia, the industry was im-
pacted by external control mechanisms — in Canada it was
governmental control, while on Tyneside it was the coal-own-
ers’ cartel.
Work by Boyns et al. [1997a, b] has not only featured com-
parative archival research for the U.K. and France, but has also
3Trevor Boyns has pointed out to us that post-1860, the South Wales coal
industry’s growth depended more upon expanded export than the local iron
industry. Hence, subsequent to that date, owners might have been expected to
pay greater attention to distribution networks.
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urged that accounting and business historians follow the lead.
Variously they have suggested that “the need for such work
[comparative accounting history] is receiving increased recog-
nition,” that comparative history is a “valid methodological
tool,” and that accounting historians should begin to think be-
yond the box of their own native methodologies [Boyns et al.,
1997b, pp. 7, 8, 13]. It is within this framework that the follow-
ing study is undertaken, but with the additional parameter that
the imperial connection aided and abetted the spread of ac-
counting. We are also following the lead of Boyns et al. [1997a,
b] in focusing on what they defined as “industrial” accounting.
Our emphasis here is more specifically directed toward costing,
although we do touch upon the financial reporting necessitated
by the GMA’s absentee ownership of its Nova Scotian mining
operations.
There has been a wealth of recent literature on the export
of British accounting structures to former colonies [Annisette,
1999; Briston and Kedslie, 1997; Carnegie and Parker, 1999;
Chua and Poullaos, 1998; Parker, 1994]. However, the emphasis
of this research has been limited to the transfer of accounting
professionalization. Within the context of the 20th century,
Briston and Kedslie [1997, p. 194] wondered the degree to
which the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
attempted to export “its training, educational and examining
processes.” Pre-20th century accounting links between metro-
polis and periphery are featured in work by Carnegie [1997],
Neu [1999], and Spraakman [1999], but this literature does
not deal with the export of industrial accounting methods.
Even though Canada was identified by Parker [1994, p. 609]
as an “active importer” of accounting exports from the U.K.,
we have not seen any research that focuses on costing issues.
Vent and Milne [1997] have done a comparative study of
precious metals mining, but since the mines were American
and Australian, the impact of an imperial connection would
not have been present. This paper proposes to begin an exami-
nation of these linkages.
Two main archives were visited. The Public Archives of
Nova Scotia (PANS) in Halifax houses mineral and mining
records, 1800-1868, as well as the Richard Brown collection.
The Beaton Institute (BI) at the University College of Cape
Breton in Sydney contains the records of the GMA, 1827-1901.
Additionally, comparative data were obtained from the Carlisle
Record Office (CRO), housing the estate records of the
Lowthers of Whitehaven, and the Northumberland Record
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Office (NRO), which contains the records of the North of
England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers.
Narrating the story of the Sydney Mines is greatly facili-
tated by the longevity of key personnel, both in Nova Scotia and
the GMA in London. The Richard Browns, father and son,
served in an unbroken tenure of some 70-odd years as manag-
ers of the mines. Similarly, J.B. Foord and C.E. Swann served
for most of the century as Secretaries to the GMA proprietors.
The paper proceeds with a brief historical overview of the
history of the GMA’s coal-mining operations in Nova Scotia,
followed by an extensive analysis of the surviving accounting
records. Featured here are sections on expense control, capital
estimations, regulation, and accounting for labor. The paper
concludes with an assessment of the perceived linkages be-
tween Nova Scotian and Tyneside coal-mining practice.
THE GMA IN NOVA SCOTIA: AN OVERVIEW, 1826-1901
The systematic exploitation of coal in Nova Scotia began
with the formation of the GMA in 1826. Coal had been mined in
the province since at least 1715, but the early proprietors had
insufficient capital to engage in large-scale operations [Brown,
1871, pp. 100-101; Martell, 1945]. The GMA was formed by the
jewelry firm, Rundell, Bridge & Co., which acquired a 60-year
monopoly over all of the province’s mineral rights in commu-
tation of the debts of Prince Frederick, Duke of York. The mo-
nopoly only lasted 30 years as the GMA agreed to its revocation
on December 31, 1857 in return for a new lease of its existing
holdings on preferential terms. The company also reserved the
right to expand into designated new sites [Brown, 1871, pp.
100-110; McKay, 1983, p. 20; Wylie, 1997, p. 15].
The Earl of Lowther must have had connections with the
company as it was at his behest that one of his stewards, Rich-
ard Brown, was sent to examine and report on the coal mines
in Cape Breton Island. Brown had trained as a viewer in the
Earl’s coal mines in Westmorland, England, a county heavily
influenced by Newcastle practice. In Canada he became man-
ager of the Sydney Mines and chief engineer of the whole op-
eration. As the paper will relate, Newcastle viewers did
consultancy work for the Lowther estates and were well known
to Brown. It is probably through these connections, plus the
fact that the north-east was internationally renowned for its
mining expertise, that the London-based company also em-
ployed them in Canada. The GMA’s lack of previous mining
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experience is probably significant; there would be an incentive
to hire the best people for this enterprise, taking into account
the scale of the investment.
In his later book, Brown [1871, p. 91] noted that the chief
objective of the GMA was to establish an extensive trade with
the U.S. In 1827, 20% of the coal consumed in Boston and New
York came from Great Britain, 34% from Pennsylvania, and
46% from Virginia [Brown, 1871, p. 93]. The GMA was unsuc-
cessful in its attempts to penetrate this market, partly due to
the opening of the Schuylkill Canal in 1825, which provided
Pennsylvanian coal with an outlet to the sea. The company was
also impeded by U.S. trade tariffs that were only temporarily
relaxed between 1854-1866 [Forsey, 1926, p. 5; Macnutt, 1965,
p. 215]. Most of the GMA’s expansion was fed by increased
demand from the Canadian provinces. Coal production under
the GMA expanded from about 20,000 tons per year in 1825 to
about 100,000 tons in the 1850s. The period following the
rescission of the GMA’s monopoly saw the largest increase,
with production in Nova Scotia rising from about 600,000 tons
in 1867 to 8 million tons in 1913. New entrepreneurs were
attracted into the market, with most of the investment coming
from Britain, the U.S., and Montreal, resulting in a decline of
the relative position of the GMA [McKay, 1983, p. 13; Wylie,
1997, pp. 15-16]. The GMA sold its interests in Pictou to the
Halifax Coal Company in 1872 and the Sydney Mines to the
Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company in 1901. The Sydney
Mines in Cape Breton and the Albion Mines in Pictou were the
GMA’s major holdings, but there were also secondary workings
at Bridgeport, Lingan, Joggins, and elsewhere [McKay, 1983, p.
18]. Despite the large number of operations, Sydney was the
flagship installation and the focal point of most surviving
accounting records. It is to this archival material that we now
turn.
THE COMPARATIVE ACCOUNTING RECORD
In this section, the accounting practices of the GMA will be
considered across four parameters: expense control, capital
estimations, regulation, and accounting for labor. Comparisons
will be made to corresponding techniques found in north-
eastern coal mines during the industrial revolution.
Expense Control: From the outset, the Directors of the GMA
were interested in economy. In a report to the GMA’s Directors
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in 1834, John Buddle, the foremost Tyneside viewer, empha-
sized the need for economy [NRO: 3410/BUD/19/270]. When
Brown, Jr. was appointed to succeed his father in March 1864,
Foord, on behalf of the GMA, emphasized this responsibility:
. . . hence it becomes of the utmost importance that the
cost of raising and shipping it [coal] should be reduced
as low as possible. Your recent visit to the Collieries of
the North of England, and the practical information
you have doubtless acquired in those Collieries where
economy is studied as closely as possible, will enable
you to apply that information with advantage in your
future management of the Sydney Mines, so far as it
might be  susceptible of solid and useful improvement
[PANS: MG1/158/37].
In 1880, when Brown’s managerial duties were extended to the
Low Point Barrasois and Lingan Mining Company, he agreed to
the following covenant:
Brown shall and will at all times observe the strictest
economy in all expenses he may incur on account of
the said company and keep or cause to be kept just and
true accounts of all his receipts, payments, transac-
tions, and dealings on account of the said Company
[PANS: MG1/158/35-36].
While these contractual statements have the ring of boilerplate
verbiage, the Browns apparently believed that expense control
was an utmost responsibility. In 1870, Brown, Sr. wrote to his
son, congratulating him for reducing costs at Sydney and opin-
ing that “. . . the cost of working is the grand test of the compe-
tence of the manager and will speak for him in the strongest
language” [PANS: MG1/151/109].
The desire to reduce costs was reflected in the costing pro-
cedures adopted. Expenses were analyzed monthly and yearly
and subjected to ex post rationalization. The system went be-
yond the tracking of expenditure and constituted a genuine sys-
tem of cost control, the basis of which was the calculation of
unit cost. R.H. Bridge, who is described in one of the docu-
ments as “accountant,” forwarded a retrospective estimate of
the cost per ton at the Sydney Mines for March 1870 to Foord.
In the letter, he referred to similar reports for January and
February, indicating regular monthly returns. Bridge also sent
Foord an annual return of the cost per ton at the Sydney Mines
for 1869 [BI: MG1419/83-110-1870/D8c]. Another annual return
has survived for the Albion Mines in 1841. Here, the annual
expenditure was analyzed and grouped under subheadings of
47
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2001, Vol. 28, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2001
39Fleischman and Oldroyd: An Imperial Connection?
raising charges, shipping charges, new works, and royalties.
The various shipping charges were divided by the numbers of
chaldrons shipped, whereas the other charges were divided by
the number of chaldrons raised, the sum producing a grand
total. The chaldron was a traditional output measure based on
the volume of a coal wagon. This particular report was desig-
nated number 15, indicating that it was part of a sequence
[PANS: RG1/463/46].
A complete set of monthly cost returns has survived for the
Albion Mines for June 1868 in the papers of Thomas E. Forster,
the Newcastle viewer [NRO: 3410/FOR/3/2/131]. As well as in-
cluding inventories of plant and analyses of employees and
rates of pay, these returns provided a detailed analysis of the
monthly expenditure converted into unit cost. The average cost
per ton for each expense was listed beside the average cost per
ton for the year to date and the average cost per ton to the same
point in the previous year. The report also included a summary
of the cost per ton of the various expenses for each of the five
previous years. Correspondence in August 1868 between
Brown, Jr. and Foord indicates that by this time the company
was using pro-forma cost sheets designed by Forster. Brown
complained that Forster’s monthly cost-per-ton sheets were
more detailed than those which the company had used previ-
ously [NRO: 3410/FOR/3/2/140]. The fact that this letter was
also found among Forster’s papers shows that Foord must have
sent it to Forster for his comments.
The 1870s saw an upsurge in costing activity at Sydney.
Comparative costings per ton for the Sydney and Lingan Mines
for 1872 were carried to tenths of a cent [PANS: MG1/159/52].
Perhaps the surviving record most reflective of sophisticated
costing is an 1874 document of Brown, Jr. in which he calcu-
lated the price of sales necessitated at various production levels.
First, Brown reckoned that the “fixed charges” for a relevant
range from 75,000 to 150,000 tons amounted to $62,972. He
then calculated the unit cost per ton at different levels to which
he added a variable cost component of $0.97. To generate the
profit required, Brown established a per-ton price ranging from
$2.75 at the 75,000 tons volume level to $2.00 at 150,000 tons.
He then performed a sensitivity analysis on the impact of a
$0.50 price advance per ton [PANS: MG1/159/75].
Correspondingly, the calculation of unit cost in the Tyne-
side coal industry had a long ancestry. In a letter to the Duke of
Northumberland in 1617, Hugh Bird computed the unit cost of
working and leading (overground haulage) Newburn Colliery
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[Hatcher, 1993, p. 265]. By 1730, unit cost calculations were
common practice in the region [Oldroyd, 1996]. There are
strong indications that the types of calculation which had been
devised on Tyneside in the 17th and 18th centuries were still
being practiced in the British coal industry in the nationaliza-
tion era following World War Two. They certainly featured in
government statistics showing the unit cost, unit selling price,
and unit profit for the industry as a whole and in the pro-forma
costing forms used by individual collieries in the 1940s and
1950s. They were remarkably similar in design to the ones de-
vised by Forster for the GMA some 80 years previously [Bulman
and Redmayne, 1951, pp. xxiii-xxiv, 116, 121; Clement, 1951,
pp. 38-41].
The pattern of survival of costing documents in Nova
Scotia is sporadic, with high points occurring in the 1840s,
1870s, and 1890s. Whether this pattern reflects the creation of
records or is merely a function of the vagaries of record survival
is difficult to tell. In some cases the peaks do correspond to
initiatives taken by particular officials.
In 1842, one George Wightman was sent to investigate the
GMA mining operations and to write a report on why the
Albion Mines were suffering losses [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3,
folder of materials 1841-1856]. Wightman concluded that losses
on land speculation (£7000), dead stocks of materials and stores
(£1750), unnecessary expenditures on the works (£43,470 —
mostly a vastly overpriced railroad and superfluous housing),
an annual loss occasioned by the faulty arrangement of the coal
yard (£1000), and excessive labor costs (50% more than neces-
sary) were to blame.
The second great wave of costing activity came in the
1870s, occasioned by the appointment of Jonathan Rutherford
as General Manager of the GMA holdings in 1872 and the
Swann visitations at the end of the decade. At this time there
appears in the archive a detailed record of expenditures on a
new winning at Sydney with columns for costs incurred
through to the end of 1872 and 1873 respectively [PANS: MG1/
159/62]. As was the case in the Newcastle region, managers
were concerned about the relative efficiency of horses and ma-
chinery [Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. In 1869, James Hudson,
a resident viewer trained in the U.K., complained to Cunard
and Morrow, the GMA’s Halifax agents, that at the Joggins
Mine the number of horses to tons raised (13 horses for 8,000-
8,500 tons annually) was proving too costly [PANS: RG21/A/Vol.
3]. The GMA’s proprietors were informed in the report for 1877
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that a reduction in the number of horses and associated human
handlers in favor of underground hauling machinery saved ap-
proximately £35-£40 per horse annually [BI: MG1419/91-68-
2690/G/9]. Notwithstanding this concern, Brown, Sr. noted to
Jr. in March 1877 that greater attention should be paid to cost
on a monthly basis, citing as evidence the gross fluctuation in
annual horse upkeep charges ($74 in 1871, $106 in 1872)
[PANS: MG1/151/282].
Swann’s tenure as GMA Secretary had a positive impact on
the volume of expense control reports. In 1878, the year of
Swann’s first visit to Nova Scotia, E.W. Scovell, Chair of the
Board of Directors, reported how production costs had declined
as a result of working a new winning rather than the Queen Pit
and the considerable reductions in other expense categories the
Directors had enforced at the mines [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H,
1878]. In the same year, it was further reported that Swann had
affected many economies and that he should return to Nova
Scotia frequently [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G/9, 1878]. A report
for 1880 chronicled another visit in which Swann reportedly
went over every item of expenditure with Brown, Jr. [G/11,
1880].
Although the annual reports to the GMA became extremely
sketchy in the 1890s, the last decade of ownership, and rarely
transcended barebones financial statements, certain of the ex-
pense control documents reflected a growing maturity. In 1896,
Swann was provided with an estimate for a new winning with
calculations of the expenses associated with 11⁄2 years of prov-
ing the coal seam and three years production at 100 tons and
upward per day. There were 33 expense categories [PANS:
MG1/159/98]. There was also an 1894 cost comparison of filling
orders in summer and winter. From July - September, when
raising costs alone impacted upon the cost of production, the
cost was 70.111¢ per ton. In winter (February-April), when
banking was an additional factor, the cost was 72.049¢. The
improvement in expense control at Sydney over time is seen
rather dramatically in a comparison of an 1860 and an 1897
abstract of production costs presented as Exhibits 1 and 2. The
differences in detail and the number of data categories are im-
mediately apparent.4
4Boyns [1993, pp. 336-337] demonstrated how the cost sheets at the Powell
Duffryn Colliery in South Wales reflected a more detailed breakdown of costs
in the period 1871-1913. New categories of cost were related to technological
innovations.
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EXHIBIT 1
Abstract of Production Costs, Sydney Mines, 1860
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EXHIBIT 2
Abstract of Production Costs, Sydney Mines, 1895
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The simple act of increasing the number of cost categories
does not in and of itself guarantee that managers utilized the
expanded data for more effective cost control. Typically ar-
chives do not contain the evidence to provide such assurances.
In this case, however, the detailed nature of the GMA’s cost
records, together with the inclusion of comparative data for
previous periods, indicates that the costs incurred were sub-
jected to ex post rationalization, which is confirmed in the sur-
viving correspondence and comparisons of actual to budget. A
letter in February 1869 from Forster to Foord began:
I have gone carefully through the various cost sheets of
the Mines belonging to the General Mining Associa-
tion, which you forwarded to me, and as far as I am
able to judge from a consideration of the figures given,
I think the increase in the working charges has arisen
from the following causes: [NRO: 3410/FOR/3/2/140].
He then proceeded to discuss the major items, with suggestions
about how they might be reduced. A statement for the Albion
Mines in June 1842 computed the cost saving that would have
arisen in the month had the work force been paid at the same
rates as at Sydney. The situation was reviewed again in Febru-
ary 1843 when the actual labor cost saving was calculated at
£431, which over 12 months was expected to reduce the cost of
coal by nearly 2s a chaldron. The document also analyzed the
“proposed reductions not carried out,” totaling £38.8s.7d, and
found additional cuts of £78.4s.6d over and above the ones pro-
posed by Brown, Sr. This analysis is the most detailed we have
seen in the GMA archive in terms of both the number of cost
reductions undertaken and the narrative provided to explain
and justify the cuts [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 7, folder of materials
1842-1866].
In summation, there seems ample evidence of managerial
attempts to control expenses. It appears that the Board of
Directors in London were willing to be proactive in overseeing
this phase of operations. One or two surviving letters indicate
that the London-based Directors felt at a disadvantage because
of the distances involved [see, for example, Foord’s letter to
Brown, Sr. of November 1849, BI: MG1419/82-42-1512/D9e].
The culmination came in 1878 with the first of Secretary
Swann’s “secret visits” that, for a while at least, became annual
events. The Browns looked upon intrusion by the Directors as
an irritant. In 1870, Brown, Sr. wrote to his son advising him to
keep his responses to the Directors’ requests for information
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simple as he doubted their ability to comprehend details. He
also urged his son to communicate expenses in pounds sterling
as they would appear less than if stated in dollars [PANS: MG1/
151/106]. In another letter of November 1877, perhaps in re-
sponse to Brown, Jr.’s complaints about the intrusion of
Swann into mine affairs, Brown, Sr. pointed out that Foord, as
GMA Secretary, had been his cross to bear, and complained
that the Secretaries attempted to justify their positions by in-
vestigating trifling matters of expense (“ascertainments”)
[PANS: G1/151/300].
Capital Estimates: While the 1870s saw a heightened attention
to expense control of daily operations, what was not evident
were accounting records relating to Sydney’s obvious competi-
tive shortcoming: the absence of an adequate distribution
network. The Sydney operation did not have a fleet of coal
carriers, as did some of its competitors. The 1871 annual report
to the proprietors identified the “shipping problem,” that the
buyers had to supply their own vessels while other mining en-
terprises were delivering coal [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G/2].
The 1873 report urged the construction of a new wharf to
accommodate steamers [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G/4]. In
Rutherford’s first report as General Manager in Nova Scotia,
he averred that he had not yet had time to bring his attention
to bear on production costs as he was dealing with distribu-
tion problems [BI: MG1419/91-68-2680/H, 1872]. In light of
this documented, high-priority difficulty, one might expect to
see in the archive estimates for dredging, wharf improvement,
ship procurement and alternative transport. There is virtually
nothing of this genre, giving rise to our thought that capital
improvements were not a focus of the accounting system.
The archive was not totally devoid of capital project esti-
mates, however. One of the best examples was prepared in
March 1834 by D. Hoard, a Newcastle viewer. Hoard was one of
Buddle’s associates, and his computation was appended to a
report by Buddle on the construction of a new railway at
Sydney. The point at issue was whether to ship coal from the
existing quay at North Sydney or a new one at Bar Harbor.
Hoard costed the Bar Harbor link and calculated the relative
cost saving of the shorter route [NRO: 3410/BUD/19/227].
Homegrown examples of a similar genre include a technology
proposal (unauthored, but probably by Brown, Jr.) in 1882, in
which it was pointed out to Swann that Sydney had spent
$9333.48 on drawing and pumping water alone. A new engine
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costing $8651.68 would save $1726.20 per annum in working
and $700 on repairs [PANS: MG1/159/59]. Brown, Sr. sent an
estimate to Foord in May 1860 of the cost of opening pits at
Cornhill, along with the cost of a branch railroad [PANS: MG1/
159/17b]. There was a reasonable amount of detail about the
various cost items associated with these projects, but his esti-
mates still fell short of the capital improvement estimates made
on Tyneside a generation earlier. Brown sent the GMA’s Board
of Directors an estimate for a new colliery at Low Point in the
early 1870s, totaling £27259 [PANS: MG1/159/54a, b]. Items
that would have been broken down in Newcastle included
“materials of all kinds in pit £3140” and “labor £1370.” Contin-
gencies were given at 20%, twice the “fudge factor” typical of
Tyneside costings of capital projects.
If focusing on expense control was possibly a function of
absentee ownership, is there an explanation as to why account-
ing for capital improvements, particularly in transportation,
was in a nascent state of development compared to practice in
the vicinity of Newcastle?5  It is difficult to tell as the mines in
Nova Scotia appear to have had access to the same range of
technical and accounting expertise as in Tyneside, although the
relative concentration of expertise in England compared to
Canada was probably a factor. Resident viewers, often trained
in England, such as Brown, Sr., Scott, or Hudson were in place
in the mines at Albion and Sydney, while general viewers from
England acted as consultants. This was the pattern employed at
the Earl of Lowther’s estates in England from whence Brown,
Sr. came, although in other situations, such as the Londonderry
estates in County Durham, general viewers such as Buddle were
in residence or acted as partners in mining enterprises. The
greater depth of the Tyneside coal mines, at least until 1854
when the Queen Pit was opened at Sydney, and the more sub-
stantial distances of access to water transport may have occa-
sioned a greater attention to capital expenditure projects. Also,
the Newcastle-area viewers, who performed a variety of cost
accounting functions, may have been more interested in “big-
ger-picture” items than daily expense control. Absentee owner-
ship might have influenced differential agency patterns and the
nature of the accounting data required. Another possibility is
5See Fleischman and Parker [1997, pp. 121, 125, 131] for a discussion of
appraising the relative advantages of capital improvement projects and esti-
mating the profitability of new workings on Tyneside.
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the difference in competitive environments prior to 1858 when
the GMA’s monopoly ceased. In Britain, coal mining was
extremely competitive throughout the 19th century, and tech-
nology provided the key to accessing more coal at greater
depths at lesser cost, as well as reducing the cost of trans-
portation. In Nova Scotia, the GMA’s position was not seriously
challenged until the second half of the century when its relative
fortunes declined. Falling profit margins as a consequence of
increased competition have been traditionally portrayed in the
literature as an impetus to better costing systems [Solomons,
1952, p. 19].
Regulation: Another feature of Nova Scotian coal mining was
the large amount of internal management data required by the
provincial government. As lessor of the province’s mineral
rights (in the U.K. the mineral rights belonged to the land-
owner), the provincial government had an interest in the mines
being managed efficiently to maximize its royalties and to pre-
serve the mines’ future operating capability. While it is assumed
that British landowners were profit maximizers in terms of
royalties from their coal leases, they could not command the
volume of information solicited by the government.6  For this
reason, the GMA was obliged to submit an annual survey of the
state of the operations, and the government’s Inspector of
Mines had full access to the mine workings [PANS: RG1/461/
123]. For instance, surveys have survived for the Joggins and
Albion Mines in 1859 that give details of location, seams,
method of access, shafts, depth, levels from the shafts, drifts,
overground railways, winding gear, wharves, buildings, and
steam engines [PANS: RG1/461/106, 198]. Analyses of sales and
employees were also required on an annual basis. In 1846, for
example, returns were prepared of the quantity and value of
coal raised and sold during the year from the Albion, Sydney,
and Bridgeport Mines, sub-analyzed by market (U.S., neighbor-
ing colonies, and home consumption) and by size of coals
[PANS: RG1/461/3-4]. There are many similar examples cover-
ing a wide range of years. The analysis by markets shows that
6We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for AHJ who informed us that
the British government began to require data from collieries regarding employ-
ment and output, commencing in 1872. Apparently the amount of information
solicited increased over time. In the case of Nova Scotia, there was a quantum
leap in the required data between the 1840s and the 1870s, but returns for the
1880s and 1890s have not survived in the archives.
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the purpose of this information went beyond the calculation of
royalties (royalties were based on total output). The survival of
various time series, such as a statement of coal shipped to the
U.S. in the years 1830, 1840, 1850, and 1855, suggests that the
main interest of the government in these returns was to moni-
tor the industry’s development [PANS: RG1/461/121]. The gov-
ernment also seems to have had a demographic interest in the
industry, hence the requirement for the GMA to submit annual
returns of the average numbers of persons employed at each
mine during the two preceding years [PANS: RG1/461/123].
These returns listed the average numbers of men and boys by
occupation and, like the surveys and sales returns, were sworn
by two company officials before a justice of the peace [PANS:
RG1/461/110].
On Tyneside as well, there was an institution exogenous to
the individual coal-mining enterprises which dictated the gen-
eration of additional accounting data than would otherwise be
required. There the relevant agencies were the coal-owners’
cartels that collected large quantities of information for the
purpose of controlling both the retail sales and labor markets
[see Fleischman and Macve (2001) and Oldroyd (1996)].
Accounting for Labor: It seems clear that labor scarcity was a
reality of Cape Breton mining as was the case in the Newcastle
vicinity [Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. The problem was spe-
cifically mentioned in the reports to the proprietors’ yearly
meetings in 1871, 1873, 1883, and 1887 [BI: MG1419/91-68-
2690/G2, 4, 14, 17] and was discussed in the GMA’s abstracts of
accounts for 1873 and 1874 [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H, 1873,
1874]. Occasionally reasons for the perceived shortfall were
provided. In 1871, workers were siphoned off to work on the
Intercolonial Railway [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G2]. Rutherford
reported in 1873 that a shortage of worker housing was a prob-
lem [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H, 1873]. Strikes could also spawn
temporary dislocations, as at Lingan in 1883 [BI: MG1419/91-
68-2690/G 14]. Of course, one does not need to look very far for
root-cause explanations given the smallness of population rela-
tive to the scale of coal-mining operations. Attempts to remedy
the situation through the importation of workers proved abor-
tive. The provincial government imported French emigrants in
1873 [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G, 1874]. Brown, Sr. wrote to his
son in May 1882 of the “disgraceful conduct” of the scoundrels
imported from Scotland to work in the mines [PANS: MG1/151/
446]. The problem of labor shortage was exacerbated by the
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extreme mobility of the mining population, who proved willing
to move from coalfield to coalfield, often on a collective basis
[McKay, 1983, pp. 306, 311, 323].
McKay [1983, pp. 311-320] did not find as serious a labor
shortage in the Cumberland Coalfields further south in Nova
Scotia. In point of fact, the local population was sufficient to
obviate the need to import foreign-born labor. McKay also
found that the “extraordinary mobility of the mining popula-
tion” meant that Cape Breton miners could be attracted to the
region, particularly to the major mining operation of Springhill.
The movement does not appear to have been a two-way flow,
however, as Cape Breton was a far more distant outpost with
few alternative employment opportunities. Here, where the im-
portation of British miners was a higher priority, the compara-
tively lower wages failed to attract many recruits.
Perhaps as serious a problem as the shortage of miners was
their perceived low level of productivity. Rutherford com-
plained in 1873 that the number of workers was adequate but
that the recent increase in wages had “induced less work from
each individual” [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G4]. Rutherford re-
ported to the GMA’s proprietors in 1874 that a vicious cycle
involving wage levels and production characterized Nova
Scotian mining. The miners took advantage of their scarcity
and market conditions to secure wage increases. “The usual
result of these advances was to be feared, viz., a diminished
production arising from mere idleness in many cases, and from
a reduction in the amount of work performed by the more
industrious workmen” [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H, 1874].
Swann’s visitations in the early 1880s brought a similar lament.
He complained about the indolence of the men, rather than the
paucity of numbers, as responsible for production shortfalls.
His expectation was for 80-100 tons per man per month, but
the actual results were 50-60 [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G 12].
The senior Brown was very conscious of the expense to the
company of sub par work. He wrote in his book [Brown, 1871,
p. 70; see also Martell, 1945, p. 170] that the company had to
provide the same rations (and housing) for all workers, regard-
less of their skill levels.
The Sydney managers did not adopt methods used in the
U.K. to guarantee an adequate supply of labor. In the Newcastle
area, miners were bound to a specific colliery for a period typi-
cally just short of a year. The system was made functional by
the mine-owners’ cartel that limited to some degree the mobil-
ity of miners to seek out better conditions or wages within the
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region. Martell [1970, p.170] found evidence that a form of
binding existed in the early days of Nova Scotia coal mining.
Supposedly miners could be engaged on either four or twelve-
month contracts, commencing January 1. In either scenario,
the miners were paid only at the contract’s termination date.
However, there is no indication that the GMA mines entered
into contractual agreements of this type, and there was cer-
tainly no owners’ association in Nova Scotia to clip the colliers’
wings. In any event, “binding” had mostly disappeared from
Tyneside by the middle of the century, to be replaced by
monthly or fortnightly contacts [Church, 1986, pp. 237, 261;
Fleischman and Macve, 2001; Hammond and Hammond, 1919,
p. 12].
Other U.K. coal regions attempted to use subcontracting
(the “butty” or “chartermaster” system) to retain a labor force.
The Sydney archive contains both a proposal and an actual
subcontracting agreement. In his 1842 report on the unprofit-
ability of Albion, Wightman suggested subcontracting the labor
function in order to pass the risk of inefficiency to the subcon-
tractor [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3]. There is no evidence that the
Board seriously considered establishing that form of labor con-
trol, although there does exist an 1869 subcontracting agree-
ment with Richard Partridge, a molder (patternmaker). The
contractor agreed to specified piece rates and to pay rents, doc-
tor fees and coal for his charges [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3]. How-
ever, since the molding function was such a small part of the
Sydney operations, it cannot be assumed that this method was
of importance.
The labor control technique that found favor with Sydney’s
management was a series of piece-rate structures with varying
degrees of sophistication.7  The accounting records that tracked
labor varied considerably during the course of the 19th century.
The earliest was a “GMA Timebook” dated 1830-1832 [BI:
MG1419/83-110-1870/E1a]. The miners were numbered with
comments offered for those who did not put in a full-day’s work
(such as, absences, injuries and sicknesses). The entries rarely
dealt with workers’ inefficiencies, except when their physical
presence differed from expectation. There was one mention of
7It is well known in the economic literature that increasing piece rates as a
device to attract labor is dysfunctional since the higher wages result in height-
ened voluntary absenteeism [Hirsh and Hausman, 1983, p. 147; Walters, 1975,
p. 293].
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an operative being fined for failing to separate slack from large
coals and another who turned in a cart under measure. As time
went on, the number of comments increased and came to in-
clude the home-coal consumption of individual miners. In
March 1832, for example, items were recorded on 40 of the 140
operatives. The data collection improved with the July 1832
entry as monthly recapitulations appeared in the book wherein
each man’s productivity was totaled and reconciled to the pro-
duction total from each pit. The prices for getting the coals
were also stipulated as were the piece rates paid for carting coal
to the wharf. These rates varied from 5d to 2s per 36-bushel
chaldron as a function of pit location. In 1872, Brown, Sr.
wrote to his son suggesting a premium plan whereby a 10%
bonus would be paid to workers who averaged five days per
week at work for the year [PANS: MG1/151/164]. While there is
no indication whether this plan was ever implemented, it and
other surviving evidence lead us to believe that Sydney manage-
ment and the GMA were primarily concerned with labor turn-
out. Labor efficiency was an imponderable that a manipulation
of piece rates failed to solve as was also the case on Tyneside
and elsewhere in the U.K. [Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. This
approach seems to be characteristic of environments where
labor is scarce and cannot be recruited from other industries
[see, for example, Fleischman and Tyson’s (2000) study of ac-
counting on Hawaiian sugar plantations].
This apparent concern for turning out as opposed to pro-
ductivity was reflected in a lengthy series of time books, 1839-
1879 [BI: MG1419/81-52-1272/A1-A10]. Throughout the length
of the series, the only information conveyed were tick marks
representing days worked by individual miners. Occasionally
quarter days of work were indicated. The books contained col-
umns for pay rates that were rarely filled. The only exception
was the 1858-1859 time book [BI: MG1419/81-52-1272/A7]
which contained details on individual hewers’ productivity in
terms of tubs mined, forward progress, and mine location.
Whatever happened at Sydney at the time of this record-keep-
ing discontinuity also occurred at the smaller Point Aconi Mine,
another GMA holding [BI: MG1419/83-110-1870/A22]. Here, for
example, Daniel Hartigan received £9.15s in September 1855
for 91⁄2 days sinking at 6s, “15 yards of level at 4s” (presumably
a reference to forward progress), and 105 tubs at 9d.
The lack of piece-rate information between 1839-1879 is
surprising given that we know from other sources that the com-
pany was using piece-rate incentives in 1834 and 1878, that
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piece rates were used at the Spanish River Mines in Sydney as
early as 1801 [PANS: RG21/A], and that the piece-rate system
was the established method of paying miners in Britain
throughout the 19th century. In 1834, Buddle said that he was
very concerned about the high proportion of small coals being
produced at Sydney and made the following recommendation:
The present mode of paying the Colliers by cubical
measure, is I conceive objectionable in every point of
view, as it holds no inducement whatever to them, to
take any pains in producing round Coals, as far as I
can discover. And I should strongly recommend work-
ing by the Ton to be adopted, to  separate or riddle the
Coal below ground, and to pay the Collier for the
round Coals only - or at any rate to pay a very reduced
price for the small. By this plan it would become the
Collier’s interest to make all the round Coal he possibly
could, and it would also enable the proprietors to re-
ward him, for doing so, by giving him an additional
price, on the round [NRO: 3410/BUD19/279].
This quote illustrates a system of piece rates already in opera-
tion, as well as showing a belief in their potential for influenc-
ing behavior so as to optimize the firm’s profitability. Similarly,
in 1878, the “Billy Fairplay” system was introduced at Sydney,
having first been developed in South Wales and from thence
making its way to the North of England [BI: MG1419/91-68-
2690/H, 1879 report to the GMA]. The system was a screening
process that separated small coals and stones from the more
valuable larger chunks. Because the screening was done on the
surface, the miners underground were spared the labor of “rid-
dling,” the process of separating the two coal varieties. Brown,
Sr. initially informed his son of “Billy Fairplay” in April 1877
[PANS: MG1/151/285]. A year later, in a letter to H. Poole,
Brown, Jr. reported the establishment of the system from April
1, 1878 [PANS: RG21/A/3]. Not only did the process produce a
higher quality product for sale because the slack was now fully
screened out, but it provided an inducement through a revised
piece-rate structure for the miners to be more cautious in
avoiding the smaller coals. Previously, miners had been paid
$0.39 per ton of large coal and $0.17 for riddled slack. Now the
piece rate was $0.43 per ton for large coals and nothing for
slack. Brown observed to Poole that the miners could typically
make the same or slightly more money and produce more coal
per day, saved as they were the labor of riddling. The fact
remains, however, that complaints about productivity were a
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recurrent theme, suggesting that while it is likely that piece
rates were used throughout the period, they did not achieve the
desired result, which could explain the emphasis on turnout in
the pay records.
Commencing in the 1880s, the time books became vastly
more complicated and reflected a wage structure that may have
existed earlier, but which is not contained in extant Sydney
records we have seen. A number of piece rates were inscribed
into the front covers of the volumes. The rates paid in 1882-
1883 for the quantity of tons mined varied from $0.44 to $0.62
as a function of the “height” of the seams from which the coal
was taken. “Height” referred to the thickness of a coal seam so
that a thicker seam would yield a greater quantity of coal more
readily. Consequently, coal mined from a seam of four feet,
eight inches in height was priced at $0.44, while a ton from a
three-foot seam returned $0.62.8  Likewise, piece rates were also
paid for forward progress, varying from $0.50 to $0.86 for
workings ranging from six to nine yards wide. Day rates were
also given — $1.07 for cutters, $0.80 for driving. Prices were
also provided for slack coal and stones of various diameters. A
few other points of interest were apparent in the 1882-1883
rates. Prices paid in winter were only 75% of those paid in
summer.9  The transition from long tons to tons occurred at this
time, and piece rates are provided for each. Finally, the U.K.
term “hewer” for the miner taking coal from the coalface had
been replaced by “coal cutter” [BI: MG1419/81-52-1272/A10].
The contents of these volumes featured the calculations of
pay for the cutters, combining the various components. There
were data categories for each individual cutter of days worked
cutting at the day rate, the forward progress at four prevailing
rates, the tonnage prices, as well as columns for fines and re-
marks. In subsequent books of this genre, there were additional
data categories for non-routine cutter functions, such as “room
breaking,” “troubles,” “timbering,” and “low coal” (with
8We are grateful to Trevor Boyns for correcting our error in previous
drafts that “height” referred to vertical distance from the mine floor so that
higher piece rates were paid for coal closer to the floor which would have
required the miner to stoop in order to access the coal.
9Nothing we have seen in the archive explains this seasonal differential. It
may have reflected the additional cost of banking and tied-up capital since
Sydney’s harbor was frozen until the spring thaw. The lower piece rate may
have represented the minimum the GMA felt it had to pay during the slack
season to retain its labor force. This situation was in evidence on Tyneside at
least for the hewers. Here, however, the slack season was considerable shorter.
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subheaders of height, tons, and piece rate) [BI: MG1419/81-52-
1272/A11]. It would appear that the Sydney management had
developed a pay structure that took into account the wide vari-
ety of work environments which the cutter could encounter.
Later time books of the 1880s saw additional refinements.
First, a distinction was made in the piece rates paid at two pits
designated north and south. Second, the piece rates were
amended annually, an attention not in evidence on Tyneside
during the industrial revolution. Finally, the records came to
include columns headed “cavil” and “tally.” “Tally” was a gen-
eral term that did not have a specific application in coal-mining
terminology in the 19th century, and could signify any kind of
matching up. McKay [1983, p. 864] defined it as the number
placed by the miner on the tubs of coal filled. The fact that each
miner had a distinct tally number, with his “previous tally” also
recorded, meant that pay was cross-referenced to output on an
ongoing basis. Positioning was a significant factor in earnings
potential, and “caviling” enabled the cutters to share good and
inferior places by drawing lots. Similar equity considerations
were seen in Tyneside mining [Church, 1986, p. 275; Flinn and
Stoker, 1984]. The “cavil” column reflected a sequential num-
bering of the miners in pairs, perhaps indicating the operation
of a “buddy” system. Such mutual looking-after was much more
vital in a “bord and pillar” environment where the cutters were
more isolated in the mine.
Aside from the later time books, there is little surviving
evidence that the GMA used the accounting books to control
labor productivity.10 There are two coal account books for
Sydney 1889-1890 [BI: MG1419/82-256-1726/D3a, b] and for
Victoria Mines 1884-1885 [D3c]. These volumes recorded the
individual miner’s daily production of riddled coal and slack (in
separate books for Sydney). There is also an extant hauling
account book dated 1893-1896, which contains the tonnage
hauled by each operative daily multiplied by the piece rate as
10Christopher Napier, the discussant of this paper at the IPA Conference,
Manchester, July 2000, queried why would economically rational managers
carry on for a half-century with a system that did not achieve the desired labor
control. While we feel comfortable with the explanation that a new control
system would be too costly, particularly with reference to anticipated resis-
tance from a scarce labor force, there is a possibility that the apparently
heightened attention to piece rates in the 1880s might have been in place all
along and that the evidence just did not survive in the archive. After all, there
were scattered time books from the 1850s that reflected the same intricate
piece-rate calculation methodology.
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determined by the distance involved. Also noted was the num-
ber of days each worked, although never expressed in half or
quarter days as seen in the miners’ time books [BI: MG1419/81-
52-1272/A17]. In none of these volumes is there any indication
that punitive action was taken against inefficient or unproduc-
tive workers, suggesting that their purpose was to reconcile
payments to output rather than to increase efficiency. Accord-
ing to McKay [1983, p. 848], the lack of discipline of the work
force was a distinctive feature of coal-mining culture in Nova
Scotia.
It may have been that the GMA would have generated even
less information on its laboring force were it not for the wealth
of data required by Nova Scotia’s provincial government
through its Inspector of Mines. The paper has already touched
on the provision of costing data for regulation. The government
had to be in a position to respond to memorials such as the one
presented in 1873 by the leading mine owners soliciting the
revocation of royalties during hard times [PANS: RG21/A/Vol.
12]. A printed form was distributed to the mines in 1875, re-
questing a vast amount of information. 21 operative groups
were identified, and for each, highest, lowest, and average wage
data were required for 1873 and the average for “10 or 20 years
ago.” Additionally, prices of necessities were requested, along
with data on housing availability and cost. These costs were
totaled to calculate average cost per man per day. Further cat-
egories asked the cost and consumption of oil, powder, picks,
and other mining materials. Finally, in questions which paral-
leled those asked by the Newcastle coal-owners’ cartel in the
1830s, the greatest amounts of coal mined and shipped on a
single day were solicited [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 12; see also
Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. In an interesting addendum, the
government invited the owners to indicate with an asterisk any
information they did not want made public.
AN IMPERIAL CONNECTION?
Having examined the accounting methods in evidence at
the Sydney Mines, we will attempt in this section to measure
Nova Scotia’s inheritance from Tyneside specifically and the
U.K. more generally. Given the GMA’s absentee ownership, a
researcher might expect a substantial flow of information to
London and back as was found in various archives of partici-
pants in the industrial revolution such as Carron [Fleischman
and Parker, 1990] and Cyfarthfa [Edwards, 1989]. However,
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there are few surviving financial reports which were going to,
or instructions coming from, the Board of Directors prior to the
1860s, and even subsequently most of the annual reports were
short and uninformative. The London proprietors were con-
cerned with controlling expenses, but this attention was more
general than reflective of a careful item-by-item analysis. The
more significant links to Tyneside and Britain were in terms of
managerial accounting techniques and technological innova-
tion. In particular, the expertise of the Newcastle viewer was a
vital resource for the Browns in their management of Sydney.
It is difficult to assess what Richard Brown brought with
him from the Earl of Lowther’s estates in England because of
the paucity of costing data that have survived in the estate
records. However, what does survive reveals consistency with
contemporary Newcastle practice. For example, annual unit
cost was calculated during the 31 years prior to 1842, and plan-
ning schedules exist of the extra costs that would have been
needed to increase weekly production [CRO: D/LONS/W7/1/28,
333A]. Brown does not feature in the estate papers despite his
notability in Canada. John Peile, the chief colliery agent, was
the main character, although they were both probably part of
the same viewing network. In 1838, John Buddle reminded
Brown of the method that had been employed by Peile to extin-
guish a fire in the estate mines in reply to a request for advice
on a similar fire at Pictou [PANS: MG1/158/3]. Buddle’s connec-
tion with the estates as a consultant went back at least as far as
1812 when he supplied answers to a number of Peile’s technical
queries [CRO: D/LONS/W7/1/28]. It is likely that he and Brown
were personally acquainted, which would help to explain why
the GMA used him subsequently. The same may have been true
of T.E. Forster. He was at his most active with the GMA in the
1860s; the second earliest extant profit and loss statement for
1869 reveals a stipend paid to him of £105 [BI: MG1419/91-68-
2690/H, 1870], but a document in the Nova Scotia archives
shows that he and Brown had an earlier connection. In May
1839, Forster, “as requested by Mr Brown,” reported to the
Directors of the Northern Coal Company that had been formed
two years previously in England [Church, 1986, p. 131] on the
value of the collieries leased to them [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 7].
Such connections are not surprising given the way viewers
trained and operated. Top viewers like Buddle and Forster sold
their consulting services nationally and internationally and
were extremely influential. Church [1986, p. 410] referred to the
importance of their patronage in securing positions at the
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largest collieries, as was the case at the Albion Mines in April
1865 following the death of James Scott, the resident manager.
Forster regretted Scott’s death in a letter to Charles Tupper, the
Provincial Secretary, and mentioned that it was he who had
originally sent Scott out 11 years before [PANS: RG21A/5].
Forster’s nephew, James Hudson, proved to be the replacement.
Tupper had been asking for Forster’s help in finding a new
Inspector of Mines, and Forster replied that he could recom-
mend someone, although the going rate for “a good and practi-
cal viewer” was £600 per annum plus expenses.
While the mines in Nova Scotia had “managers” who per-
formed many of the same functions as the resident “viewers” on
Tyneside, the GMA also drew upon the expertise of nonresident
“general viewers” from the north-east on a wide range of issues.
As well as providing consulting services, Buddle apparently did
procurement for the Sydney Mines. In a letter to Brown, Sr., he
averred that he had not yet made a contract for iron coal tubs
but would work with Mr. Foord of the GMA on the matter.
Forster, for his part, drafted a list of questions to put to Brown,
Jr. in the late 1860s to serve as the basis for suggesting opera-
tional changes [PANS: MG1/151/52b]. Unfortunately, neither
the questions nor the answers have survived in the archive.
Apparently, Forster procured technology for the mines as had
Buddle. A letter from Brown, Sr. on March 30, 1867 informed
Brown, Jr. that Forster would solicit tender offers on a new
engine once provided with information on the depth of shafts,
the size of pumps, and the tons of coal to be raised [PANS:
MG1/151/16]. In 1877 Forster reported to the GMA on under-
ground haulage techniques [PANS: MG1/151/285].
Swann, the long-term Secretary of the GMA, visited mines
in Wales and Staffordshire in 1880 to study underground haul-
age [PANS: MG1/151/389]. Earlier, Swann had observed and
detailed the screening process used in the Newcastle vicinity
[PANS: MG1/151/268]. These studies were but two of many
technological investigations undertaken by GMA personnel.
Brown, Jr. toured the Seaton Delaval Colliery in February-
March, 1864. He filled an 80-page notebook with his observa-
tions on this major Tyneside coaling operation [PANS: MG1/
152/74]. His major interest was in technology as typified by a
coal-hewing machine he described to Foord in a letter dated
February 23, 1864 [PANS: MGI/159/10a,b]. Although the ma-
chine was applicable only to the “longwall” method of mining
rather than the “bord and pillar” technique typical of Nova
Scotia and Tyneside, Brown wrote a very detailed narrative of
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operations, including the descriptions and pay rates of the 16
operatives required per shift. The total cost per shift was
£3.7s.2d with typical production of 90 tubs of 8 cwt. each, de-
pending upon seam thickness. Brown was also interested in the
British names given to various operative classifications and to
U.K. ventilation methods. He also took notes on testimony
given by T.E. and G.B. Forster before a Parliamentary investi-
gating committee. In particular, Brown wanted to get ex-
pert opinion on how much coal to extract (1/3) and how much
to leave in the pillars of the mine (2/3) to provide adequate
shoring for the roof using the extraction technique employed in
Nova Scotia [PANS: MG1/152/74].
Personnel were sent from Canada to Newcastle for training.
The best viewers had their own firms of associates and appren-
tices, as is revealed by correspondence in 1872 between James
Hudson and G.B. Forster. Hudson had inquired whether
Forster was prepared to accept the nephew of Mr. Cunard, the
GMA’s agent in Halifax, as a trainee, and Forster wrote back in
the affirmative, setting out his terms. He revealed that he cur-
rently had six apprentices, although he personally was not in-
volved in their early training as they were too much of “a bother
at first” [NRO: 3410/FOR/2/16/136]. Three generations of
Richard Browns were committed to the lessons that could be
learned from U.K. mining. In September 1870, the senior
Brown, now in semi-retirement in the U.K., advised his son that
managers in Nova Scotia should travel to England to visit the
northern collieries “to get any information or knowledge of
improvement” [PANS: MG1/151/107]. A quarter of a century
later, Brown, Jr. proposed to the GMA that he send his son to
England “to get familiar with the most modern mining prac-
tices,” particularly those with undersea operations [PANS:
MG1/152/255]. However, it was recognized that on occasion the
parroting of British methods could produce costly results be-
cause of environmental differences. For example, the report of
George Wightman for 1842, which identified the causes of
losses incurred at the Albion Mines, observed that the miners
were overpaid since a sufficient number of miners had to be
retained for periods of maximum production, and the wages
paid had to cover the lengthy slack period of winter (frequently
four months). The precedent for this practice was related “to
the maxims and practices of England,” but there the slack sea-
son was considerably shorter, typically a month around Christ-
mas in Tyneside [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3, folder of materials,
1841-1856].
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CONCLUSION
The paper has compared the costing methods employed by
the GMA in Nova Scotia to practice in the U.K. in the 19th
century, especially to the North-East of England. Costing was
used by the GMA for expense control, including labor, and to
generate data for the regulatory authorities. In the area of day-
to-day expense control, the GMA mine managers seem to have
taken great care, as did their counterparts in Newcastle. In
Nova Scotia the system went beyond the tracking of expendi-
ture and constituted a genuine system of cost control. Expenses
were analyzed monthly and yearly and subjected to ex post
rationalization. There are indications that this heightened em-
phasis on expense control reflected difficulties felt by the Direc-
tors in London in managing the operations at such a distance.
It might also be the case that greater attention to actual costs,
as distinct from ex ante cost estimation techniques for business
decision making, may typify more nascent cost accounting
frontiers. In terms of the major items of capital expenditure,
the GMA’s costings do not compare favorably with the careful
estimations and cost tracking of pit sinkings, rail and wagon-
way construction, and new technology procurement in North-
East England. This deficiency was probably related to the con-
centration of technical and accounting expertise in Tyneside
compared to Canada. The difference in competitive environ-
ments was another factor.
Common links with Tyneside in the personnel and in the
costing procedures adopted show that some costing methods
were exported from Britain to Canada. Tyneside viewers were
highly influential. Resident managers at Albion and Sydney
were drawn from their ranks, and the best viewers also pro-
vided consultancy, recruitment, and procurement services. Per-
sonnel were sent from Canada to Britain for training.
These findings support a global view of the development of
management accounting in different locales at the expense of
cultural differences. However, the paper has only considered
the costing records of the GMA, an English company. Perhaps
it is not surprising that it relied heavily on English practice.
Although the GMA was the single most important company in
the development of coal mining in Nova Scotia in the 19th
century, it became but one of several mining companies after
1858, with capital coming from the U.S. and Montreal as well
as the U.K. The province therefore stood at a cultural cross-
roads between investors from the south, west, and east, and it
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would be worthwhile replicating this study in relation to the
new investment taking place in the second half of the century.
Similarly, there are the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Virginia
to consider which were the GMA’s major competitors in the
U.S. market. Harris [1976] referred to a number of studies on
the transfer of coal-mining technology from Britain to the U.S.,
and it would be interesting to see whether costing practice was
homogenized here also, or whether these fields developed their
own distinct tradition.
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Abstract: A. C. Littleton [1933, pp. 149-151] in Accounting Evolution
to 1900 wrote that the sub-division of financial statements and the
valuation of assets were two of the most important elements in the
development of modern financial statements. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the historical evolution of the recognition, group-
ing, and valuation of current assets on the balance sheet in the
United States between 1865 and 1940 at which time the basic for-
mat for reporting such assets had been adopted. The paper expands
the examination of the balance sheet beyond a traditional emphasis
on long-life assets to an investigation of the evolving classification of
current assets with a special emphasis on the influence of financial
users (especially creditors) for its unique development. Historical
illustrations of the ways in which companies presented and valued
current assets on the balance sheet are presented.
In matters of form the greatest change which later
statements showed was the grouping of data into sub-
sections [A. C. Littleton, 1933, p. 149].
INTRODUCTION
In 1913, Charles Sprague [1913, p. 26] wrote that “the bal-
ance sheet may be considered as the groundwork of all accoun-
tancy, the origin and the terminus of every account”. At that
time, however, some companies still issued annual reports that
did not include balance sheets or, if balance sheets were in-
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cluded, the financial information was often minimal. Addition-
ally, at the beginning of the 20th century most companies did
not classify balance sheets, and in the statements of the few
companies that did, there was no consistency in the grouping of
items.
Moreover, neither the order of liquidity nor market or net
realizable values were determined for assets such as accounts
(bills) receivables or inventories. In fact, Foulke [1968, p. 189]
notes that it was after 1900 that public accounting firms com-
monly used the terms ‘current assets’ and ‘current liabilities’.
Yet, as Foulke [1945, p. 70] writes: “The classification of cur-
rent assets is undoubtedly the most important classification in
a balance sheet, as current assets largely determine the going
solvency of a business concern.” This lack of classification also
affected credit analysis as pointed out by Brown [1955, p. 18] in
her dissertation on the history of ratio analysis: “For years the
financial statements published by banks were not adequate for
extensive analysis because of a lack of significant classification
and clarity of expression.” Although her statement concerned
banks, the inability to conduct meaningful financial statement
analysis was equally true for other industries.
Despite the lack of significant balance sheet classifications
at the beginning of the century, by 1940 the basic format for
reporting current assets on the balance sheet had been adopted.
Instead of following British precedent established under the
Companies Acts, the American (or Continental Europe) balance
sheet had its own characteristics, especially in regard to the
classification and position of current assets. Although many of
these characteristics developed after the start of the 20th cen-
tury, antecedents of these changes began shortly after the end
of the U. S. Civil War and reflect the evolution of the business
environment itself.
Immediately after the Civil War there was little need for
classified balance sheets. By 1940, it was impossible not to have
them. During that period, the business world evolved from one
that consisted primarily of sole proprietorships with little need
for financial statements to one consisting of larger businesses
that had to provide basic financial statements to their creditors.
The American business world then evolved towards larger
corporations that had to provide financial information to
shareholders, analysts, creditors, and various governmental en-
tities. This paper examines how the economic, legal and social
forces that contributed to the reorganization of the American
business world also contributed to the recognition, grouping,
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and valuation of current assets on the balance sheet and ex-
plores how these forces created the unique needs of the Ameri-
can business system which led to the development of financial
statements different from those developed in Britain.
Several accounting historians have investigated the evolu-
tion of financial statements into their present form. However,
most studies have concentrated on the overall development of
financial statements or upon the presentation and valuation of
long-term assets on the balance sheet rather than current items.
Examples of these investigations are numerous. Claire [1945]
examined the evolution of the annual report of United States
Steel Corporation (USS) from 1902 to 1943 while Schiff [1978]
contrasted the 1902 and 1974 annual reports of that corpora-
tion. Vangermeersch [1970, 1971/72, 1986] also examined fi-
nancial reporting milestones in the annual reports of USS over
seven decades as well as USS’s depreciation policies. Reed
[1989] contrasted the historical depreciation reporting practices
of USS with replacement cost estimates for 1939 and 1987. In
Financial Reporting Techniques in 20 Industrial Companies
Since 1861, Vangermeersch [1979] continued his analysis of an-
nual reports. Here, Vangermeersch examined the financial re-
porting techniques of companies such as General Electric and
Pullman & Company in regard to 63 aspects of reporting in
eight major topical areas such as balance sheets, income state-
ments, depreciation, and inventory. Through these studies,
Vangermeersch examined in depth the changing role and for-
mat of the balance sheet over the years. However, these studies
concentrated primarily on the changing balance sheet itself in-
stead of changing classifications on the balance sheet such as
current assets. Edwards [1984] in Studies of Company Records
1830-1974, presented a historical discussion on the develop-
ment of financial statements. In Corporate Financial Reporting
and Analysis in the Early 1900s Brief [1986] presented the early
annual reports of companies such as International Harvester
Company and American Telephone & Telegraph Company as
well as a series of historical comments on those reports. In an
article the following year, Brief [1987] further discussed the
financial reports of leading companies at the turn of the 20th
century. Recently, Previts and Samson [2000] examined the
annual reports of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad for the
period, 1827-1856. In addition, there have been two major con-
ceptual studies on working capital and solvency. In his disserta-
tion, Huizingh [1967, p. vii] examined the genesis and develop-
ment of the working capital concept (especially through the
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expressions of academic/financial writers) and proposed a new
structure for its presentation. In the AICPA’s Accounting Re-
search Monograph 3 (Financial Reporting and the Evaluation of
Solvency), Heath [1978], presented an extensive discussion of
the concept of solvency, the principles of balance sheet classifi-
cations, and problems incurred in defining current assets.
This paper expands the examination of the balance sheet
beyond the traditional emphasis on long-life assets to an inves-
tigation of how the classification of current assets on the bal-
ance sheet evolved from the end of the Civil War in 1865 to
1940 by which time the basic format had been adopted for the
reporting and valuation of current assets. A special emphasis is
placed on the influence of financial users (especially creditors)
in this development process. As Anton [1962, p. 5] writes: “the
great historical influence of bankers on financial statements
cannot be overemphasized . . . preparation of statements for the
granting of credit influenced not only the statements them-
selves but accounting principles as well.”
The end of the Civil War is used as the beginning point for
this investigation because at that time the major factors that led
to the increased importance of the balance sheet and the ulti-
mate need for the classification of current assets emerged. For
example, Huizingh [1967, p. 62] writes that it was soon after
the Civil War that the practice of purchase on open account
developed; Horrigan [1968, p. 285] states that it was in the
1870’s that “commercial banks began to request financial
statements for lending purposes”; and Foulke [1945, p. 618]
stated that “efforts were made by The Mercantile Agency in the
1870’s . . . to obtain balance sheets, which at that time were
better known as property statements [emphasis in original], for
the use of the mercantile and bank creditors.” Littleton and
Zimmerman [1962, p. 92] note that it was during this period
that bankers encouraged “utilizing short-term bank loans as a
source for much of the working capital needed by business.”
In order to address the development of current asset classi-
fication, the paper is divided into four periods: (a) 1865 to 1879,
(b) 1880 to 1899, (c) 1900 to 1920, and (d) 1921 to 1940. For
each period, a historical overview of the business environment
and the attitudes of management toward financial information
are discussed. The impact of the public accounting profession,
academic writings, judicial precedent, and statutory authority
on the reporting and valuation of current assets are also
reviewed. Additionally, historical illustrations of the ways in
which companies presented and valued current assets are
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presented.1  The final section presents the summary and conclu-
sions.
A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF INFORMATION, 1865-1879
Prior to and at the end of the Civil War, the great majority
of businesses were small proprietorships or partnerships that
had little need to prepare financial statements because the own-
ers personally knew the financial condition of their businesses.
Additionally, most businesses dealt directly with their suppliers
and, as Lough [1917, p. 113] stated, trade credit was the most
important form of credit where “purchases of merchandise
were customarily settled by notes running six, eight, or ten
months . . . which were readily indorsed [sic] and discounted.”
During the War and continuing afterwards, however, “mer-
chandise business came down to a basis of cash or of credit of
only ten to thirty days” [ibid]. This policy continued until the
early 1880s, when credit terms became somewhat longer but
“these terms were combined with offers of liberal discount for
cash payments” [Lough, 1917, p. 113]. Thus, as Lough [1917, p.
114] writes, with the end of the Civil War, “trade credit . . . is
relatively less important, and bank credit is more important.”
Although bank credit was now more important, a new
problem was created for the banks. Instead of discounting two-
party commercial notes, banks began to issue single-name
paper [Foulke 1945, p. 68] and, as Huizingh [1967, p. 62] points
out, “having foregone the security of double protection, they
sensed the need of obtaining more adequate and reliable finan-
cial information from their clients.” The reliable information
desired in most cases was the balance sheet, and on the balance
sheet, the liquidity of the assets became the major consider-
ation. Huizingh [1967, p. 62] writes: “His [banker’s] preference
was to obtain a statement indicating the probability that he
would be able to recoup his investment even though the busi-
ness were not to continue beyond the term of his loan.” With
the greater credit exposure, there was an increase in the impor-
tance of the mercantile credit agencies that had been estab-
lished before the Civil War and placed upon these agencies an
1In selecting illustrations, an effort was made to select companies respec-
tive of the major industries and to select companies with financial statements
illustrative of the various methods of presentation and valuation of current
assets on the balance sheet at that time.
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obligation to obtain “exact financial information as a trained
intermediary for creditors” [Foulke 1945, p. 68].
Although the great majority of businesses were not incor-
porated at the end of the Civil War the corporate form was
common in certain industries such as canals, railroads, banks,
and insurance. Incorporated during the first part of the 19th
century under special state charters and during the latter part
under general charters, these entities often were required by
their charters to issue some form of annual report. Often, how-
ever, the reports did not include balance sheets or profit or loss
statements. For example, the 28 page annual report of the
Union Canal Co. of Pennsylvania, 1865 contained an extensive
narrative of the company’s operations and offered great detail
about tonnage hauled and changes in cash balances. However,
the report contained neither a balance sheet nor an income
statement while the total revenues and ordinary expenses were
stated only in the management narrative.
Among companies that included balance sheets in their an-
nual reports, there was no uniform style. Each company devel-
oped its own format and decided what was to be included on
the statement. The formats of most balance sheets, however,
were variations on the “account form,” “columnar trial balance”
form, and the “beginning of the [use of the] ‘report’ ” form
[Littleton, 1933, p. 143]. The columnar trial balance form was
similar to today’s work sheet in that a trial balance was ex-
tended to various columns such as a balance sheet column and,
in time, “the inclusion of a profit-and-loss column” [Littleton,
1933, p. 143].
Regardless of the format, assets on the balance sheet were
not classified into categories (e.g., current assets).2  Moreover, it
was often the practice to offset certain assets with liabilities
and present only the net amount as the balance: in some cases
basically creating net working capital. For example, on the bal-
ance sheet of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., 1870, receiv-
ables were presented under the heading “Cash assets, Notes
2Although Littleton [1933, p. 149] stated that one of the greatest innova-
tions in financial reporting was the “grouping of data into sub-sections,” he
pointed out that in the United States broader classification concepts had to be
resolved before this could occur. Littleton [1933, p. 149] wrote “In the nine-
teenth century ... some wished them called real and representative … others
wished accounts classified as material, property, personal, profit-and-loss; still
others as real, personal and imaginary … [Thus] the generally accepted classi-
fication of real and nominal accounts came later, as did the sub-division of the
balance-sheet into current assets.”
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receivables, etc. deducting Liabilities, $2,197,959.51.” With this
presentation, the reader had the amount of working capital of
the company. However, there were no individual amounts for
either assets or liabilities.
In 1865, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company [1865,
pp. 24-26] issued its 44th annual report which included both a
“profit and loss account” and a “summary of the liabilities and
assets,” however, accounts on neither statement were classified.
The only headings on the “balance sheet” were Liabilities (listed
first) and Assets. Under Liabilities, equity was listed first fol-
lowed by liability accounts. Lehigh’s $11+ million of assets were
represented by only six accounts which are presented in Exhibit
1. The six assets were apparently listed in inverse order of li-
quidity.
EXHIBIT 1
Asset Section, Balance Sheet, January 1, 1865
Report of The Board of Managers
Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Canal and River Improvements $ 4,455,000.00
Lehigh and Susquehanna Rail-road 1,917,895.35
Real Estate, cost of coal mine land. . .
and improvements 2,072,984.50
Moveable effects, Debts due the Company,
Bills Receivable, Bonds and Mortgages, &c. 2,128,112.02
Contingent Fund: cost of investments 640,952.02
Cash on hand  165,975.86
––––––––––––––
$11,380,919.75
Due to state incorporation laws, railroads were subject to
greater regulation and annual reports were often required
[Littleton and Zimmerman, 1966, p. 94]. State laws, however,
were often vague and charters did not always address
management’s reporting responsibilities [Hawkins, 1963, p.
136]. Thus, the reporting practices varied widely between rail-
roads and from year to year within the same railroad. Some
railroads provided no annual reports as was seen when the New
York Stock Exchange asked the Delaware, Lackawanna & West-
ern R.R. Co. for copies of any reports that it had recently
issued. In its reply to the NYSE, the Railroad declared
[McLaren, 1947, pp. 4-5]: “The Delaware, Lackawanna & West-
ern R.R. Co. make no reports and publish no statements and
have done nothing of the sort for the last five years.”
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In contrast to no reports or minimum accounts by some
railroads, the balance sheet (represented by a General Account)
of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 1865
showed over 20 types of assets. However, there was no sub-
classification of assets and items such as cash and freight re-
ceivables were offset with liabilities for wages and materials.
During this period, companies that intended to present a
more complete financial picture had few reporting guidelines
available. Unlike in Britain, U.S. companies had no railway or
companies acts to provide basic models for financial state-
ments.3  It would be nearly two decades before practitioner
journals such as Accountics and the Book-Keeper emerged with
discussions of such accounting concerns.
In the few accounting/bookkeeping texts that were avail-
able at the time of the Civil War, the preparation of financial
statements often was ignored. For example, the 60th edition of
Mayhew’s Practical Book-Keeping [1861, p. 6] devoted 200 pages
to a discussion of “general book-keeping, commercial calcula-
tions, philosophy & morals of business, and double entry book-
keeping.” It did not, however, address or illustrate either a
profit and loss statement or a balance sheet.
One author of the period that went beyond bookkeeping
was Thomas Jones. In contrast to writers even in the early
1900s, Jones’ 1855 Bookkeeping and Accountantship dealt
broadly with the issue of valuing current resources. Under the
heading of “Resources”, Jones [1855, p. vii] listed “Merchandise
on hand valued at,” which Jones explained was “an estimated
value [set] upon his merchandise.” Moreover, Jones advocated
that each year a company establish a reserve account in which
the estimated bad debts of the following year would be re-
corded.
A later text that examined the preparation of a balance
sheet was the 1878 Bryant and Stratton Common School Book-
3The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 offered a model balance sheet on
which assets were classified into three categories (property held by the com-
pany, debts owing to the company, and cash and investments). These in turn
were sub-classified into categories such as immoveable (i.e., buildings) and
moveable (stock in trade) property. Moreover, on the balance sheet, “receiv-
ables” were to be divided into good and “debts [receivable] considered doubtful
and bad” [Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956, pp. 364-365]. In regard to the separation
of current items on the Companies Act, 1856 model balance sheet, Chatfield
[1996b, p. 63] writes: “The distinction made by classical English economists
between fixed and circulating capital may have persuaded legislators to sepa-
rate current from long-term assets and liabilities.”
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Keeping. The balance sheet presented in this text was based
upon the columnar work sheet concept. That is, the initial trial
balance was extended to succeeding columns designated: in-
ventory, business accounts, stock, and financial statement
[Packard and Bryant, 1878, p. 141]. The financial statement
column in turn was separated into two columns — resources
(assets) and liabilities (liabilities and capital). No reserves
(allowances) for either bad debts or depreciation were shown.
As Brief [1969, pp. 1-2] points out, external influences can
impact accounting behavior. However, at this time with the
exception of banks, external influences were minimal. For ex-
ample, in 1869, the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List adopted
the policy that, once listed on the Exchange, companies must
publish an annual financial report. Many companies, however,
did not follow the policy and the NYSE usually did not take
action [Hawkins, 1963, p. 149].
In contrast to many other external influences, the U.S. judi-
ciary has both a review process and an enforcement mecha-
nism. Because of these characteristics, the legal system has
played an important role in the development of accounting
standards and practices. As Mills [1988, p. 13] writes in The
Legal Literature of Accounting: “accounting practices have been
subject to and shaped by legal constraints throughout their his-
tory.” Moreover, as Reid [1987, p. 256] points out, legal actions
often predate the development of an accounting concept.
At a time when some companies did not provide financial
statements and most companies did not classify their balance
sheets, courts began to respond to the needs of the public. One
early case was Rubber Company v. Goodyear [1869].4  Although
the case largely dealt with patent issues, an additional concern
of the Court was the costs which should be considered in a
company’s determination of profit. Justice Swayne, writing for
the United States Supreme Court [9 Wall. 804], stated that
among: “other necessary expenditures, if there be any, and bad
debts, are to be taken into the account, and usually nothing
else.” Thus, under the court’s reasoning, a company’s profits
should reflect an estimate for bad debts. Although the court
gave consideration to the profit and loss statement, it did not
address the corresponding effect on assets in the balance sheet.
4Full legal citations for all cases are presented in the references.
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THE EMERGENCE OF LARGE CORPORATIONS, 1880-1899
During the last decades of the 19th century, the business
environment in America changed drastically. As Alfred D. Chan-
dler [1959, p. 4] points out, America was transformed from a
largely agrarian economy to one in which “major industries
were dominated by a few firms that had become great, verti-
cally integrated, centralized enterprises.” It was a time of merg-
ers and the creation of substantial industrial and distribution
corporations such as General Electric Company, United States
Rubber Company, and Sears, Roebuck & Company. With the
growth of such companies, ownership was separated from man-
agement while shareholders became more numerous and im-
portant. As corporations sought outside sources of capital, they
faced new demands for financial information because investors,
bankers, and bureaucrats often had to rely on financial state-
ments for decision making [Littleton, 1933, p. 366].
Although there was an increase in the importance of finan-
cial information, there was little change in the preparation and
appearance of the financial statements themselves. In contrast
to Britain, where the concept of stewardship greatly influenced
the concept of the balance sheet, the preparation of the balance
sheet in the U.S. continued to be influenced by the needs of
creditors. It was during the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury that requests by banks for financial statements became “a
widespread practice” [Horrigan, 1968, p. 285]. Reflecting on
why the liquidity concept continued to prevail in the U.S.,
Montgomery [1912, p. 212] wrote: “it has the sanction of the
bankers and credit men of this country, who use balance sheets
oftener than any other class.”
Even with new demands for financial information, the atti-
tude prevalent in the previous period toward the disclosure of
financial information often prevailed. Consequently, companies
often did not keep stockholders informed of the results of their
operations, the information provided was influenced by the
viewpoint of the managers, and the information was often un-
reliable because of what it excluded [Hawkins, 1963, pp.135].
Moreover, the information provided was often of little value for
inter-company comparisons because there were few accepted
rules for the recognition of financial items such as depreciation
or reserves [Previts and Merino, 1998, pp.125-126]. Even in
regulated industries such as railroads, where more detailed in-
formation was required, accounting practices varied with state
requirements [Hawkins, 1963, p. 135].
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In this environment, reporting practices varied widely de-
spite a growing need for financial information. For example, in
1881, American Bell Telephone’s Report of the Directors did not
include a balance sheet. The following year, American Bell’s
annual report [1882, p. 10] included a balance sheet, however,
over $7 million of assets were listed in seven broad categories
such as patents, other stocks and bonds, merchandise, and bills
& accounts receivable. A reserve account was presented on the
liabilities side of the report but its purpose was not disclosed.
In 1885, Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company issued its 64th
Annual Report that included both a “revenue and expenses”
statement and a “balance sheet.” The 1885 balance sheet, how-
ever, differed little from the 1865 balance sheet (see Exhibit 1)
except that a greater number of accounts were shown. As in
1865, the 1885 balance sheet neither classified the assets (e.g.,
current) nor valued the assets (receivables or plant).
Despite the greater detail provided in the annual reports of
railroads, the structure of their financial statements had not
advanced much beyond those of other corporations.5  Little or
no classification or valuation was presented. Although some
railroads did provide information about selected accounts in a
narrative or supporting statements, these statements led to con-
fusion. For example, on a financial statement included in the
1880 fiscal year report [1881, p. 38] of the Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railroad Co., Accounts Receivable was valued at
$1,428,008.67. In General Statement 4, however, Bills Receiv-
able (not accounts receivable) was listed as $2,288,185.82
which included $119,599.82 interest on delinquent accounts.
Then, in a separate narrative, the following information was
provided:
Our bills receivable Dec. 31, 1880, on live sales,
amount to $2,288,185.82. Of this amount, $341,006.45
5The developing nature of the balance sheet was shown in a 1883 article in
The American-Counting Room. In “Counting-Rooms Chats,” readers posed
questions for the writers to answer. A reader asked: “what form of balance-
sheet is best and shortest.” In reply, the article [“On Balance-Sheet,” 1883, p.
346] stated that the columnar (worksheet) balance sheet form, “in actual busi-
ness it has become almost universally condemned.” Then, the article illustrated
two acceptable forms for a balance sheet. The first was a simple “trial balance
resource and liability” form with all assets’ balances on the debit side and
liabilities (including capital) on the credit side. The second example was a
“financial condition of the business” statement. Under this format, assets were
classified in three categories: actual resources (cash, real estate), commercial
resources (merchandise, other companies’ stock), and personal resources
(bills-receivable, accounts-receivable).
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is overdue and unpaid. During the year 1880, dead
sales to the amount of 10,496.73 acres, $55,989.91,
have been cancelled.
The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe continued this method of
reporting receivables on the balance sheet throughout the 19th
century.
Unfortunately, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) did
not address variation in balance sheet reporting. In 1869, the
exchange had established a requirement that newly listed com-
panies must publish annual financial reports, but the NYSE
generally did not enforce its policy.6  In 1885, the NYSE further
weakened the policy by establishing a dual listing of stocks. In
order to attract companies that did not want to disclose finan-
cial information, the NYSE created an Unlisted Department
where companies “were not required to furnish the Exchange
with financial information relevant to the issue . . . neverthe-
less, these shares were traded with regularly listed securities,
unlisted stocks being distinguished on quotation sheets only by
an asterisk” [Hawkins, 1963, p. 150].
While the NYSE was lessening its disclosure requirements,
American courts were establishing new guidelines. In 1890, the
issue of the proper inclusion and valuation of current assets
was addressed by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Hubbard v.
Weare. Examining several accounts, which the appellant con-
tended “were improperly included as assets, and others omitted
from the statement of liabilities,” the court set guidelines for
the balance sheet. In regard to inventory, the Iowa court held
that “until it had an actual value it should not have been in-
cluded as an asset.” The court then addressed the issue of the
valuation of receivables. The appellee had listed on his 1879
balance sheet receivables with a value of $22,821.39; however,
no provision had been made for a loss. The Supreme Court of
Iowa held that the reported value of receivables on the balance
sheet must include an estimate for the “shrinkage or loss in
collections,” for “without such an approximation, the result
would not show with any reasonable certainty the state of the
company’s affairs” [Hubbard v. Weare, 44 N.E. 920]. Thus, with
this decision, we see judicial precedent for changes in the way
assets were valued and reported which coincides with Reid’s
6For example, as late as 1923, over 30% of NYSE listed companies were
not required to issue annual reports to their shareholders, and only 25% of the
companies provided both annual and quarterly reports to their shareholders
[Seligman, 1995, p. 48].
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[1987, p. 256] proposition that legal actions often predate the
development of an accounting concept. Subsequently, other
courts established similar guidelines.
Perhaps because the courts were beginning to set account-
ing principles through legal actions during the 1890s, account-
ing and auditing texts were more expansive in their coverage of
current assets. For example, Dicksee’s7  1892 Auditing included
a page and a half discussion of “bad and doubtful debts.” In his
guideline for receivables, Dicksee [1892, p. 45] wrote:
An intelligent system of dealing with the difficult ques-
tion of Bad and Doubtful Debts is of such assistance to
all commercial houses that the Auditor should lose no
opportunity of suggesting that the matter be put upon
a scientific basis.
Dicksee’s scientific basis consisted of two phases. First, as
soon as a debt became sufficiently overdue to merit attention, it
should be transferred to a “Doubtful Debts Ledger.” Dicksee
[1892, p. 46], however, cautioned that an account should not be
written off “until it is irretrievably bad.” The second phase con-
sisted of establishing a provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts
through a Bad Debts Suspense Account. The suspense account
was credited with the estimated loss while the Bad Debts Ac-
count was debited “in the usual way” [ibid].8
7Due to the scarcity of American accounting texts, during the late 1800s
and early 1900s, basic British accounting texts or American versions of British
texts often were used. On this scarcity, John Carey [1969, p. 101] writes “in the
first 30 years of its existence, however, the American accounting profession
had little native technical literature with which to work.” On the importance of
British writers, Carey [1969, p. 101] adds: “[at this time], the most important
book available was the American edition of Auditing: A Practical Manual for
Auditors, by Lawrence R. Dicksee, Professor of Accounting at the University of
Birmingham, England. The American version was edited by the amazing Rob-
ert H. Montgomery.” One interesting aspect of Dicksee’s Auditing was its con-
sideration of the effects of legal rulings upon the profession and its liability. In
addition to legal discussions in the body of the text, Appendix B contained
nearly forty pages of “Reports of Cases, The Decisions of which are of Profes-
sional Interest.”
8In Auditing, Dicksee [1892] did not state whether the created “suspense”
account for bad debts should appear on the liability side of the balance sheet
or as an offset to accounts receivable. Later in his Advanced Accounting, he
stated that while the created “reserve” account could be shown on the liability
side of the balance sheet; “it is preferable, however, in the case of Reserve
Accounts raised to provide for shrinkage in the value of specific assets, to
deduct them from those particular assets, in which case, no entry whatever
will appear upon the liabilities’ side of the balance sheet” [1903, p. 232].
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In the early 1890s, many corporations did not follow the
lead of the courts or the texts. For example, United States Rub-
ber Company (USR) issued its first annual report in 1893. Its
financial statements provided minimum information. Only five
categories were employed for USR’s $29 million assets and all
liabilities were listed in one account. No provision for losses in
the receivables or valuation of plant assets were shown. USR
continued its minimal reporting throughout the 1890s and into
the early 1900s except that in most years assets were listed in
four categories. However, in one sense, USR’s balance sheet
was forward looking because current assets were listed first. At
this time, many American companies followed the British prac-
tice of listing current assets last, and it was not until the late
1930s that several large industrial companies reversed the prac-
tice.9  The 1893 asset section of USR’s balance sheet is pre-
sented in Exhibit 2.
EXHIBIT 2
Asset Section, Balance Sheet, March 31, 1893
First Annual Report
United States Rubber Company
Cash on hand and in bank $25,456,194.02
Notes and Accounts Receivable 2,846,163.50
Value of Rubber and other Mdse.
on hand, estimated  674,011.51 $ 3,576,369.03
––––––––––––––
Furniture and Fixtures:
New York and Boston $4,587.18
Investments  $25,267,833.69  25,272,420.87
–––––––––––––– ––––––––––––––
Total Assets $28,848,789.90
In contrast to the minimal financial reporting practices of
companies such as American Bell Telephone and United States
Rubber, a few corporations provided information about their
current assets. For example, in January 1893, General Electric
9Littleton and Zimmerman [1962, pp. 92-93] in Accounting Theory: Conti-
nuity and Change stated there was a logic in the British and American presen-
tations of current assets — “The British had a strong natural interest in the
relationship of permanent capital and fixed assets. Belief in the interpretative
usefulness of placing these elements at the top of the balance sheet is a logical
result of such an interest. … [In America] the party most interested in seeing
the balance sheet was the lender; his chief concern was logically the borrower’s
ability to repay a short-term loan.”
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Company (GE) issued its first annual report and much of the
current asset data presented is similar to that included today.
In its report, GE listed Stocks And Bonds Of Local Cos., Cash,
Notes Receivable, Accounts Receivable, Inventories, and Work
In Progress in a classification titled “Other Assets.” GE was
unique in including the last account, for at that time, work in
progress often was not listed on the balance sheet. It was not
until nearly 50 years later that Dun & Bradstreet [Foulke, 1945,
p. 81] would emphasize that a comprehensive balance sheet
must include “a breakdown of the inventory of manufacturers
into three parts, raw materials, in process, and finished merchan-
dise” (emphasis Foulke).
Again unique for the period, GE estimated the net realiz-
able value of two current assets (inventories and receivables)
while many companies valued neither. Inventories were listed
at $2,307,225.13 “less 10%” for an estimated net realizable
value of $2,075,502.62. The basis for the 10% reduction was
not given. Also, listed at estimated net realizable values were
Notes Receivable ($5,151,950.64) and Accounts Receivable
($7,078,879.15). Although there were no indications on the bal-
ance sheet that receivables had been evaluated, in the text of
the Report, GE [1893, p. 7] stated “after careful examination,
deductions have been made from the notes and accounts receiv-
able to cover fully all bad and doubtful items.”
In General Electric’s annual report, 1895 the “Other Asset”
section was dropped and instead all assets were reported on the
left side of the balance sheet with no subheadings. In contrast
to the reduction of information on the balance sheet itself, GE’s
management [1895, p. 10] expanded its discussion of receiv-
ables:
This account represents what is believed to be a con-
servative value of notes and open accounts of custom-
ers, after deducting and charging off to Profit and Loss
old notes and accounts receivable of 466 debtors, not
now dealt with except on a C.O. D. basis, amounting to
$2,291,844.48, heretofore carried at $234,973.69, but
no longer carried as assets, except for the aggregate
sum of $466, being one dollar for each debtor. They
will be liquidated as speedily as possible.
Although most large industrial companies still did not clas-
sify their balance sheets, by 1890 several major railroads had
started to do so and included, among other subheadings, a sec-
tion for current assets. For example, the balance sheet in The
Great Northern Railway Company’s first Annual Report [1890]
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included a current asset section in which cash, receivables, and
“material supply” were listed. There was, however, no provision
for losses associated with the receivables.
In the same year, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
road Company (AT&SF) issued a detailed balance sheet listing
nearly $350 million of assets classified under five major head-
ings (Franchise & Property, Permanent Investments, Other In-
vestments, Deferred, and Current). Each heading in turn had
sub-headings. Under the Current heading were the sub-head-
ings Accounts Receivables, Bills Receivable, Cash, and Securi-
ties Owned. Instead of listing inventory as a current asset, the
AT&SF listed “Material and fuel in stock” as a “Deferred” item
along with “Sundry Advances” and “Deposits.” Like The Great
Northern, the AT&SF made no provisions for bad debts or de-
preciation.
Although many companies did not include provisions for
bad debts, by the end of the 1890s the importance of such a
provision was being discussed. For example, in April 1897, P.
W. Sherwood presented a paper to the Associated Accountants
entitled “The Preparation of Accounts for Legal and Other Pur-
poses” which was published in Accountics. In his paper,
Sherwood discussed the importance of the proper preparation
of the financial statements, and he emphasized that receivables
on the balance sheet must be reported at their estimated net
realizable values. Sherwood’s [June 1897, p. 54] illustration of
the proper valuation and presentation of receivables is pre-
sented in Exhibit 3.
EXHIBIT 3
Presentation of Receivables on the Balance Sheet
P. W. Sherwood, April 1897
Accounts Receivable $50,000
Deduct Worthless Accounts $6,200
Deduct Accounts Appraised at 50 percent 6,000
Deduct Accounts Appraised at 30 percent  2,000  14,200
–––––– ––––––––
35,800
Add Accounts at 50 percent of $6,000 3,000
Add Accounts at 30 percent of $2,000  600  3,600
–––––– ––––––––
$39,400
––––––––
Source: Sherwood, P.W. [1897], “The Preparation of Accounts For Legal and
Other Purposes,” Accountics, Vol. 1, June: 54.
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MINIMAL UNIFORMITY IN STATEMENTS, 1900-1920
At the turn of the century, there was increased public con-
cern regarding potential market abuses by large corporate
trusts [Merino and Neimark, 1982, p. 45]. Partially, as a result
of these concerns, in June 1898, Congress established the U.S.
Industrial Commission to hold hearings on the possible re-
straint of trade by large corporations [Previts and Merino, 1998,
p. 184].10  During four years of hearings, various examples of
corporate abuses relating to competition and stock issuance
were presented and, in 1902, the Commission issued its recom-
mendations.
In the Commission’s Final Report, Thomas W. Phillips set
forth recommendations that included the need for independent
audits, recognition of potential conflicts of interest, preparation
of financial statements, and liability for material misstate-
ments. Moreover, the Report [Phillips, 1902, p. 3] recommended
that the balance sheet include: “A statement of the method of
valuing assets, whether at cost price, by appraisal, or otherwise,
and of the allowance made for depreciation.” Because the
Commission’s proposals were only recommendations, com-
panies often ignored its demands for greater disclosure.11  The
lack of disclosure can vividly be seen in the 1905 balance sheet
of American Smelting and Refining Company (AS&RC). With
over $113 millions in assets, AS&RC reported its assets in only
five broad categories: Property ($86,845,670.51), Investments
($3,982,576.08), Metal Stocks ($16,418,542.68), Material
($1,118,901.73) and Cash ($4,636,649.18). No receivables, de-
preciation, or reserves were listed on the balance sheet.
In October 1906, in response to the growing demand for
information, Thomas Warner Mitchell began a series of twelve
articles12  in The Journal of Accountancy on the topic of financial
10 For a further discussion of the history of the U.S. Industrial Commission
see Barbara Merino [1996] “U.S. Industrial Commission.”
11Vangermeersch [1979, pp. 1-3] points out that the financial reports of
early companies sometimes did not even include balance sheets and it was not
until the 1920s that several major companies first reported current assets as a
separate section of the balance sheet. Vangermeersch also points out that com-
panies that reported current assets often listed them in an inverse order of
liquidity.
12“The October 1906 column was not attributed to Mitchell but the others
[articles] were” [Brief, 1986, “Introduction,” np]. Thomas Warner Mitchell was
a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a widely “perceptive” analyst
[see Brief, 1986, “Introduction,” np].
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reports and financial analysis [Brief, 1986, “Introduction,” np].
These articles, in the Journal’s words [Editorial, 1906, p. 458],
were: “a critical review of the reports of American Corpora-
tions.”13  In his articles, Mitchell often criticized the lack of
information in statements, lack of review by an independent
accountant, and the company’s manner of presentation. Some-
times, Mitchell suggested ways for improving the statement.
For example, in reviewing the International Paper Company’s
current assets, Mitchell [1907, p. 397] stated the problem with
presenting only a simple listing of assets:
This assumes that the inventories and accounts and
bills receivable were stated at their real worth in the
balance sheets; of course if the inventories could be
duplicated at much less cost or if the ‘accounts and
bills receivable’ included an accumulation of ‘dead
wood’ from past years, the working capital has been
impaired and is really much less than the sums stated.
During this time, accounting writers began to devote more
time to the importance of the balance sheet and the presenta-
tion of current assets. In The Philosophy of Accounts, after stat-
ing that he thought the American mode (assets on the left) of
preparing the balance sheet was preferable, Sprague considered
the order of items on the balance sheet. He wrote: “The ar-
rangement of the items in the balance sheet is of some impor-
tance especially if the list is voluminous.” [Sprague, 1913, pp.
32-33]. Although in an example of a balance sheet, he listed the
items in order of “liquidation,” Sprague stated that an argu-
ment could be made that “in an industrial enterprise where it
was thought that productivity or earning power was more
important . . . it might be that the fixt [sic] plant was entitled to
the first place among the asset.” [ibid.] Sprague then added:
“But, at any rate, some (emphasis Sprague) principle of ar-
rangement is better than haphazard.” [ibid].14
13In August and September of 1910, The Journal of Accountancy again
examined the proper preparation and presentation of the balance sheet in two
articles by John Noone [1910a,b].
14Although the classified balance sheet was becoming the common illustra-
tion, many textbooks [e.g., Cole, 1910, Paton & Stevenson, 1916] continued to
list plant assets as the first classification. On the importance of the order,
Paton and Stevenson [1916, p. 188] wrote: “Some accountants prefer to place
the current assets and current liabilities above the fixed assets and capital, but
the location of these groups is a matter of minor importance.”
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In his 1909 landmark [Zeff, 2000, p. 93] text Modern
Accounting: Its Principles and Some of Its Problems, Hatfield
extensively examined the valuation and presentation of specific
current assets on the balance sheet. In his biography of
Hatfield, Zeff [2000, p. 95] points out that Hatfield with Modern
Accounting became a pioneer in the development of the concept
of the contra or offset approach of presenting valuation ac-
counts on the balance sheet. In his discussion on inventory,
Hatfield [1909, pp. 101-102] stated that although the “going
concern” concept made a strong logical case that “merchandise
for sale be valued at the present selling price with a reduction
to cover selling expenses” generally accepted practice required
“merchandise shall be inventoried at cost.” Moreover, Hatfield
[1909, p. 101] continued “prudence further demands that mer-
chandise which evidently cannot be sold except at a loss, be
marked down even below cost.”
Hatfield also devoted three and a half pages to the record-
ing and valuation of book accounts, acceptances, and promis-
sory notes. In addition to discussing the merits of the percent-
age of sales or receivables methods in estimating allowances,
Hatfield linked the account-specific information with a discus-
sion of reserve accounts and their impact on the Surplus ac-
count.15  According to Hatfield, the Allowance for Bad Debt had
to be established in order to properly value the Surplus account
so that the appropriate dividends could be paid.
The influence of the judiciary upon the establishment of
accounting standards can be seen in Hatfield’s writings. For
example, Hatfield cited the 1869 Supreme Court case of Rubber
Company V. Goodyear [9 Wall. 788] in his Modern Accounting.
In regard to the court’s influence and guidance, Hatfield [1912,
p. 100] wrote:
That such allowance should be made is not only dic-
tated by business prudence and accounting practices,
but is as well commanded by the United States Su-
preme Court. . . . The amount is to be decided in each
individual case but it certainly should not be much
15Hatfield [1912, p. 233] explained the Surplus account as: “But it is un-
usual to distribute all of the profits earned and there is ordinarily further
action by the directors or stockholders deciding to retain part of the profits.
The profits thus reserved from distribution are called Surplus, and constitute
an addition to the capital of the concern.”
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below what has been generally accepted in the specific
business concerned.
Following this ruling, Hatfield [1912, p. 100] provided the
following illustration as the proper presentation of receivables
and allowances:
Bills Receivable $99,900
Less Allowance for doubtful debts  100 $99,800
––––––––
Hatfield’s example of valuing receivables and presenting
the related bad debts as a subtraction from the receivables was
echoed in Montgomery’s 1912 Auditing Theory and Practice.
However, Hatfield’s contra-approach towards the allowance ac-
count was not universally accepted. In his 1910 text Accounting
and Auditing, Cole indicated that the allowance account should
be shown as a liability account separated from Accounts Re-
ceivable. Cole [1910, pp. 324-325] supported his position with
the following statement:
A devise must be provided therefore to reduce assets by
the amount of expected shrinkage in these claims; and
yet if that reduction is made by subtracting from any
figure of assets, the balance sheet is out of accord with
the books. We saw long ago that subtraction is practi-
cally never performed in bookkeeping, and, therefore,
we fall back on the devise of increasing the other side
. . . Its appearance on the liability side of the balance
sheet indicates that the business is responsible to make
good this shrinkage, and that the amount has been
subtracted from income to satisfy that responsibility.
Several other authors of accounting textbooks agreed with
Cole’s approach to the reporting of the allowance account. For
example, Klein [1913] and Paton and Stevenson [1918] advo-
cated that the allowance should be included on the equity side
of the balance sheet.
Despite these discussions of current assets, some large cor-
porations16  still provided a minimum amount of financial infor-
mation. However, by 1910, other companies had begun to clas-
sify balance sheets and to establish reserve accounts for
16For example, on their 1910 non-classified balance sheets, American
Smelting & Refining Company reported over $93 million of assets in only five
categories while United States Rubber Company reported over $120 million of
assets in eight categories.
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selected assets.17  One of the leading companies18  in this regard
was International Harvester Company (IH) which, in the early
1900s, began extensive disclosure and evaluation of its current
assets (inventories, receivables, and cash). For example, in its
1908 Report, IH stated in a narrative that all inventories (raw
materials, work in progress, finished goods) were reported at
the lower of original production cost, actual purchase price, or
current market price. Moreover, IH provided a supporting
schedule of the inventory. Receivables were listed on the bal-
ance sheet offset by an accumulated reserves for contingent
losses, and a note on the balance sheet indicated that a discus-
sion of the contingent losses could be found on a separate page.
Here, IH presented the loss reserve at the beginning of 1908,
the amount written off in 1908, and the loss provision estab-
lished for 1908. Finally, due to the length of time it extended for
credit, IH stated that it was its policy to maintain a reserve to
reflect the expenses incurred in the collection of receivables.
Although IH was a leader in the disclosure and valuation of
current assets, the order in which they were presented was tra-
ditional. As did most companies, longer-life current assets were
listed first and cash listed last [Claire, 1945, p. 49]. The 1908
current asset section of IH’s balance sheet is presented in Ex-
hibit 4.
17Merino and Neimark [1982] write that a major reason for the increased
disclosure by select companies was to avoid future federal regulation. In the
early 1900s, there were increased expressions of concern about the reporting
policies of many companies. This concern was expressed in hearings before the
Industrial Commission, the final report of the Commission, and in Mitchell’s
series of articles in The Journal of Accountancy.
18Two other leading companies at this time in the reporting of current
assets were General Electric Company and Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co.
Although its 1910 Balance Sheet was not classified, GE defined the major
current assets (e.g., work in progress, receivables, consignments) in a narrative
and stated that proper allowances had been made for losses in the accounts. In
confirmation of this, GE’s auditor (Marwick, Mitchell & Company) in its re-
port [1910, p. 26] stated: “The amount at which the notes and accounts receiv-
able are included in the Balance Sheet represents their realizable value. . . . We
have satisfied ourselves that these inventories have been carefully taken, that
have been valued at cost price or under, and that due allowance has been made
for old and inactive stocks.” For 1910, Westinghouse Electric presented a de-
tailed classified balance sheet-listing both current and working & trading as-
sets sections. The latter section included raw materials, work in progress, fin-
ished goods, and goods on consignment. In the liability section, Westinghouse
listed a reserve for loss account; however, it was a general reserve which
included potential losses on materials, finished goods, and receivables.
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EXHIBIT 4
Current Assets, Combined Balance Sheet,
December 31, 1908
The International Harvester Company
Inventories:
Finished Products, Raw
Materials, etc., at close of
1908 Season $33,854,932.88
Subsequent Material
Purchases and Manufacture
for 1909 Season 13,832,123.38
––––––––––––––
$47,687,056.26
Receivables:
Farmers’ and Agents’ Notes $25,471.132.81
Accounts Receivable  13,064,927.11
––––––––––––––
$38,536,059.92
––––––––––––––
Deduct:
Accumulated Reserves for
Contingent Losses, (See Page 7)  2,224,829.91 36,311,230.01
––––––––––––––
Cash  9,339,054.90
––––––––––––––
93,337,341.17
Although corporations like IH were moving toward more
disclosure, in April 1917, the first national attempt at a formal-
ization of authoritative reporting standards occurred with the
publication in the Federal Reserve Bulletin on “Uniform
Accounting” [Brief, 1987, p. 149].19  Prior to the statement’s
issuance, the Federal Trade Commission, under chairman
Edwin Hurley had strongly advocated the establishment of
“uniform accounts” for several industries, independently
19After the initial committee (Harvey Chase, George O. May, Robert H.
Montgomery) assigned to establish the criteria for an uniform plan for the
independent audit of the balance sheet failed to reach agreement, George O.
May (senior partner - Price Waterhouse) gave the committee a report by John
Scobie prepared several years before for Price Waterhouse’s internal use that
addressed the needs of an independent audit of financial statements [Allen and
McDermott, 1993, p. 51]. This report was accepted by the committee and
forwarded to the Federal Reserve. As related in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
[Uniform Accounting, 1917, p. 270], this report after approval by the FTC and
the FRB and conferences with the FTC and AIA, the FRB then “submitted it
[Uniform Accounting] to the banks, bankers, and banking associations
throughout the country for their consideration and criticism.”
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audited financial statements, and a federal register of account-
ants. After opposition by professional groups to specific aspects
of the proposals, Hurley, emphasizing the need for uniform
accounts and audits, transferred the proposal to the Federal
Reserve Board which had expressed an interest in the idea.
As Carey [1969, p. 132] writes:
The Federal Reserve Board, however, was keenly inter-
ested in the credit worthiness of organizations whose
commercial paper was discounted by Federal Reserve
Banks . . . the Board, therefore, had an immediate and
vital interest in the reliability of certified financial
statements of such enterprises.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board stated that a major impe-
tus for the issuance of the statement was the importance that
banks and bankers assigned to the balance sheet [Huizingh,
1967, p. 69]. In fact, in 1908, the Committee on Credit Informa-
tion of the American Bankers Association had recommended
that banks request “statements certified by reputable public ac-
countants,” however, “[banks’] fear of offending customers and
losing business was still too strong to permit effective enforce-
ment of such a regulation” [Brown, 1955, p. 13].
In 1917, after reviewing a major fraud case in which a
financial statement was not requested, Lough [p. 119] in Busi-
ness Finance wrote: “In the absence of financial statements . . .
there is really no method of telling whether a corporation is
borrowing beyond the limits of safety or not.” Moreover, Lough
[1917, p. 125] wrote that the Federal Reserve Bank “favors”
paper based upon certified financial statements and probably
will “insist that some evidence be given that bank loans are
‘self-liquidating’.” Finally, Foulke [1945, p. 599] wrote that the
Federal Reserve had a deep interest in the development of more
uniform methods for the preparation of the balance sheet, “so
that the analyst would have more uniformly reliable informa-
tion on which to base his interpretation of business figures.”
Although the “Uniform Accounting” statement (a joint ef-
fort between the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the American Institute of Accountants) was
largely directed toward audit procedures, the report presented a
model “Comparative statement of profit and loss” and a “Form
of balance sheet,” for banks to follow. In 1918, the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin’s article was reissued in pamphlet form as the
Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance-sheet State-
ments. When compared to the balance sheets then being issued
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by many companies, the model statement was quite innovative.
As Vangermeersch [1996, p. 387] points out the “focus group of
the report was bankers performing their credit function by
short-term loans,” and thus, based upon their perceived needs,
“its [balance sheet] format was in the ‘current assets first for-
mat’ in the order of liquidity, except for marketable securities.”
This order was in sharp contrast to the British balance sheet, in
which capital and liabilities were listed first, and also differed
from the statements of many U.S. corporations in which long-
term assets were listed first.20
EXHIBIT 5
Uniform Accounts
Federal Reserve Bulletin
Current Assets, 1917 Form of Balance Sheet
Cash
1a. Cash on hand—currency and coin
1b. Cash in bank
Notes and accounts receivable:
3. Notes receivable of customers on hand (not past due)
5. Notes receivable discounted or sold with indorsement or
guaranty
7. Accounts receivable, customers (not past due)
9. Notes receivable, customers, past due (cash value $)
11. Accounts receivable, customers, past due (cash value $)
Less: Provisions for bad debts
Less: Provisions for discounts, freights, allowances, etc.
Inventories:
17. Raw materials on hand
19. Goods in progress
21. Uncompleted contracts
Less payments on account thereof
23. Finished goods on hand
Other quick assets (describe fully):
Total quick assets (excluding all investments)
Securities:
25. Securities readily marketable and salable without
impairing the business
27. Notes given by officers, stockholders, or employees
29. Accounts due from officers, stockholders, or employees
Total current assets
20As late as 1938, some major industrial companies continued to list long-
term assets first on their balance sheets [Vangermeersch, 1996, p. 387].
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Moreover, in contrast to many balance sheets, the model
balance sheet (presented in Exhibit 5) was classified (Current
Assets, Fixed Assets, Deferred Charges, Other Assets) with
noticeable detail about the classification of both “Quick and
Current Assets.” When Cash, Notes & accounts receivable, In-
ventories, and Other quick assets were combined, they created
“Total Quick Assets.” The addition of “Securities” to Quick
Assets created “Total Current Assets.” Heath [1978, pp. 32-33]
notes: “many different terms were used to describe asset cat-
egories during the early part of the century,” and this included
the quick assets — “often used as a synonym for current as-
sets.”21  On the balance sheet, assets were listed in the order of
liquidity starting with the current assets;22  a provisions for bad
debts was established and directly subtracted from receivables;
and inventories included raw materials, goods in process, un-
completed contracts, and finished goods. Later, “the more com-
prehensive financial statement forms of commercial banking
institutions, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., and larger mercantile
concerns” would require a breakdown of inventory similar to
this [Foulke, 1945, p. 81]. Although the pamphlet was directed
21In its description, the Federal Reserve [Uniform Accounting, 1917, p.
272] explained the use of the two terms: “The term ‘Quick assets’ is used here
in the sense in which it is used by Federal Reserve practice. ‘Current assets’ is
used to comprise these assets and other assets which through current are
excluded in determining the eligibility of the paper for Federal Reserve pur-
poses.” Although Heath [1978, p. 33] noted that at this time “quick assets” and
“current assets” were used sometimes interchangeably, “quick assets” at this
time could refer to a subcategory of current assets, namely cash, trade receiv-
able, and inventory-excluding only marketable securities and receivables from
stockholders, officers, and employees.”
22Even, leaders in informative financial reports such as Westinghouse
Electric and Mfg. Co. [Annual Report 1920, p. 10] still listed plant assets first
on the balance sheet. For Westinghouse Electric, recognition as a leader in the
area of financial disclosure was a major change. During the late and very early
1900s, Westinghouse was constantly cited as an example of a company that
held no annual meetings (1897-1906) and provided little or no financial in-
formation [Brief, 1987, p. 147]. Furthermore, Westinghouse had gone into
receivership in 1907; emerging in 1908. However, by 1910, Westinghouse’s
financial reports were among the most comprehensive and informative of
all major companies. In fact, after reviewing Westinghouse history and
financial problems, Arthur Dewing [1914, 200fn] in Corporate Promotions and
Reorganizations wrote: “This [Westinghouse] annual report of March 31, 1911,
is worthy of permanent preservation for its fullness, frankness . . . the present
writer knows not its equal among corporation reports.” For an interesting
history of the beginning, reorganization, receivership, and recovery of
Westinghouse Electric see Dewing’s Corporate Promotion and Reorganizations
[1924, pp. 165-202].
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primarily at banks, Huizingh [1967, p. 69] writes “large seg-
ments of the business community accepted the recommended
form . . . as extending to the preparation of all balance sheets.”
However, since the model balance sheet only was a recommen-
dation, its acceptance was limited.
At the same time as the model balance sheet was proposed,
courts again addressed the issue of current asset valuation and
the resulting effects of such valuations on the financial state-
ments.23  In Cameron v. First National Bank [1917], the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas [194 S.W. 469] held that “to include in
such statements as assets accounts which had proven uncollect-
ible and which by general commercial custom and usage should
not be included in a financial statement” was sufficient to
charge the corporation’s directors with false representation of
the assets. In this case, a company had included in its receiv-
ables the accounts of deceased persons, persons in bankruptcy,
and accounts barred by limitation. Instead of charging such
accounts to the profit or loss, the company placed such ac-
counts in a “suspended ledger account” which continued to be
listed as an asset. Concluding, Chief Justice Pleasants for the
court [194 S.W. 474] considered: “This method of keeping
books and preparing financial statements is contrary to com-
mercial custom and usage.”
EXPANSION, DEPRESSION, AND REGULATION, 1921-1940
Beginning as a time of prosperity and ending with the start
of a major depression, events in the 1920s provided much of
the impetus for the greater self and governmental regulation of
financial statements that occurred in the 1930s. As the 1920s
began, there were major variations in the preparations of
the balance sheet especially in regard to current assets [Bax-
ter, 1951, p. 158].24  For example, in its annual report 1920,
23In Cornell v. Seddinger [1912, p. 396], the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that “Work in Progress” should not be reported at cost when the contract
price was “less by more than $180,000 than the vessels cost to build.”
24In 1926, The Atlantic Monthly published “From Main Street to Wall
Street” and “Stop, Look, Listen!” by William Z. Ripley (Professor of Economics
at Harvard University); these articles were quite critical of the financial report-
ing practices of many major corporations. The articles, later a part of Ripley’s
book Main Street and Wall Street [1927], provided numerous examples of the
inadequate and sometimes non-reporting practices of companies such as
United States Rubber Company, Royal Baking Powder Company, and National
Biscuit Company. In regard to the “progressive improvement in the practice of
accounting,” Foulke [1945, p. 596] credits Ripley as “probably the Renaissance
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American Can Company issued a non-classified balance sheet
with only five asset accounts (Plants, Real Estate, &c., Other
Investment Items, Cash, Accounts & Bills Receivable, Materials
& Products Inventory) totaling over $140 million.
Financial statements such as these probably prompted the
comments of authors such as William Z. Ripley [1927, p. 191]
who, in his widely read book, Main Street and Wall Street, wrote
“Balance sheets are prone to be inadequate or misleading in
two principal respects. One is downright omission of important
items . . . another is the failure to disclose the method of the
valuation.” To illustrate the vagueness of valuations, Ripley
[1927, p. 191] gave the example of Punta Alegre Sugar Com-
pany which listed on its balance sheet “Planted and Growing
Cane, $3,651,579.42.” In determining its value, Ripley [1927, p.
191] wondered “what price they counted on getting” and “how
they found out what the weather was going to be.”
In the reports that did classify assets, some companies
(e.g., Commonwealth Edison Company, Cuba Cane Sugar Cor-
poration, The North American Company) listed plant assets or
long-term investments first on the balance sheet while others
(e.g., General Motors Corporation, United States Rubber Com-
pany) listed current assets. Additionally, while some (e.g., Pa-
cific Gas and Electric Company, International Harvester Com-
pany) offset receivables directly with allowances (reserves),
others (e.g., Westinghouse Electric, Commonwealth Edison)
listed reserves in the liability section. In turn, reserves could be
specific or general in nature. For example, in a narrative, The
North America Company [1920, p. 6] stated it had increased its
general reserves by 27.14% which included “substantially in-
creasing the Reserves for Depreciation.” One major factor in
the increased acceptance of the allowance concept was the Rev-
enue Act of 1921. The 1921 Act allowed the use of bad debt
allowances, which as Chatfield [1996a, p. 59] writes: “encour-
of more recent years in this broad subject was due more to William Z. Ripley
than to any one other individual.” In a letter to the New York Times and in an
address to the AIA published in The Journal of Accountancy, George O. May
(Chairman of Price Waterhouse & Co.) responded to Ripley’s articles. Although
May [1926, pp. 321-324] stated that Ripley’s information was somewhat dated
and “did not constitute an altogether fair presentation of the situation which
exists today,” he conceded that improvements could be made in the reporting
process. Moreover, May wrote that it would be an advantage to corporations to
have common reporting standards for companies “who desire to be guided by
the best practice.”
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aged taxpayers to anticipate bad debt losses and deduct them
before they occurred.”
During the 1920s, the reporting of inventories varied
among companies. Some companies (e.g., General Electric,
Westinghouse Electric) stated in a narrative that their invento-
ries were carried at the lower of cost or market while other
companies such as Sears, Roebuck and Co. stated on the bal-
ance sheet itself that inventories were carried at “Cost or Mar-
ket, Whichever is Lower.” American Woolen Company stated
on its balance sheet that its inventories were carried at market.
Companies that reported inventories at LCM often did not state
what market meant.
This problem was highlighted in a 1926 article in The Ac-
counting Review in which E. L. Kohler stated that, over the last
five years, there had been an increasing tendency to report in-
ventories at LCM; however, this information was not always
useful for “market has at present no commonly accepted busi-
ness meaning.” Kohler [1926, p. 5] therefore stressed: “Because
of the variations in the methods of valuing inventories, a bal-
ance sheet must be judged incomplete if the basis of the inven-
tory valuation has been omitted.”
Although there were substantial differences in the financial
statements of companies, accounting textbooks by the early
1920s were more uniform in their presentation of current assets
[Huizingh, 1967, p. 56]. In most textbooks, the classified bal-
ance sheet was the common illustration and current assets were
listed first.25  Despite this agreement, textbooks differed in their
definitions of what current assets were.26  For example, Kester
[1922, p. 26] in Accounting Theory and Practice provided the
following definition: “Asset items are classified as current if
conversion into cash is expected within three to six months,”
and included cash, receivables, and merchandise inventory.
Kester classified assets such as prepayments and most supplies
as Deferred Charges. In contrast, Montgomery [1922, p. 393] in
Auditing, Theory and Practice advocated that prepayments be
included with other current assets and predicted that “within a
25On the need for classification, Roy B. Kester [1922, p. 25] wrote: “The
balance sheet, accordingly, should be so arranged that the condition of the
business as related to its ability to pay its debts will be apparent.”
26Although “current” was the most commonly used term for this classifica-
tion of assets some writers such as Scovill [1924, p. 278] used the term “quick
assets” for the classification. Scovill noted that corporations used both terms
for the classification. On the Federal Reserve Bulletin’s 1917 Model Balance
Sheet, Current Assets minus Securities equaled Quick Assets.
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short time good accounting practice will sanction the inclusion
in current assets of all current prepayments.”27
By the early 1920s, more textbooks had adopted the use of
the net realizable method for receivables with the reserve (al-
lowance) account a direct offset on the balance sheet. In an
unusual twist, Montgomery advocated the use of the realizable
concept. However, he stated that the estimated uncollectible
amount need not be reported. Montgomery [1923, p. 128]
stated his reasoning:
It is not necessary to state in published balance sheets
the gross amount of accounts receivable and the re-
serves to be deducted therefrom. It is information of
interest to competitors more than to anyone else.
It is proper to state that accounts receivable are “net of
reserves,” but it is not necessary, because an unquali-
fied certificate implies that the accounts and notes re-
ceivable have been stated at their realizable value.
Unlike the other methods, Montgomery’s method actually pre-
sented less information by netting the two accounts.
Also, by the 1920s, the importance of ratio analysis had
been recognized. Arthur Andersen (founder of Arthur Andersen
& Co.) wrote an article for Manufacturing Industries entitled
“Operating and Balance Sheet Ratios.” In this article, Andersen
[1926, p. 351] wrote: “One of the most significant indices to the
condition of a business is that afforded through the use of ra-
tios developed from balance sheet and operating statement fig-
ures.” He then noted that of special importance was the “bank-
ers ratio” — that is the working capital ratio.
In 1929, the Federal Reserve Board issued Verification of
Financial Statements which was a revision of its 1917 balance
sheet audit guidelines and which, like its predecessor, included
a model balance sheet. Since its issuance in 1917, the “Uniform
Accounting” bulletin had become subject to the criticism that
its general instructions for an audit had actually “debased audit
standards” [Previts and Merino, 1998, p. 290]. Also, as Carey
points out, the 1929 guidelines were in response to the chang-
ing nature and needs of an audit and of financial statements.
The 1917 statement [Carey, 1969, p. 159] “stressed balance-
27Agreeing with Montgomery, Kohler [1926, p. 5] wrote: “Prepaid expenses,
such as insurance and rent, are always properly a part of current assets, al-
though often denied that classification by accountants.” Kohler cautioned that
it was important not to confuse prepaid expenses with deferred charges such
as organization costs which should be reported separately.
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sheet items, as was natural in that day when commercial bank-
ers, whom the bulletin was mainly intended to serve, were more
interested in liquidity than earning capacity.” In contrast, the
1929 bulletin stressed the importance of internal control and
“the use of tests instead of detailed verification when internal
controls were reliable” [ibid] as well as the increasing impor-
tant issue of income taxes which were not material in 1917.
Although similar, there were some differences between the
two models presented by the Federal Reserve Board in regard
to current assets. For example, the term “Current Assets” re-
placed “Quick Assets.” The valuation account to offset accounts
receivable was now the “reserve for bad debts” instead of “pro-
visions for bad debts.” In addition, more information on receiv-
ables was required on the balance sheet. If receivables had been
assigned, the amount of assignment had to be shown. Receiv-
ables from directors, officers and employees were to be listed
separately from trade receivables. On the 1917 statement, only
investments in short term securities were shown while on the
1929 statement, both current (marketable securities) and long-
term investments (securities of affiliated companies) were
listed.28  Inventories were to be “stated at cost or market price,
whichever are the lower at the date of the balance-sheet.”29  One
classification, however, did not change. On both model state-
28Verification of Financial Statements [1929, p. 329] distinguished between
the two types of investments: “Under the caption ‘Securities’ must be listed
securities in which surplus funds of the company or firm have been tempo-
rarily invested and those which are considered available as ‘current assets,’ i.e.,
items which can be turned into money in time of need. Where stocks of bonds
represent control of or a material interest in other enterprises, the ownership
of which constitutes value to the holder aside from the dividend or interest
return, they should be considered as permanent investments and be stated
apart from current assets in the balance sheet.”
29This prevailing academic viewpoint of inventory was in sharp contrast
with the base stock method set forth by Maurice Peloubet the name partner of
Peloubet & Co. (a leading accounting firm at that time) and former President
of the New Jersey Society of CPAs. In a presentation at the 1929 International
Congress of Accounting, Peloubet argued that current assets should be consid-
ered a “fixed investment” in that receivables, inventories, and supplies are
always present and normally are maintained at rather constant levels, and
therefore for certain business, it should be carried at original cost. Peloubet
[1930, p. 573] wrote: “Regardless of Government requirements the books of
corporations engaged in a business meeting the tests described above and the
financial statements drawn therefrom should show their inventories on a basis
of normal stocks at fixed prices so that the management and public may get a
true view of the position of the company and its realized, distributable net
income, unaffected by any marking up or down of a fixed asset.”
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ments, “prepaid expenses, interest, insurance, taxes, etc.” were
listed not as current assets but as “Deferred charges” which
followed fixed assets on the balance sheet [Verification, 1929,
pp. 321-354].
To Heath [1978, p. 34] the continued classification of these
charges (and sometimes inventories) as non-current assets or in
a separate category (deferred items) reflected the influence of
bankers upon financial statements and “the bankers’ liquidating
point of view” in classifying assets. As Heath [1978, p. 34]
points out, to bankers, deferred charges “were clearly different
in some sense from cash and receivables,” and, moreover, there
was a question “whether deferred charges would yield anything
at all on liquidation.” Under this reasoning, if current is defined
as immediate liquidation to cash at or near stated value, then
deferred charges may be deemed closer to long-term assets than
current and thus classified as such.
During the 1920s, the courts dealt with two important
cases which addressed the valuation of current assets. In 1928,
in Branch, Trustee v. Kaiser et al., the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania while addressing the question of solvency and direc-
tors’ responsibility, examined the issue of inventory valuation.
Among other alleged misrepresentations on the balance sheet,
the Girard Grocery Company reported its sugar inventory at
cost — which ranged between 26 to 28 cents a pound. However,
after Girard had purchased the sugar, prices “suddenly dropped
to as low as 5 1/2 cents a pound, entailing in this one item, a
loss of $500,000.” On the importance of reporting a realistic
inventory value on the balance sheet, Justice Frazer [1928, pp.
546-547] writing for the court stated: “In addition, they pre-
sented inflated inventory sheets, giving to the actual merchan-
dise the company had on hand a cost valuation, when in fact
the value had enormously decreased.” Thus, under Pennsylva-
nia law, a material decline in the value of inventory had to be
recognized both in the income statement and on the balance
sheet.
In 1930, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
purpose and the proper presentation of the reserve for bad
debts on the balance sheet in Landesman-Hirschheimer Co. v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev. The court observed that the real pur-
pose of the reserve “is to show the probable, true, present value
of the accounts [receivable], or that sum which it is expected
will be realized from such accounts.” Therefore, for balance
sheet purposes, the appeals court [44 F.2d 522] stated:
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The real situation could better be shown by deducting
the amount of the reserve from the total of the ac-
counts receivable, on the asset side of the statement,
and thus fixing the valuation of accounts receivable at
that sum which is probably collectible thereon.
With these decisions and others, as pointed out by Berle
and Fisher [1932], by 1930 the support of the judiciary for the
valuation of receivables and merchandise inventory was rather
clear. Under the court’s rulings, receivables normally should be
reported at estimated net realizable value and inventories
should be reported at the lower of cost or market. Moreover,
Berle and Fisher noted that the law placed certain responsibili-
ties on the accountant to help ensure the proper valuation of
such accounts. Illustrating the accountant’s responsibility,
Berle and Fisher [1932, p. 600] addressed the valuation of re-
ceivables:
The law must look to the accountant to discover
whether the account receivable has in fact that quality
of collectivity connoted by the label which it bears;
whether the apparent realization of profit permitting
an addition to surplus in fact exists.
With the collapse of the securities market in 1929 and the
revelation of massive fraud in a New York Stock Exchange
listed company, the concept and requirements for financial re-
porting underwent a massive change. Moreover, the responsi-
bility and potential liability of management for financial re-
ports expanded. In January 1933, Richard Whitney (President
of the NYSE) announced that companies applying for a listing
on the NYSE had to have their financial statements (balance-
sheet, income statement, and surplus statement) certified as to
correctness by an independent public accountant. Mr. Whitney
insisted that the scope of the audit “must be not less than that
indicated” in the revised guidelines set forth by the Federal
Reserve Board in May, 1929 [Stock Exchange, 1933, pp. 81-82].
Additionally, in a letter to each listed company and published in
The Journal of Accountancy, Whitney emphasized the impor-
tance of the scope of the audit. He requested that each listed
company provide the NYSE with an auditor’s letter that ad-
dressed such points as “whether in their opinion the form of the
balance-sheet and of the income, or profit and loss, account is
such as fairly to present the financial position and the results of
operation” [Accountants, 1933, p. 242].
At the same time, landmarks in the regulation of account-
ing and financial reporting occurred — the passage of the Secu-
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rities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
The 1933 Act conferred upon the FTC the authority to prescribe
accounting methods for companies. Under the act, accountants
could be held liable for losses that resulted from material omis-
sions or misstatements in registration statements they had cer-
tified. The 1934 Act transferred the authority to prescribe ac-
counting methods to the newly established Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and required that financial state-
ments filed with the SEC be certified by an independent public
accountant. Moreover, the 1934 act gave the SEC “broad au-
thority to prescribe the form and content of financial state-
ments required to be filed by registrants.” Specifically, the SEC
was given the power to determine “the items or details to be
shown in the balance sheet” [Hills, 1957, p. 52].30  Thus, with
the passage of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934 and the
establishment of the SEC, the classified balance sheet and the
valuation of listed assets (e.g., accounts receivables, invento-
ries) were now a required part of financial reports for many
companies.
After the market crash, the resulting investigations, and the
securities acts of 1933-34, the accounting profession became
the target of substantial criticism for not accepting professional
responsibility for the results and accuracy of its audits, espe-
cially in regard to inventory [Previts and Merino, 1998, p. 290].
When the profession pointed out that an audit statement made
clear the audit’s limitations in regard to the detection of fraud
and understatement of assets, critics questioned the purpose of
an audit. The establishment of a federal bureau of auditors
which would be certified by the federal government was even
suggested [Previts and Merino, 1998, pp. 291-293].
In response to the criticism and threats, the American Insti-
tute of Accountants (AIA), established a committee headed by
Samuel Broad to address the issue. In doing this, Previts and
Merino [1998, p. 293] write: “the minutes of the AIA show that
the institute’s major objective was to establish the autonomy of
the accounting profession over audit standards.” In 1936, in
one of the first examples of the profession’s greater responsibil-
ity for self-regulation, the AIA issued the official release, Exami-
nation of Financial Statements. Unlike the 1917, 1918, and 1929
bulletins issued through the Federal Reserve Board, this report
30Required registrants were those subject to the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 [Hills 1957, p. 52].
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was published by the AIA with the Federal Reserve Board “ac-
knowledging that the latest bulletin . . . superseded the 1929
edition” [Carey, 1969, p. 205].
As in the previous bulletins, the 1936 statement included a
model balance sheet, and although the changes were small,
there were differences in the treatment of current assets be-
tween the models. The valuation basis for inventory was now
listed directly on the balance sheet as was the basis for market-
able securities. Previously, the valuation bases were not pre-
sented for either asset. The “Reserve for bad debts” became the
“Reserve for doubtful notes and accounts,” while “Goods in
process” became “Work in process.” Additionally, notes receiv-
able now followed accounts receivable in the order of liquidity
[McLaren, 1947, p. 28].
As with the Federal Reserve Pamphlets of 1917 and 1927,
the AIA 1936 Model Balance Sheet included prepaid expenses
in the Deferred Charges category. Graham and Meredith [1937,
p. 25] explained the basis of exiling prepaid items to the long-
term category: “The item Prepaid Expenses is of little impor-
tance in analysing [sic] the balance sheet, except that it gives
some information as to how the company’s business is con-
ducted.”31  The AIA’s 1936 model current asset section is pre-
sented in Exhibit 6.
By the late 1930s, most accounting texts’ illustrations were
similar to the AIA model balance sheet. No longer was the re-
serve for bad debts listed with the liabilities and inventories
were normally valued at the lower of cost or market. Account-
ing textbooks, thus, followed the lead of the judiciary and en-
acted legislation in their discussions of the valuation and pre-
sentation of this financial statement component.
31It was not until 1947 that the AIA in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 30
recommended that prepaid expenses be included in the current asset section
[Vangermeersch, 1979, p. 3]. ARB No. 30 contained another major change in
that it changed the basic definition of current assets/liabilities. Previously, one
year often was used as a primary determinant whether or not an asset was a
current asset. In 1944, in The Journal of Accountancy, Anson Herrick set forth
the argument that the operating cycle of a business should be used in this
determination - not simply an arbitrary period of one year. Herrick [1944, pp.
48-49] writes: “working assets are available cash and those which are made to
appear and disappear by the operations of the ‘operating cycle’.” Herrick then
basically defined the operating cycle as the time in which merchandise is
purchased and sold, cash to cash. As a member of the Committee on Account-
ing Practice saw his idea prevail in the committee’s unanimous vote for the
“now classic ‘one year or the normal operating cycle, whichever is greater’
rule” [Vangermeersch, 1996, p. 388].
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EXHIBIT 6
American Institute of Accountants
Examination of Financial Statements
Current Assets, 1936 Form of Balance Sheet
Cash in banks and on hand
Marketable securities (state basis)
Notes and accounts receivable:
Customers:
Accounts receivable
Notes receivable
Others
Less:
Reserve for doubtful notes and accounts
Reserve for discounts, freight, allowances, etc.
Inventories (state basis)
Raw materials and supplies
Work in progress
Finished goods
Other current assets:
Indebtedness of stockholders, directors, officers and
employees (current)
Indebtedness of affiliated companies (current)
Other items (describe)
Total current assets
Also, in the 1930s, the importance of the analysis of finan-
cial statements and the role of ratios in the analysis was seen in
the publications of two classic financial texts Security Analysis
[1934] by Graham and Dodd and The Interpretation of Financial
Statements [1937] by Graham and Meredith. Here, Graham and
Meredith set forth an extensive discussion of what constituted
cash, inventories, current assets, working capital, and the work-
ing capital ratio and what should be considered in evaluating
them — including the importance of “offset-reserves” in deter-
mining the proper valuation of assets. They concluded with a
comprehensive example of “analyzing a balance sheet and in-
come account by the ratio method.”
The influence of the Securities Acts of the 1930s, the new
listing requirements of the NYSE, and the AIA’s model balance
sheet on the evolution of the current asset section perhaps can
best be seen by contrasting balance sheets of the early 1930s
with those at the decade’s end. While some companies’ state-
ments already met the AIA’s 1936 balance sheet recommenda-
tions, other companies had to create new financial statements.
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By 1930, The American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company’s
annual report presented its current assets almost identically to
those on the AIA’s 1936 model balance sheet. The balance sheet
was classified, current assets listed first, current assets were
evaluated, and the valuation basis given.32
For Sears, Roebuck and Co. to meet the 1936 guidelines,
only modest changes were needed. Although Sears, Roebuck’s
balance sheet in 1930 presented much greater detail than most
companies’ statements, the report of 1940 was still more infor-
mative and nearly identical to the AIA model. In 1930, fixed
assets were listed first on the balance sheet. However, in 1940,
current assets were first. In the 1930 report, by contrast to
inventories which were reported at LCM, marketable securities
were listed but no method of valuation was given. In 1940, both
cost and market for marketable securities were presented. In
1930, Sears presented accounts receivables with no offset for
bad debts and used a general reserve. Ten years later, accounts
and notes receivable were sub-classified (customers, employees,
other) and a direct offset (reserve for collection and doubtful
accounts) was employed.
Although, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, General Elec-
tric Company was a leader in the development of a detailed
balance sheet, its balance sheet evolution had not progressed as
far as American Brake Shoe or Sears. On GE’s 1930 balance
sheet, there was no stated valuation of either inventory or
notes/accounts receivable; only a general reserve was shown. In
1930, marketable securities were listed but whether a cost or
market valuation was used was not disclosed. In GE’s 1940
report, marketable securities were reported at the lower of par
or market with both values given. Inventories were reported at
the lower or cost or market (less reserves) although whether
cost or market was used was not stated. Accounts and notes
receivable were reported net of reserves. However, in contrast
to most companies, the reserve was not a direct offset to receiv-
ables but it was reported in the general (miscellaneous) reserves
in the liability section.
32International Business Machines was another company whose 1930 cur-
rent asset section of its annual report met the recommendations of the 1936
model. IBM’s balance sheet listed current assets first, evaluated current assets,
and reported the valuation basis. The only noticeable difference between IBM’s
1930 and 1940 current asset sections were inventories were reported “at cost or
lower” in 1930 and “lower of cost or market” in 1940.
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Unlike American Brake Shoe and Foundry, Sears Roebuck,
and General Electric, there were companies like American Can
Company that, between 1930 and 1940, developed an entire set
of financial statements. For example, in American Can’s annual
report, 1930 its “Profit Statement” consisted of four lines start-
ing with “Net earnings for 12 Months” (with no explanation of
how this amount was derived) less “amount written off for de-
preciation” less “reserve for federal taxes” equals “balance”
($22,883,940.63). In 1930, with nearly $200 million in assets,
American Can presented a six line non-classified asset section.
By 1935, although its “Consolidated Income Amount” State-
ment still consisted of four lines, American Can’s “Consolidated
Sheet” (balance sheet) was now classified and presented some
detail on current assets. Although valuations for neither inven-
tories nor receivables were presented, in the President’s Letter,
the valuation method was reported. And, unlike 1930, “Market-
able Securities” were reported at both cost and market in 1935.
Although still rather brief when compared to many compa-
nies’ reports, by 1940, American Can’s balance sheet met the
general guidelines of the 1936 AIA model for current assets.
Current assets were listed first. In a note at the bottom of the
balance sheet, American Can stated the basis or the value of its
inventory.33  Receivables were divided into “accounts and bills
receivables” and “deferred accounts and bills receivable” with
the latter reduced by an allowance account.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Brief [1987, p. 155] writes that the development of financial
reports and disclosure in the U.S. was a “period of experimenta-
tion and innovation” for, during most of the period, few au-
thoritative standards existed to guide the construction and pre-
sentation of the financial data. The development of the balance
sheet and the resulting classification of current assets was,
therefore, the response of various entities to a changing busi-
ness environment. In their discussion of why the American and
British balance sheet differed, Littleton and Zimmerman [1962,
p. 92] wrote: “In America as in England, the accounting action
33The note to American Can’s balance sheet [1940, np] stated: “As hereto-
fore, a fixed quantity of tin plate (approximately one-half of our average inven-
tory in flat stock) is carried at a constant price which is substantially lower
than present market price; the remainder of the inventory is valued at the
lower of cost or market.”
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taken came in response to local conditions; different conditions
demanded different solutions.”
In contrast to America, by 1870 through the Companies
Act, 1862 and the Regulation of Railways Acts, 1868, the basic
concept of the British balance sheet had been established: “a
horizontal division was made in the British balance sheet . . .
the upper portion reported share capital and mortgage debt on
the left, permanent assets and ‘balance down’ on the right”
[Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962, pp. 81-85]. This was a logical
presentation, since “British balance sheets were designed to
publicize both the stewardship of the initial use of the share-
holders’ investments and the stewardship of the company offic-
ers in maintaining capital while seeking profits” [Littleton and
Zimmerman,1962, p. 92].
By contrast, in 1870, the purpose, form, and order of the
American balance sheet was not settled — the balance sheet
was a fluid document. In fact, at this time, many businesses did
not issue annual reports. While corporations such as transpor-
tation companies, banks or insurance companies were often
required by state charters to issue annual reports, these reports
did not always include financial statements. If financial state-
ments were included, they were often of a minimal nature.
In truth, there was little reason for companies to do other-
wise. There were no authoritative guidelines to follow, no Fed-
eral Reserve Board, no SEC, few demands by banks, no re-
quests by security analysis, no CPAs to audit the statements, no
editorials demanding more informative statements, and few
shareholders to satisfy. As Littleton and Zimmerman [1962, p.
92] point out: “American business did not at that time draw
significant amounts of capital from the public sale of securities;
there was as yet no history of large issues of stock or of exten-
sive investor losses from stock speculation.” Therefore, unlike
the situation in Britain, the concept of stewardship did not
dominate the preparation of the few statements they were being
issued.
Thus, while the balance sheet concept was still quite fluid,
a significant change occurred in credit policy. As has been dis-
cussed, during and immediately following the Civil War, trade
credit became less important and bank credit became more
important. Instead of discounting two-name notes which car-
ried with them a certain degree of security, banks often issued
single-name notes. With single-name notes came more risk and
banks began to review their credit procedures. Although they
often had personal knowledge of the business seeking credit,
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banks began to make more use of mercantile credit agency re-
ports in their decisions. Moreover, banks began to require more
financial statements, especially balance (property) sheets from
customers. As most debts were short term, banks placed special
emphasis on the ability of a business to repay a loan. Instead of
looking at solvency (the ability to repay over the life of a busi-
ness), banks concentrated on liquidity (the ability to repay im-
mediately or in the short run — working capital).
One problem that banks faced was traditional balance
sheets did not readily provide liquidity information. At this
time, most balance sheets were not classified by assets and if
they were, long-life assets were normally listed first. Thus,
banks developed their own balance sheet forms for customers
to complete on which assets were listed in the order of liquid-
ity. Similarly, because banks were concerned with the repay-
ment of short-term debts, credit agencies and merchandising
firms placed great emphasis on the balance sheet and especially
the liquidity of the assets.
Because of this trend, by the time the great American cor-
porations emerged and a corresponding increase in sharehold-
ers occurred, the general format of the balance sheet had been
established. The credit aspects of business still determined the
financial reporting practices. Littleton and Zimmerman [1962,
pp. 92-93], write: “Circulation of financial statements to share-
holders would not be necessary; because of the nature of the
loan, the working capital position of the debtor was of greatest
interest to these banks . . . the party most interested in seeing
the balance sheet was the lender; his chief concern was logically
the borrower’s ability to repay a short-term loan.”
The banker’s balance sheet (assets on the left and in the
order of liquidity) gained credence with the 1917 issuance of
the “Uniform Accounting” statement by the Federal Reserve
Board. Although the model balance sheet in the statement was
not required, it provided guidelines for companies to follow at a
time when few guidelines were available. Yet, at this time, some
companies still did not issue classified balance sheets and many
listed plant assets first. The usefulness of the availability of
such classifications was shown by the increase in the number
and importance of security analysis.34
34In 1919, Alexander Wall, Secretary-Treasury of the Robert Morris Associ-
ates set forth a systematic method of analysis and followed that with analysis
studies based upon the comparison of companies within industries [Brown,
1955, pp. 14-15].
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In 1929, the Federal Reserve System issued the Verification
of Financial Statements, a revision of its 1917 balance sheet
audit guidelines and, like its predecessor, included a model bal-
ance sheet. As before, the model was only by way of a guideline
and it was not always followed. Its similarity in format, how-
ever, reinforced the concept of listing items in the order of
liquidity. Moreover, although the 1917 and 1929 reports were
largely directed at banks, other business often looked upon the
model balance sheets as basic guidelines for their own state-
ments [Huizingh, 1967, p. 69].
With the collapse of the securities market and the revela-
tion of improper financial reporting, financial reporting under-
went an extensive investigation and ultimately a permanent
change. The Securities Act of 1933 conferred upon the FTC the
authority to prescribe accounting methods for companies. The
1934 Securities and Exchange Act transferred the authority to
prescribe accounting methods to the newly established SEC
and required that financial statements filed with the SEC be
certified by an independent public accountant. Additionally, the
1933 Act required the inclusion of a balance sheet and profit
and loss data “in such form as the Commission shall prescribe”
while the 1934 act gave the SEC “broad authority to prescribe
the form and content of financial statements” [Hills, 1957, p.
52].
In 1936, the AIA issued its Examination of Financial State-
ments. This report, which superseded the 1929 bulletin issued
by the Federal Reserve Board, was the accounting profession’s
first major step toward self regulation and a commitment to
more uniform financial statements. As in previous bulletins, the
statement included a model balance sheet. Although this was
similar in many ways to previous statements, it placed greater
emphasis upon the proper valuation of current assets on the
balance sheet.
Although comprehensive guidelines for the presentation
and valuation of current assets were put forth in 1917 and 1927,
these guidelines often were ignored. Only after the 1933-34 se-
curities acts and the issuance of the AIA’s model current asset
section in 1936 did companies have the liability incentive and
the authoritative guidelines available to disclose and appropri-
ately value current assets on the balance sheet.35  Although
35Although railroads were leaders in their acceptance of the classified bal-
ance sheet, it was the 1950s before many railroads discontinued the practice of
listing current assets after plant assets and investments on the balance sheet.
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current assets have been reexamined and redefined several
times since the 1936 model was presented, the overall format of
today’s current asset section is still quite similar to that of 1936.
Accounting historians might continue the exploration begun in
this paper by contrasting the historical development of that
model with the historical development of the presentation and
valuation of current assets in countries such as Britain or
France in which government regulation of companies and
authoritative reporting standards developed much earlier.
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Abstract: This paper explores the structure of the Canadian audit
market between 1901 and 1941 based on a sample of 3661 financial
statements from 956 firms. Two aspects of the market are examined:
first, the overall degree of market concentration, and second, the
existence of market segmentation. In addition, a specific concern of
the paper is to analyse competition between domestic accounting
firms and the international accounting firms leading to the merger
of major independent Canadian firms with international accounting
firm networks after World War Two. The data show a pattern of
increasing concentration during the period among a small set of
domestic and international firms. The data identify both a national
market and a series of regional markets for audit services. There is
also evidence of market segmentation by industry and stock ex-
change listing. Overall, the evidence suggests that the early Cana-
dian audit market was competitive but fragmented into a series of
niche markets. Domestic firms were able to compete with the inter-
national firms but the market was becoming increasingly concen-
trated.
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the structure of the Canadian audit
market in the first half of the 20th century. This is a key period
for the development of the audit market and audit firms in
Canada. The first full time public accounting firms appeared in
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the mid-1800s but were initially concerned primarily with
bankruptcy and receivership work. The change in focus of the
accounting firms from bankruptcy to attest work began in the
1900s based on the introduction of statutory audits. The re-
quirement of audits for public companies was written into the
Ontario Companies Act of 1907 and the Canada Companies Act
of 1917 (see Murphy [1988] for a discussion of the evolution of
these requirements). The banks also fell under statutory audit
requirements. After a series of bank failures [Naylor, 1975a],
the Bank Act was revised in 1911 to require shareholder audits
and again in 1913 to require external audits. After a bank
failure in 1923, the Bank Act was further revised to require dual
auditors, auditor rotations and to prohibit a bank auditor from
providing other services to banks [Richardson and Lew, 1992].
By the mid-1920s the Canadian auditing market had thus taken
its current institutional form.
Although a substantial body of work has documented and
analysed the emergence and development of financial reporting
and professional associations in Canada (see Murphy [1993] for
an anthology of this literature), there have been no studies of
the development of the Canadian audit market and the firms
that served this market. The absence of such studies is unfortu-
nate. An understanding of the structure of the early audit mar-
ket would be useful, for example, in gauging the degree of
change in audit concentration brought about by the recurrent
waves of mergers in the industry. It would also allow an assess-
ment of the impact of the liberalization of the trade in services
(e.g., under the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations) on the fortunes of do-
mestic firms. More generally, at the moment, there is no
baseline for assessing changes in the market for audit services.
This paper addresses this gap in the literature focussing on
the crucial first half of the 20th century in which the audit
market began to assume its present form. The dimensions on
which the audit market will be described have been informed
by the literature on the relationship between industry structure
and economic performance [Scherer and Ross, 1990; Baumol,
Panzar and Willig, 1988; Cubbin, 1988]. In brief, this literature
is concerned with the effect on social welfare of deviations in
industry structure from the ideal of perfect competition. Al-
though there are other models of industry structure that are
consistent with competitive behaviour, the classical model of
perfect competition is the most stringent and is used here as a
benchmark. The key issues are thus the extent of market con-
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centration among suppliers and market segmentation. Each of
these dimensions reflects the ability of firms to extract mo-
nopoly rents in the market (i.e., to restrict supply and/or in-
crease prices above their competitive baseline) or to engage in
strategic behaviour with respect to other firms in the market.
Since the existence of monopoly rents is unobservable, this
paper follows the tradition in the industry structure and perfor-
mance literature by examining key structural attributes of the
audit market and using these attributes to infer potential per-
formance issues. The paper addresses three research questions:
first, who audited Canadian public companies during this pe-
riod and how concentrated was the supply of audit services;
and, second, how was the audit market segmented among ac-
counting firms? These research questions are overlaid with a
third, more general, question reflecting a concern with the
openness of the Canadian market within the global economy:
how did domestic accounting firms fare in competition with
foreign accounting firms?
The first research question seeks to document the distribu-
tion of audit services among different suppliers. In a perfectly
competitive market all suppliers implement the same produc-
tion function and are price takers within the market. In this
setting the marketplace will be composed of many firms of
similar size. The first question is thus concerned with the possi-
bility that one or more firms have achieved a sufficient scale of
operations that their actions can affect market prices or supply.
The empirical literature has found a positive relationship be-
tween industry concentration and profits [Cubbin, 1988, p. 52].
The literature suggests that in concentrated industries prices
may rise between 10 and 20% above their level in competitive
markets.
The second research question looks at market segmenta-
tion. If the demand for audit services can be broken down into
a series of niche markets, then it is possible that a firm may be
able to achieve monopoly pricing with respect to a particular
niche. Geographic constraints on practice [Chan, 1995] and
specialized knowledge required for particular industries or
capital markets [Danos and Eichenseher, 1982] may serve as
barriers to entry to particular niches of the market. The exist-
ence of market segmentation thus provides evidence of devia-
tion from the ideal of perfect competition. Empirical studies of
market segmentation suggest that prices may be increased be-
tween four and 34% above competitive levels in such markets
[Cubbin, 1988, p. 55].
120
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/12
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2001112
The third research question examines the effect of competi-
tion between domestic and foreign firms on the structure of the
Canadian audit market. Canada is a small, open economy. For-
eign accounting firms, i.e. those originating in Great Britain
and the United States, were present in Canada virtually from
the beginning of the market for audit services. These firms grew
along side domestic firms and competed for the Canadian audit
market. The dynamics of international competition in this mar-
ket provide insights into the emergence of international ac-
counting firms/networks.
DATA
The paper is based on 3661 financial statements from 956
client firms published in The Annual Financial Review, Cana-
dian [Briggs and Houston, eds.] between 1902 and 1941 when it
ceased publication.1  These volumes include financial state-
ments dated between 1901 and 1941. The Review presented a
summary of the annual reports of the major Canadian firms
through this time period. The summary included the main fi-
nancial statement information and the name of the auditor(s)
and other key officers. It did not include the auditors’ certifi-
cate. This series has been used as a source of information about
Canadian financial reporting practices [Murphy, 1988] in the
absence of archives of early Canadian annual reports. This data
source has not been used however to explore the early Cana-
dian audit market.
Although this is a rich and unique source of data on early
Canadian companies’ financial statements, the database has
limitations. The financial statements included in the Review re-
flect the willingness of companies to provide data in an era of
voluntary disclosure and the editors’ choices of which firms to
include to maximize sales of their publication. While these se-
lection criteria ensure that the most significant companies in
Canada through this time period are included, there may be
biases in the coverage. It is likely, for example, that the compa-
1The data used are all financial statements published in Volumes 2, 6, 9,
11, 13, 20, 21, 22, 26, 31, 36 and 41. Each volume includes financial statements
dated up to three years prior to the year of publication. The volumes generate
approximately 500 financial statements in each of the periods used for analysis
(see Tables 2 and 3). The sample size was limited by lack of availability of the
complete series and the cost of transcribing the volumes into machine-read-
able form.
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nies included are the larger companies in Canada, with widely
dispersed shareholdings or closely held-companies with signifi-
cant impacts on competitors. Since this is not a random sample
from a universe of Canadian firms and there is no reliable data
on the population of firms in Canada through this period, no
attempt will be made to generalize from the sample.2
ANALYSIS
Among the 3661 financial statements reviewed, 2823 in-
cluded a listing of the auditor (or auditors in the case of dual
auditors). Most of those financial statements where no auditor
is listed are dated prior to the introduction of a mandatory
audit requirement in the Ontario Companies Act of 1907, the
Bank Act of 1913 and the federal Companies Act of 1917. In
order to develop a profile of the market during the period under
examination, the audit firms that represented continuations of
partnerships and named individual members of firms were
grouped together. For example, the Clarkson firm is taken to
include the firms named Clarkson Gordon Dilworth, Clarkson
Gordon Dilworth & Nash, Clarkson Gordon Dilworth Guilfoyle
& Nash, Clarkson & Cross, Clarkson Cross & Helliwell, and the
individuals ERC Clarkson and GT Clarkson3  (among others).
The number of financial statements audited by the firms was
then summed. Table 1 provides a listing of the major audit
firms in Canada between 1901 and 1941. This Table also lists
the firms and individuals grouped under a common firm name
for analysis. It should be noted that even with this consolida-
tion of the audit firms in the sample, there are 316 separate
firms/auditors listed in the database.
The data in Table 1 provides evidence of market concentra-
tion among audit firms. More formally, the degree of concen-
tration discussed below will focus on the concentration ratio,
2 Statistics Canada Historical Statistics of Canada Series R783-794 (avail-
able via the Internet) provides a listing of the number of companies and the
value of their production at five-year increments beginning in 1900. The num-
ber of companies in the sample by year correlates significantly with this series
(r=0.95 all companies, r=0.92 companies over $1 million in value of produc-
tion). Partial correlations controlling for year were not significant. These re-
sults suggest that the sample size for each year (i.e., the number of companies
included in each volume) is proportional to the growth in the economy but
that the sample may not be representative of the specific firms that constitute
the economy during this period.
3 Most early bank audits, for example, were attributed to individuals rather
than accounting firms.
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TABLE 1
 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
1 Price F S Price and N E Waterhouse; 392
Waterhouse Price Waterhouse & Co;
Price Waterhouse & Co, CA;
Price Waterhouse & Co, Toronto.
2 Clarkson Clarkson & Cross; Clarkson, McDonald, 266
Currie & Co;  Clarkson, Cross &
Helliwell;  Clarkson, Cross & Menzies;
Clarkson, Cross & Helliwell,
Vancouver;  Clarkson, Gordon &
Dilworth Clarkson, Gordon &
Dilworth, CA;  Clarkson, Gordon,
Dilworth and Nash;  Clarkson, Gordon,
Dilworth and Nash,  CA; Clarkson,
Gordon, Dilworth, Guilfoyle and Nash,
CA; Clarkson, Gordon, Dilworth,
Guilfoyle and Nash; Clarkson,
McDonald, Curie and Co, CA;
Clarkson, McDonald, Currie and Co;
E R C Clarkson, FCA; G T Clarkson;
G T Clarkson, CA; G T Clarkson, FCA;
R J Dilworth, of Clarkson, Gordon &
Dilworth.
3 Ross A F C Ross; A F C Ross, CA; A F C Ross, 203
CA, FCA; J G Ross; A F C Ross; J W
Ross; James G Ross; James G Ross, CA;
Jas G Ross, CA; P S Ross; P S Ross &
Sons, CA; P S Ross & Sons; P S Ross
and Sons, CA; G G Dustan, CA; P S
Ross & Son; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
and Co.
4 Mitchell Marwick, Mitchell & Co; Marwick, 184
Mitchell & Co, NY; Marwick, Mitchell,
Peat & Co; Marwick, Mitchell, Peat and
Co, CA; Peat, Marwick & Mitchell &
Co; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co,
CA; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co,
NY.
5 Riddell Riddell, Stead, Graham & Hutchison; 125
Riddell, Stead, Graham & Hutchison,
CA; Riddell, Stead, Hodges, and Winter.
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 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
(continued)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
6 Touche G A Touche and Co; George A Touche 102
& Co; George A Touche & Co, CA;
Touche, Niven and Co; Geo A Touche
& Co.
7 Edwards Edwards & Ronald; Edwards, Morgan 86
& Co; Edwards, Morgan & Co, CA;
Edwards, Morgan, Clark & Co;
Edwards, Ronald & Co; George
Edwards, FCA; H Percy Edwards, FCA;
George Edwards, FCA; H Percy
Edwards, CA; George Edwards;
H Percy Edwards.
8 Scott C S Scott; C S Scott and Co; C S Scott 84
and Co, CA; C S Scott, FCA; John Scott,
CA; John Scott; John Scott & Co, CA.
9 Thorne Thorne Mulholland & Co; Thorne, 71
Mulholland, Howson & McPherson;
Thorne, Mulholland, Howson &
McPherson, CA.
10 Macintosh Macintosh & Hyde; Macintosh & Hyde, 65
CA; Macintosh, Cole and Robertson,
CA; Macintosh, Robertson and
Paterson, CA.
11 Deloitte Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co; 57
Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths and Co,
London; Deloitte, Plender, Haskins &
Sells.
12 Milne Crawley Milne & Co; Crawley Milne 46
& Co, CA; Milne, Steele and Co; Milne,
Steele and Co, CA; Sharp, Milne & Co;
Sharp, Milne and Co, CA.
13 Creak Creak, Cushing & Hodgson; Creak, 45
Cushing & Hodgson, CA; G Creak; L
Cushing; C Hodgson; George Creak, CA.
14 Vigeon Harry Vigeon, FCA; Frank Vigeon 37
Harry Vigeon, FCA; Frank Vigeon, CA
Vigeon & Co Vigeon & Co, CA.
15 Young Ralph E Young; Ralph E Young & Co, 34
CA; Ralph E Young, FCA; Ralph E
Young, FCA; G E F Smith, FCA; Ralph
E Young & Co, CA; Toronto Ralph E
Young, CA; Charles Stiff, CA.
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16 McDonald George C McDonald & Co, CA; 33
McDonald, Currie & Co, CA;
McDonald, Craig and Co; McDonald,
Currie & Co, Montreal.
17 Barber Barber & Co; Henry Barber & Co; 27
Henry Barber, Mapp & Mapp; Henry
Barber, Mapp & Mapp, CA; Henry
Barber, Mapp & Mapp, and etc.
18 Barrow Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co; Barrow, 26
Wade, Guthrie & Co, NY; Barrow,
Wade, Guthrie and Co, CA.
19 Hardy A J Hardy; James Hardy, FCA. 25
20 Gunn Gunn, Roberts & Co; Gunn, Roberts 25
and Co, CA.
21 Oxley F H Oxley; F H Oxley and Co; F H 25
Oxley, FCA; Oxley & Johnson; Oxley
& Johnson, Halifax.
22 Neff A C Neff & Co; A C Neff and Co, CA; 25
A C Neff, FCA; Neff, Robertson Co, CA;
Neff, Robertson and Co; Neff,
Robertson and Co, CA; Neff,
Robertson and Co.
23 Helliwell Helliwell, Maclachlan & Co; Helliwell, 24
MacIachlan & Co, CA; Helliwell, Moore
& Maclachlan, CA; Helliwell, Moore
and Maclachlan, Vancouver.
24 Welch H J Welch, CA; Henry J Welch, FCA, 24
Toronto; Lawson, Welch & Campbell;
Lawson, Welch & Campbell, CA;
Lawson, Welch & Co; Welch, Anderson
and Co; Welch, Anderson and Co, CA;
Welch, Campbell & Lawless, CA;
Welch, Campbell and Lawless; Welch,
Campbell, Lawless and Parker CA.
25 Piers Piers, Evans and Co; T L E Piers; 24
T L E Piers, CA.
26 Haskins Deloitte, Plender, Haskins and Sells; 22
Haskins & Sells Haskins & Sells, CA;
Haskins & Sells, CPA; Haskins & Sells,
NY.
 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
(continued)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
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 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
(continued)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
27 Langley J P Langley; J P Langley and Co; 22
J P Langley and Co, Toronto;
J P Langley, FCA. 22
28 Jewell F G Jewell, FCA; George S Jewell. 21
29 Stiff and Stiff Bros & Sime, CA. 20
Sime
30 Hudsons Oscar Hudson & Co; Oscar Hudson & 20
Co, CA; Oscar Hudson & Co, Toronto.
31 Mcauliffe McAuliffe, Davis & Hope; McAuliffe, 20
Davis and Hope, CA, London, NY
and Barcelona.
C
m
, where “m” refers to the number of firms used in the calcula-
tion. The concentration ratio measures the percentage of the
market served by some number of firms (typically 4, 6 or 8 firm
concentration ratios are calculated). The concentration ratio
has, historically, been used by regulators as a first test of the
degree of competitiveness of industries [Miller, 1955] and is
still used in Canada as a benchmark [Canada, 1991]. The em-
pirical evidence reviewed by Cubbin [1988] suggests that firms
gain monopoly power when the four firm concentration ratio
exceeds 60%. In Canada, under the Competition Act, a merger
between firms in the same industry may be prevented if the
four firm concentration ratio exceeds 65%. The concentration
ratio is also the most commonly used empirical measure of
concentration. It is the measure used in all of the existing stud-
ies of the audit market and so will be used here to allow com-
parison with those studies.4
4 The United States Department of Justice has adopted the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index as a first test of market concentration. This index is defined
as the sum of the squared percentages of market share of all firms in an
industry. This index has the advantage of including all of the firms in the
industry and is based on economic theory [Kwoka, 1995]. A variation of this
approach is to calculate an index based on a set number of firms. The mini-
mum value of the index would be 1/n where n is the number of firms [e.g.,
Wooton et al, 1994].
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The concentration ratio can be measured in several ways.
Ideally the degree of market concentration should be based on
the fees charged to clients. In the absence of such data, proxies
such as total sales or total assets of clients are used [Moizer and
Turley, 1987]. The institutional environment limits the choice
of measures of market share in the period under study. During
this period, for example, clients or auditors did not disclose
audit fees so this measure could not be used. In addition, the
financial disclosures required under Canadian legislation were
limited to balance sheets until 1951 [Anderson, 1977, p. 10] so
sales and other income statement data was not consistently or
reliably reported during this period. In this paper two indica-
tors of market share are used: the number of clients and the
value of assets audited.
The number of clients provides a reasonable measure of
market share where the clients are similar in size and/or there
are large fixed costs associated with the audit. In this sample,
the known bias in the sample is towards the inclusion of the
larger Canadian firms at the expense of smaller firms. Given
this distribution, the number or percentage of clients of an au-
ditor may be a reasonable surrogate for market share. Moizer
and Turley [1987] suggest that concentration measures based
on number of clients provide a lower bound to the actual level
of concentration as this approach makes the implicit and con-
servative assumption that all clients are charged the same fee.
This concentration measure is supplemented by a measure
based on the value of assets of clients audited by the audit
firms. This measure assumes that audit fees are proportional to
client assets. This assumption may be reasonable when the au-
dit is limited to balance sheet accounts and particularly prior to
the advent of statistical sampling that reduced the cost of large
audits (i.e., audits based on sampling methods will generate a
non-linear relationship between audit fees and the size of the
client). Moizer and Turley [1987] suggest that untransformed
measures of client size (i.e., using the actual value of assets or
sales rather than the logarithm of these variables) may provide
an upper boundary to the estimate of market concentration.
Taken together, then, the two measures reported provide a
range within which the actual concentration of the audit mar-
ket should fall.5
5 Consistent with this interpretation of these indicators of concentration,
the degree of concentration indicated by the number of clients is always lower
than the degree of concentration measured by assets audited in this sample.
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Over the entire sample period, the six largest firms by the
number of financial statements audited in the sample account
for 45% of audited financial statements (i.e., Price Waterhouse,
392; Clarkson, 266; Ross, 203; Mitchell, 184; Riddell, 125 and
Touche, 102). The largest four firms account for 37% of audited
financial statements. Table 2 and 3 track the change in the
distribution of financial statements and assets audited among
audit firms in the sample over five-year windows. The five-year
windows are used to smooth variations due to missing and
small sample years. In these Tables the Big-3 international
firms (Price Waterhouse, Peat Marwick Mitchell, and Touche)
and the Big-3 domestic firms (Clarkson, Ross and Riddell) are
compared with the rest of the market combined. The final col-
umn provides the six-firm concentration ratio.
Table 2 shows the steady growth in the proportion of finan-
cial statements audited by the Canadian Big-3 firms during the
period from the turn of the century through the 1920s. The
International Big-3 firms dominate the market after 1916, most
likely due to Clarkson’s withdrawal from banking audits (dis-
cussed below). The pattern is somewhat different if assets au-
dited are used as the measure of market shares as in Table 3.
TABLE 2
Percentage of Financial Statements Audited
Total
Inter- No Number of Six-Firm
Canadian national Auditor Financial Concentration
Big-31 Big-32 Other Listed Statments3 Ratio
% % % % # %
1901-1905 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 241 NA
1906-1910 3.60 1.69 16.12 78.59 439 5.29
1911-1915 11.00 10.50 55.15 23.35 501 21.50
1916-1920 14.91 19.45 57.56 8.08 532 34.36
1921-1925 17.16 19.82 58.33 4.69 576 36.98
1926-1930 19.53 24.03 51.94 4.50 422 43.56
1931-1935 22.17 26.02 49.41 2.40 416 48.19
1936-1941 21.56 25.26 52.97 0.21 468 46.82
1 Clarkson, Ross and Riddell.
2 Price Waterhouse, Peat Marwick & Mitchell and George Touche.
3 66 financial statements were excluded because the year on which the report
was based was not given in the source material (although it could be inferred
from the year of publication this reduces the risk of misclassification).
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The Canadian firms briefly achieved parity in market share of
assets in 1935/36 when Clarkson audited the Canadian National
Railways (one of Canada’s largest firms) for one year. This brief
anomaly is discussed below. In general, however, the interna-
tional firms have dominated the national firms in terms of as-
sets audited since the First World War. By the end of the period
the six largest firms accounted for 46.82% of financial state-
ments and 61.79% of assets audited. If these two measures rep-
resent the bounds of a confidence interval within which the
correct level of concentration lies, then throughout the period
the level of concentration was below the threshold usually asso-
ciated with monopolistic behaviour.
By comparison, Shaw and Archibald [1970], based on 585
Canadian firms with year-ends in 1968 and assets over
$500,000 in manufacturing, merchandising, transportation and
utilities, reported that the largest four accounting firms audited
73.9% of assets or 41.4% of firms, and the largest six firms
audited 82.8% of assets or 56.1% of firms. The ranking of firms
in this later period is consistent with the data reported here
with Price Waterhouse leading, followed by Clarkson Gordon,
TABLE 3
The Market Share (by proportion of assets audited,
corrected for dual auditors1 ) of Major Audit Firms
in Canada 1901-1941
Inter- No Value of Six-Firm
Canadian national Auditor Assets Concentration
Big-32 Big-33 Other Listed Audited Ratio
% % % % $Billion %
1901-1905 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 $2.5 NA
1906-1910 2.74 9.49 11.24 76.53 $8.1 12.23
1911-1915 17.42 23.47 52.73 6.38 $52.2 40.89
1916-1920 14.52 38.96 40.12 6.42 $23.6 53.48
1921-1925 12.84 41.20 41.72 4.24 $31.4 54.04
1926-1930 15.30 30.92 39.41 14.37 $23.9 46.22
1931-1935 28.22 27.96 37.77 6.04 $23.6 56.18
1936-1941 25.92 35.87 37.53 0.68 $19.9 61.79
1 Where dual auditors are used, each auditor is credited with half the value of
the assets of the audited firm.
2 Clarkson, Ross and Riddell.
3 Price Waterhouse, Peat Marwick & Mitchell and George Touche.
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Peat Marwick Mitchell, Touche Ross, Thorne Gunn Helliwell &
Christensen, and Riddell Stead. The largest changes in the
rankings from the pre-World War Two period to 1968 is due to
the merger of Ross and Touche and the merger of the Thorne
group of firms.
The pattern of auditor concentration discussed above is
also consistent with data on the early U.K. audit market as-
sembled by Anderson and Edwards [1997]. Their data for 1886
show that the six largest firms accounted for 24.4% of clients
while the largest four firms served 19.8% of clients. Similarly in
the USA, Danos and Eichenseher [1986] used Standard and
Poor’s Registry of Corporations to calculate eight-firm concen-
tration ratios of 45.3% in 1950, 52.8% in 1960, 60.1% in 1970
and 51.3% in 1980. More recent data for the U.S. [Wooton,
Tonge and Wolk, 1994] suggest that the six largest firms now
account for between 65% and 98% of clients (depending on the
population of clients used, e.g. specific stock exchanges) while
the four largest firms account for between 49% and 69%. Al-
though the evidence is drawn from different countries, it sug-
gests a continuing pattern of increasing concentration over a
100 year time frame.6
Even in this early state of the development of the interna-
tional firms, it is interesting to note that only three of the six
largest audit firms operating in Canada were national firms
(Clarkson, Ross and Riddell). The three international firms with
a significant presence in the Canadian market were Price
Waterhouse, Peat Marwick & Mitchell and George Touche. The
presence of the international firms during the development of
the Canadian audit market reflects Canada’s position as a
colony and the earlier development of the audit market in the
U.K. The expansion of the U.K. firms into Canada was driven
by the flow of capital from the U.K. into North America during
the late 1800s. As will be shown below this is particularly note-
worthy for certain industries.
Differentiation in the Early Canadian Audit Market: Scherer and
Ross [1990, p. 81] note that service industries are typically com-
petitive when viewed on an aggregate level. Looking more
closely, however, monopoly power can be created through
6Maijor and Von Witteloostuijw [1996] show that this pattern of concen-
tration did not occur in Holland due to regulations on accounting practice.
The trend towards concentration appears to be particularly supported by
Anglo-Saxon institutional structures.
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product differentiation or market segmentation that limits the
effective number of alternative suppliers. Three market
segments are examined in this section: specialization by indus-
try, geography and stock exchange listing. A market niche will
exist if there are barriers to entry to competitors, i.e., the costs
to competitors are higher than to the firm dominating that
niche [Geroski et al, 1990, p. 10]. The barriers may include
specialized knowledge related to specific industries, knowledge
of and investment in specific geographic areas, or knowledge of
and credibility to specific stock exchanges. It is assumed a
priori that domestic firms compared with the internation-
al firms will have better access to niches based on industry
knowledge and geography. International firms, compared with
domestic firms, will have better access to niches based on stock
exchange listing mainly because of their greater familiarity to
distant investors.
(A) Industry Specialization: The clients represented in the
sample capture most of the key sectors of the economy (an
obvious omission is the family owned firms). The largest client
firms based on the value of assets tend to be in the transporta-
tion, finance and public utilities (e.g., hydroelectric power) sec-
tors (see Table 4). The railway and banking industries have
been particularly important in the development of the Canadian
economy [cf. Naylor, 1975a,b]. The characteristics of these two
industries and their auditors are considered below.
Canada is a large and sparsely populated country. The rail-
ways were used to tie the country together and to mould a
national identity [Berton, 1970]. The creation of an interconti-
nental railway was an explicit condition of the Act of Union
that created Canada as a country in 1867. It was thought that
an east-west railway in Canada was the best defence against the
north-south expansionist ambitions of the U.S. The railways
allowed the natural resources of the Canadian west to be ex-
ploited providing an economical means of exporting wheat, pot-
ash and other resources from the interior to the seaports of
British Columbia or the inland waterways of the Great Lakes.
The railways also facilitated immigration and homesteading
that opened new Canadian territories. The railways were expen-
sive to build and operate, requiring government guarantees of
their securities to attract investors. Even with this support how-
ever, the railways proved unable to pay their debt charges and
shortly after the First World War many were nationalized
[Bliss, 1987].
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TABLE 4
Major Clients (Top 20 by value of assets) and their Auditors
Firm Industry Total Assets Auditor (s) listed between
(Maximum Value 1901 and 1941
in sample)
Canadian Pacific Railway $11,166,433,527 Price Waterhouse
Railway
Canadian National Railway $19,695,380,979 Clarkson; Touche
Railways
Bank of Montreal Banking $16,328,350,953 Graham; Hutchison;
Hodgson; Glendinning;
Gowan; McDonald; Riddell
Royal Bank of Banking $15,814,482,709 Marwick; Mitchell; Ross;
Canada Thomson; Shepherd;
McClelland; Sr Mitchell;
Brodie
Canadian Bank Banking $14,880,368,102 Mitchell; Price Waterhouse;
of Commerce Webb; Dewar; Marwick;
Shepherd
Sun Life assurance- $13,090,894,940 Brig. Ross
Assurance Co guarantee
of Canada
Royal Trust Co Trust $12,601,354,134 Hutchison; Paterson; Gowan
Cities Service Co investment $12,532,955,457 No Auditor Listed
Canadian Northern railway $12,357,389,648 Touche
Railway Co
Bank of Nova banking $12,161,327,293 Glendinning; Price Waterhouse;
Scotia Waterhouse; Mitchell; Riddell
Dominion Textile industrial $11,729,428,690 Ross
Co, Ltd
MacKay Co telephone $11,657,950,796 Barrow
Brazilian Traction railway $11,628,799,060 Clarkson
Light and Power
Co. Ltd
Minneapolis St railway $11,560,600,985 Mitchell
Paul and Ste Marie
Railway Co
Union Trust Co Ltd trust $11,435,663,823 Cumberland; Neff; Niles;
Price Waterhouse
National Trust trust $11,417,880,494 Edwards; Scott; Touche;
Co Ltd Geggie; Mackay; Durnford;
Webb
Toronto General trust $11,416,574,440 Clarkson; Hardy; Spence;
Trusts Corp Macbeth
Imperial Bank banking $11,324,139,893 Clarkson; Dilworth; Mitchell;
of Canada Macintosh; Price Waterhouse
Canada Life assurance- $11,213,499,630 Young
Assurance Co guarantee
Bank of Toronto banking $11,118,459,249 Clarkson; Glendinning;
McClelland; Shepherd; Price
Waterhouse; Mitchell
132
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/12
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2001124
The railways were largely financed by bonds sold in the
London, UK, market [Bothwell et al, 1987, p. 178]. In fact the
majority of UK funds raised between Confederation (1867) and
the First World War were used to finance the construction of
Canada’s two transcontinental railways [Naylor, 1975a, p. 229].
Not surprisingly, then, the financial statements issued by the
railways were audited by U.K. audit firms: the Canadian North-
ern Railway was audited by George Touche until its national-
ization in 1919; the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) was
audited by Price Waterhouse; the Canadian National Railway
(CNR) was also audited by George Touche with the exception of
one year, 1935, when the Clarkson firm acted as auditor. This
incident deserves special mention, as the CNR is such a large
company that this change in auditors has a notable affect on
the aggregate data.
The brief incursion of Clarkson into railway audits is not
mentioned in the history of the firm [Little, 1964] nor is
Touches’ brief loss of this client mentioned in that firm’s his-
tory [Collard, 1983]. In the years immediately after the depres-
sion Canada’s railways were in dire financial distress and in
1933 the government of the day stepped in to attempt to save
the Canadian National Railway. Three trustees who had abso-
lute control replaced the Board of Directors of the CNR.7  The
trustees took office in 1934 and remained until mid-1936. The
auditors of the CNR were also directed to report directly to
Parliament rather than to management.
In 1934 George Touche acted as auditor (as he had in previ-
ous years) and laid before Parliament (and thereby the Cana-
dian public) a report on the capital structure of the CNR over
the previous twenty years. The report showed that the CNR was
essentially bankrupt but the firm had disguised this by inad-
equate charges for depreciation and obsolescence, and by treat-
ing government infusions of cash as equity rather than debt
[Thomson, 1938, p. 684]. This report was apparently not well
received by government.
The general public believes . . . that because part of the
content of these reports did not please the government
of the day [a Conservative majority government], the
auditing services of Messrs. George Touche & Co. were
terminated in the year 1935 [Thomson, 1938, footnote
149].
7 An Act respecting the CNR and to provide cooperation with the CPR
system and other purposes 23-24 George V C.33 1933.
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Touche was replaced as auditor by Clarkson for 1935. In
October of 1935 a federal election was held. The Conserva-
tive Party on dissolution of parliament held 137 seats; the
Liberal Party held 88 seats and other groups held 20 seats.
After the election the Liberal Party held 171 seats, the Conser-
vative Party 39 seats and others held 35 seats. The new Liberal
Government quickly set about undoing the management struc-
ture of the CNR put in place by the previous government. A
1936 Act amended the 1933 Act, bringing back a Board of Di-
rectors and separate executive team. One of this group’s first
decisions was to return the audit to Touche; thus, ended the
brief engagement of Clarkson as auditor of one of Canada’s
largest companies.
The financial sector is a crucial one for the auditors given
the introduction (after the 1913 and 1923 Bank Act revisions) of
mandatory audit requirements for the banks, the two-auditor
requirement and rotation of auditors. These statutory require-
ments provided a large and stable market for audit services that
provided a springboard for the growth of the audit firms
[Cowperthwaite, 1986, p. 10]. In addition, the banks by the
First World War were routinely requiring audited financial
statements to use as a basis for commercial lending. It is likely
that audit firms that served as bank auditors would be more
familiar to bank officers and, therefore, more likely to be rec-
ommended to their customers [cf. Shockley and Holt, 1983].
Under Canadian law, the four pillars of finance — banking,
trust, insurance and stock brokerage — had to be carried out by
separate companies, hence the presence of trust companies and
insurance companies among the list of large clients.
The banking industry was founded on a mixture of capital
from the U.K. and domestic sources. Many of the first banks
drew on U.K. funds and were primarily involved in providing
short-term credit to allow farmers to transport their goods to
market and merchants to finance their inventories. These banks
focused on the large urban centres and on the more populous
provinces. In the Prairie Provinces and in smaller centres, mer-
chants and farmers pooled their resources to create banks to
serve their needs [Bliss, 1987, Chapter 10; Naylor, 1975a, Chap-
ter 3]. In this sense “the Canadian banking industry was a trun-
cated import from Britain” [Naylor, 1975a, p. 110]. These
sources of capital suggest that both domestic and international
audit firms would have opportunities in this market.
The banking industry also has a more complex audit mar-
ket than the transportation industry as a result of statutory
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requirements. The dual auditor provision introduced in 1923
provided many opportunities for the smaller Canadian firms to
gain experience in bank audits and it is common in the sample
to see a Canadian firm acting as the junior auditor along side
one of the international firms. For example, Price Waterhouse
audited the Bank of Nova Scotia for many years with either the
Canadian firm of Riddell or Glendinning as the second auditor.
By the end of the period, however, Canadian firms were disap-
pearing from bank audits: for example in 1941 the Imperial
Bank of Canada, Dominion Bank, Canadian Bank of Commerce
and Bank of Nova Scotia were all audited by Peat Marwick
Mitchell. The notable exception was the Bank of Montreal
(Canada’s largest bank) audited by the Canadian audit firms
McDonald Currie and Riddell (as co-auditor) throughout the
period.
The gradual withdrawal of Canadian audit firms from the
banking industry may reflect the changing nature of banking or
the limitations imposed on auditors by the Bank Act. Clarkson
had been a major player in bank audits in the early part of the
period (prior to 1923). The Clarkson firms were auditors of the
Standard Bank, the Dominion Bank, the Bank of Toronto, the
Bank of Canada, and the Imperial Bank of Canada. In 1923 the
Bank Act was revised and auditors were prohibited from pro-
viding any other services to the banks if the firm acted as the
banks’ auditor. In hearings before the Senate banking commit-
tee on the proposed Act, G.T. Clarkson gave testimony that if
that provision was passed his firm would not be able to afford
to do bank audits and would withdraw from the field
[Beckhart, 1929]. He appears to have been good to his word
[Little, 1964, p. 26].
Other firms may have lost audit clients due to the changing
geographic pattern of banking. Initially the banks’ capital came
from commercial term deposits and share subscriptions. These
funds quickly proved inadequate to meet the demand for loans.
As the banks lowered their administration costs, it became cost
effective for them to expand their retail operations and secure
loan funds from demand deposits [Naylor, 1975a]. All of the
Chartered Banks during this period established national retail
branch networks. As will be discussed below under geographic
specialization, few Canadian audit firms had the office network
to match the expanding needs of these clients.
The extent of industry specialization among the six largest
firms can be seen in Table 5. Each of these firms displays a
distribution of clients by industry that differs significantly from
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the distribution of the total sample.8  In particular, the larger
firms (with the exception of Peat Marwick) show a higher than
average proportion of manufacturing clients. Peat Marwick’s
strength in the financial services and transportation industries
is evident in this table. Other notable industry concentrations
include Clarkson’s and Touche’s higher than average proportion
of clients in the natural resource sector and Ross’ concentration
in public utilities. The Herfindahl Index shows that the Big-
Three Canadian firms and the Big-Three International firms
were about equally diversified across industries (e.g., the aver-
age for the Canadian firms was 0.32 compared with 0.35 for the
international firms). The right hand column in Table 5 provides
the six-firm concentration ratios by industry. While individual
firms were specialized in certain industries, the level of concen-
tration does not appear to have provided monopoly power to
the firms.
Industry specializations are also evident among smaller
firms. The Milne companies, ranked 12th, had more than half
of their audits in light and power companies including Pennsyl-
vania Water and Power Co., Shawinigan Water and Power Co.,
Laurentide Power Co., Ltd, Canadian Light and Power Co., and
Quebec Power Co. The Langley firm, ranked 23rd, was concen-
trated in the mining industry particularly in Kirkland Lake.
Their clients included Lake Shore Mines Ltd, Macassa Mines
Ltd, Manitoba Basin Mining Co. Ltd, Murray-Kay Ltd, Premier
Gold Mining Co Ltd, Sylvanite Gold Mines, Toburn Gold Mines
Ltd and Tough Oats Burnside Gold Mines Ltd. As a final ex-
ample, F.G. Jewell, ranked 28th based on the number of audits
in the sample, is limited to mortgage companies, auditing the
Canada Trust Company, the Ontario Loan and Debenture Com-
pany, the Huron and Erie Mortgage Company, and the London
and Western Trusts Company.
(B) Geographic Specialization: In spite of its vast geographic
size, Canada’s economic activity is extremely concentrated.
There are regional differences in natural resources that provide
a natural focus for activity such as oil and gas in Calgary or
8 This statement is based on a Chi-square test between the industry distri-
bution of clients for each firm compared with the complete sample. All results
were significant at p<0.05 allowing the conclusion that the distribution of the
firms’ clients was more concentrated than would be expected if the clients
were a random selection from all clients.
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wheat in Winnipeg but the heart of Canada’s industrial and
financial activity is centred on the Great Lakes and the cities of
Toronto and Montreal. Toronto is listed as the head office on
33% of the financial statements in the sample, followed by
Montreal with 23%. The secondary centres of note include
Winnipeg, Manitoba (5% of financial statements: mainly re-
source companies), Hamilton, Ontario (4% of financial state-
ments: mainly industrial), Halifax, Nova Scotia (3.65% of finan-
cial statements: mainly financial institutions) and London,
Ontario (3.5% of financial statements: mainly insurance com-
panies). This pattern of economic development allowed for at
least two strategies for accounting firms: either to specialize in
one region or to diversify across a number of centres.
The extent of geographic specialization among the six larg-
est firms can be seen in Table 6. Each of these firms displays a
geographic distribution of clients that differs significantly from
the distribution of the total sample.9  Consistent with Collard’s
[1983] observations, the Ross firm was the most geographically
concentrated of the large firms with over 80% of its clients in
Montreal. Collard [1983, pp. 53-54] notes that the firm experi-
mented with branch offices (in Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa and
Quebec City) but was unable to make them successful. Ross
decided as a policy to “stick to their own backyard”. Clarkson
was highly concentrated in Toronto while Peat Marwick and
George Touche both have a higher than average proportion of
clients in western Canada (British Columbia, Alberta, Sas-
katchewan and Manitoba).
The Herfindahl Index reported at the bottom of Table 6
allows the extent of geographic diversification of the firms to be
compared. The Big-Three Canadian audit firms all have a
higher index values than the Big-Three International Firms.
This reflects the greater concentration of the Canadian firms’
clients in specific geographic markets. The international firms
have very low index values indicating a diversity of client loca-
tions across Canada. The right hand column in Table 6 provides
the six-firm concentration ratios by location. While individual
firms were specialized in certain areas, the level of concentra-
tion does not appear to have provided monopoly power to the
firms.
9 This statement is based on a Chi-square test between the geographic
distribution of clients for each firm compared with the complete sample. All
results were significant at p<0.05 allowing the conclusion that the distribution
of the firms’ clients was more concentrated than would be expected if the
clients were a random selection from all clients.
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The pattern of specialization in a restricted geographic area
is also common of the smaller firms. The firm of C.S. Scott, for
example, ranks as the eighth largest auditor during this period.
Their clients however were concentrated in Hamilton, Ontario
including Dominion Power and Transmission Company,
Hamilton Bridge Company, Frost Steel and Wire, Canadian
Westinghouse Co. Ltd., the Bank of Hamilton, Sawyer Massey
Ltd., and Tuckett Tobacco Co. Similarly, the MacIntosh firms,
ranked as the tenth largest auditor of the period, operated pri-
marily in and around Montreal, PQ including clients such as
Ames Holden McCready Ltd, Atlantic Sugar Refinery, Bruck
Silk Mills, Calgary Power Company (which in spite of the name
was headquartered in Montreal), Canadian Vickers Ltd., Con-
solidated Oka Sand and Gravel Co., Intercolonial Coal Mining,
MacLaren Power and Paper Co, Ottawa-Montreal Power Co,
Ltd, and Southern Canada Power Co., Ltd. The firm of Creak,
Cushing and Hodgson, ranked 13th, is also concentrated in the
Montreal area with clients such as National Breweries Ltd,
Ogilvie Flour Mills Co., Ltd, Paton Manufacturing Company of
Sherbrooke, Price Brothers & Co. Ltd, Tooke Bros Ltd, Interna-
tional Power Co. Ltd, Canada Iron Corporations, Ltd, and Ca-
nadian Airways, Ltd.
(C) Stock Exchange Listings: Among the 3661 financial state-
ments analysed, 2414 (66%) indicated that the firm was pub-
licly traded on at least one stock exchange. These financial
statements indicated a total of 3636 listings. The location of
these listings is summarized in Table 7.
TABLE 7
Stock Exchange Listings
Stock Exchange Number of Percentage
listings of sample Cumulative
Toronto 1666 45.85 45.85
Montreal 1349 37.10 82.95
London 324 8.91 91.86
New York 146 4.02 95.88
Vancouver 34 0.94 96.82
Calgary 32 0.85 97.67
Winnipeg 31 0.85 98.52
All other foreign
stock exchanges 54 1.49 100.00
Total 3636
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The data in Table 7 indicate that firms were predominately
listed on Canadian stock exchanges (approximately 87% of all
listings). Where these firms sought foreign funds, the most
common listings were on the New York and London stock ex-
changes. The firms listed on the London Stock Exchange were
primarily railways and public utilities (light and power com-
panies). Canadian National Railways and Canadian Northern
Railways are reported as listed solely on the London exchange
while Canadian Pacific Railways was listed on the Toronto and
Montreal exchanges in addition to being listed on the London
exchange. Other Canadian companies that limited their listings
to London include the Hudson Bay Company, Trust and Loan
Company of Canada and the Robert Simpson Company. The
New York Stock Exchange attracted a more diverse group of
Canadian companies and very few who chose to list solely on
that exchange (e.g., the International Nickel Company and
Borden Co.).
Within Canada, the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges
dominate the listings. These two exchanges account for eighty-
three percent (82.9%) of total listings. Naturally, given the
extent of listings on these exchanges, most sectors of the
Canadian economy are represented. The smaller Canadian ex-
changes tend to be specialized in resource-based companies op-
erating in the region of the exchange. For example, firms
listed on the Calgary exchange tended to operate in the petro-
leum industry (exploration and refining); firms listed on the
Vancouver exchange tended to be petroleum and mining firms.
The larger audit firms in the sample have a slightly larger
proportion of listed clients than smaller firms. For example,
among the six largest audit firms 75% of clients are listed while
among the bottom six audit firms on the ranked list in Table 1,
68% of clients are listed (among 121 audit firms that appear
only once in the sample 68.3% have listed clients). The rela-
tively small variation among large and small firms on this vari-
able is probably a reflection of the selection criteria used by the
editors of the Review. Presumably to ensure a market for their
publication they have focussed on those Canadian firms that
were followed by investors, resulting in a bias toward listed
firms, and/or were of interest to competitors, resulting in a bias
toward larger firms. Unfortunately in the absence of reliable
data on the population of firms during this period, it is impos-
sible to generalize beyond the sample at hand.
Among the top six audit firms, 75.9% of the clients of Cana-
dian firms and 76.2% of international firms were listed on at
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least one exchange. On average, therefore, Canadian firms dur-
ing this period were doing as well as the international firms in
attracting listed clients. Focusing on the clients listed on the
London and New York exchanges can refine this view of the
market. The big-three international firms in the sample had
11% of their Canadian clients with listings on the London ex-
change and 6% on the New York exchange. By comparison, the
big-three Canadian firms had 6.3% of their clients with listings
on the London exchange and 1.9% on the New York exchange.
These data suggest that Canadian companies listed on foreign
exchanges, particularly on the New York exchange, tended to
favour the international accounting firms.
DISCUSSION
 The data presented above show that the Canadian audit
market was becoming more concentrated over the first half of
the 20th century. Brozen [1982, pp. 27-38] identifies two time
patterns of increasing industry concentration. Concentration
based on technological innovation tends to occur in the early
years of a product’s life cycle and then is gradually eroded by
competition and further product innovation. This is not the
case in the Canadian audit market. The second pattern begins
with a diffuse market followed by increasing concentration
based on improved transportation and communications tech-
nologies, and economies of scale in production. Tedlow [1988],
commenting on the latter pattern, shows that the pace of con-
centration was uneven in the U.S. consisting of a series of sharp
rises in market concentration interspersed with periods of
stability. For most of the period considered in this paper the
level of concentration remained constant with the exception of
a surge during the late 1920s. The pattern observed in the Cana-
dian audit market is consistent with Brozen’s [1990] second
model of concentration but is at odds with Tedlow’s [1988]
findings. Both of these observations require comment.
Concentration in the Canadian audit market was not based
on technological breakthroughs that allowed firms to gain an
instantaneous comparative advantage. Rather, concentration
emerged gradually as firms differentiated themselves. A key fac-
tor in this process was the professionalization of accountancy
in Canada. The increasing concentration in the Canadian audit
market occurred simultaneously with the emergence of pro-
fessional associations of chartered accountants. The ten pro-
vincial institutes of chartered accountants, for example, were
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incorporated between 1880 and 1921. Although these bodies
did not attempt enact legislation that would give them a mo-
nopoly over practice, they did seek to differentiate themselves
from other practitioners. They were successful, for example, in
having early legislation that required audits specify that the
auditor should be a chartered accountant “or other expert
accountant” [e.g., the Ontario Municipal Act, 1897; the Federal
Trust Company Act, 1919; and, the Bank Act, 1923. Cf.
Richardson, 2000, pp. 106-107]. This format elevated the status
of chartered accountants but carefully allowed “others” to
practice. The additional clause ensured that the chartered ac-
countants would not be accused of seeking a monopoly and
prevented a call for the chartered accountants’ Institutes to
grandfather all those currently in practice into membership.
The chartered accountants’ institutes also established ap-
prenticeship rules that required potential entrants to serve
within an accounting firm prior to writing their examinations.
This requirement had three effects. First, it provided an effec-
tive barrier to entry to possible auditors and allowed existing
firms to grow rapidly based on these entrants. Second, it pro-
vided the firms with economies of scale. In most service indus-
tries, economies of scale are very limited since the service is
based on face-to-face interaction with the service provider.
Some economies of scale are possible by delegating lower level
tasks to others but this approach is limited by the extent to
which the service is decomposable and by the cost differentials
between alternative providers. In the case of apprentices, since
they will have most of the necessary skills after some period of
training a large portion of the audit task can be delegated. Also
during this period apprentices were given a meagre stipend or
in some case would be charged for the opportunity to train in
the firm. Finally, it allowed firms to differentiate themselves
based on the training opportunities provided to apprentices.
This gave large firms a competitive advantage in seeking out
apprentices and hence to grow faster relative to smaller firms.
The rise in concentration levels is also consistent with the
effects of improving transportation and communications sys-
tems on the ability of firms to expand their markets. For ex-
ample, in 1911 Clarkson, headquartered in Toronto, sent his
nephew (Helliwell) to Vancouver to open a branch of the firm.
It became evident after a few years that this arrangement was
not workable and the Vancouver firm was allowed to continue
on its own account [Crate, 1970]. Clarkson was able to open
offices in Ontario and Quebec, however, where it was easier to
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maintain contact including offices in Montreal (1922), Windsor
(1929), Ottawa (1929) and Hamilton (1938) [Little, 1964, p. 36].
It was not until 1945 that Clarkson opened an office in
Vancouver that was integrated with the rest of the firm [Little,
1964, p. 41].
One of the key differences between Canadian and foreign
auditors during this period was the geographic scope of opera-
tions within Canada. Most of the Canadian audit firms were
niche players; they were specialized in particular industries and
locations. The foreign firms, however, quickly established a
wide geographic network. This may have been a result of their
connection to investment trusts with widely dispersed assets or,
in several cases, their entry into the Canadian market as audi-
tors of the railways. In order to meet the needs of railway au-
dits, these audit firms were forced to develop the office network
and abilities to operate across significant distances within
Canada.
The final issue to be discussed is the steady rise of concen-
tration in Canada compared with Tedlow’s [1988] observations
on the pattern of concentration in the U.S. The lack of a dra-
matic rise in concentration during the 1920s compared with the
U.S. can be attributed to differences in the two economies dur-
ing this period. In the U.S. the “roaring Twenties” saw a period
of prosperity and growth that triggered the surge in mergers.
Canada however did not share this period of growth. Bliss
[1987] refers to this period in Canada as the “stuttering Twen-
ties”. Canada recovered more slowly from the First World War
than the U.S. and entered the 1920s with a severe capital deficit
that prevented rapid expansion. The entire period through the
First World War, depression and Second World War was thus
marked by steady conservative growth in Canada.
The other difference between Canada and the U.S. was
their approach to the regulation of “trusts” and other monopo-
listic behaviour by firms. The U.S. adopted the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law in 1890 and began to enforce these provisions
through the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. After the de-
pression further legislation was enacted to address price dis-
crimination, increase the damages that could be sought and
eased the burden of proof [Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 12-13].
These legal remedies ended prior surges of mergers until entre-
preneurs could invent new forms of organization and contract-
ing that did not violate the letter of the law. The result was a
series of ebbs and flows in merger activity in the U.S. Canada
actually enacted anti-trust legislation prior to the U.S. in 1889
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but this legislation used a criminal burden of proof that made
enforcement difficult. The Act was amended in 1923 to prohibit
mergers to the detriment of the public but the same burden of
proof was maintained. This Act remained in place until 1986.
During that entire period only one successful prosecution was
recorded [Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 197]. In Canada, then,
concentration was not curtailed by legislation but was not cata-
lyzed by rapid market growth. The result was the slow steady
increase in market concentration reflected in the data analysed
in this paper.
CONCLUSION
The Canadian audit market, like that of other countries,
emerged in response to the creation of capital intensive indus-
tries, joint-stock companies and government intervention in fi-
nancial reporting. The accounting firms that served this market
in Canada were a mix of international firms (most notably Price
Waterhouse, Peat Marwick Mitchell and George Touche) and
domestic firms. Among the Canadian firms few could compete
for market share with the international firms during this pe-
riod. The exceptions were the Clarkson partnerships, P.S. Ross
and Sons, and, to a lesser extent, the Riddell partnerships,
Thorne Mulholland Howson & McPherson, and Edwards Mor-
gan.
The Canadian audit market during this period was concen-
trated among a small set of suppliers. The six largest audit
firms provided 42% of all audits in the sample. Among the
larger audit firms, the international firms had a more geo-
graphically diverse set of clients than the Canadian firms but all
of the large firms had clients spread across a diverse set of
industries. Smaller firms in the Canadian marketplace appear
to have followed a niche strategy, usually concentrating on a
small geographic market or, to a lesser extent, on particular
industries. There is also evidence of market segmentation by
stock exchange listing with listed companies more likely to
choose one of the large audit firms, and companies listed on
foreign markets showing a preference for the international ac-
counting firms.
The overall level of concentration in the market during this
period was below the threshold usually associated with mo-
nopoly pricing (approximately 60% of the market served by the
top four firms [Cubbin, 1988, p. 62]). However, the existence of
niche markets in geographic areas, industries and, to a lesser
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extent, stock exchanges suggests that firms may have been able
to exercise some monopoly power. In contraindication to this,
however, the openness of the Canadian market to international
firms suggests that entry and exit to the market was relatively
easy. The potential for competition where monopoly rents were
possible may be a key factor in maintaining the efficiency of the
industry.
All of the Canadian firms, listed in this study of the pre-
World War Two audit market in Canada, have disappeared.
Clarkson merged with Arthur Young (which became Ernst &
Young), P.S. Ross & Sons merged with George Touche to form
Touche Ross (now Deloitte Touche), and Edwards Morgan
merged with Deloitte (now Deloitte Touche). Thorne Riddell
became KPMG in Canada in 1979. The Thorne Riddell firm
brought together several of the ranked firms during this period
including Thorne, Riddell, Barber, Hudson, and Helliwell. This
firm, and its predecessors, was an explicit attempt to remain an
independent Canadian partnership [Crate, 1970].
As Cubbin [1988, p. 48] notes, mergers are the key mecha-
nisms by which market concentration increases. Historically,
Canadian competition policy has focused on removing barriers
to trade rather than restricting corporate size or concentration
[Caves et al, 1980]. The openness of the audit market during
this period and the increasing concentration over time are re-
flections of this policy. The impact of the disappearance of Ca-
nadian nameplates from audit firms and the increasing concen-
tration of auditors in the post-Second World War period
requires study to further our understanding of the evolution of
the Canadian audit market.
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Abstract: This article begins by recounting the circumstances that
led to the AICPA’s decision in 1957 to appoint a special committee
to recommend a stronger research program to support the process
of establishing accounting principles. It then proceeds to examine in
depth the committee’s sometimes difficult deliberations that eventu-
ally led to a unanimous report, in which it recommended the cre-
ation of an Accounting Principles Board and an enlarged accounting
research division within the Institute. In the course of the article,
the author brings out the strong philosophical differences among
several of the Big Eight accounting firms that had been impeding
the work of the Committee on Accounting Procedure and that also
intruded into the Special Committee’s deliberations.
INTRODUCTION
One of the major junctures in the process of establishing
accounting principles in the United States occurred in 1957-
59.1  After almost 20 years of experience with the Committee on
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Art Wyatt, George Catlett, Chuck
Horngren, Oscar Gellein, Dick Brief, Tom Dyckman, Marc Epstein and Bob
Mautz for comments on earlier drafts. Mautz is the lone surviving member of
the Special Committee. They are not responsible, however, for the contents of
this paper.
1Prior to the 1970s, what is today known as “standard setting” was charac-
terized as the establishment of accounting principles. In 1970, the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales set up the Accounting Standards
Steering Committee, which began issuing Statements of Standard Accounting
Practice (in succession to Recommendations on Accounting Principles). In
1972, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants created the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (in succession to the Accounting Principles
Board), which began to issue Statements of Financial Accounting Standards.
With the inception of these two new bodies, the term “standard setting” en-
tered the profession’s vocabulary.
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Accounting Procedure,2  there was increasing criticism of the
committee’s inability to secure agreement on the most difficult
problems, including accounting for changing prices, business
combinations, deferred taxes, and pensions. The leadership of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Insti-
tute, AICPA) believed that a new approach was needed, one that
placed more emphasis on research into the fundamentals of
accounting as a means of facilitating an agreement on particu-
lars. In December 1957, the Institute created a blue ribbon
panel known as the Special Committee on Research Program in
order to recommend a new approach. The Committee’s report,
which was issued nine months later, led to the establishment in
the following year of the Accounting Principles Board (APB).
No previous study has reported on the deliberations of the
Special Committee, which was composed of strong-willed lead-
ers of the profession, including the outspoken managing part-
ner of Arthur Andersen & Co., Leonard Spacek, who was the
most vociferous critic of the Committee on Accounting Proce-
dure. It is the objective of this article to relate the Special
Committee’s deliberations in a way that brings out the strong
philosophical differences among the members. As standard set-
ting for financial reporting continues to evolve, both at the na-
tional and international levels, a study of the deliberations lead-
ing to the setting up to the predecessor of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board may provide readers with an un-
derstanding of the dynamics of change when moving from one
regime to its successor.
The author possesses a file of the minutes of the Special
Committee’s meetings, together with correspondence among
the members, and most of the contents of this article, including
2From 1939 to 1957, the Committee on Accounting Procedure issued 48
numbered Accounting Research Bulletins, of which eight were reports pre-
pared by the Committee (or Subcommittee) on Terminology between 1940 and
1949. Bulletin No. 43, issued in 1953, was a restatement and revision of the
previous 40 Bulletins dealing with accounting principles. In the same year, the
Committee on Terminology issued a review and résumé of the eight Bulletins
dealing with terminology. For all of the Bulletins and reports of the Committee
on Terminology issued between 1953 and 1959, see Accounting Research and
Terminology Bulletins, Final Edition [1961]. For all of the Bulletins issued be-
tween 1939 and 1952, see Zeff and Moonitz [1984, vol. I]. When, as will be
brought out in this article, the Special Committee on Research Program rec-
ommended the establishment of an Accounting Principles Board, it was in-
tended that the board replace both the Committee on Accounting Procedure
and the Committee on Terminology. The work of the Committee on Terminol-
ogy will not be treated in this article, as it was noncontroversial.
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several quotations, are derived from this file.3  This article
begins with a discussion of the events and developments that
collectively precipitated the creation of the committee and con-
tinues by turning to the Committee’s sometimes tense delibera-
tions and exchanges of correspondence that led to its report
filed in September 1958. It ends with the appointment of the
members of the new APB, which itself was not devoid of con-
troversy.
CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE4
The Special Committee on Research Program was estab-
lished in December 1957 as a direct consequence of a major
address given two months earlier by Alvin R. Jennings, the
managing partner of the Big Eight firm, Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery (LRB&M), at the Institute’s annual meeting held
in New Orleans. Jennings was the incoming president of the
Institute. In his address, “Present-Day Challenges in Financial
Reporting” [1958a], he gave voice to a growing unease among
leaders in the profession with the functioning of the Committee
on Accounting Procedure (CAP), which had been issuing a se-
ries of Accounting Research Bulletins since its establishment in
1938/39. In particular, he was critical of the committee for
sometimes acting too quickly under pressure and of “the diffi-
culty which exists in reversing positions previously taken”
[ibid., p. 33].
Jennings expressed disappointment that the effort by the
Institute’s research staff to develop a “procedural method” for
obtaining the views of industry spokesmen had not succeeded.5
Some of the fault, he said, “rests largely upon a failure of indus-
try to acknowledge in any major sense its own obligations, and
a disposition to interpret leadership by the Institute as an indi-
cation of willingness to assume full responsibility” [ibid., p. 31].
For its part, the Controllers Institute of America (shortly to be
3I am immensely grateful to the late Leonard Spacek for providing me with
this file in 1970, which may be the only survivng record of the Committee’s
minutes and correspondence. I am also grateful to Price Waterhouse and
Deloitte Haskins + Sells (as they were then known) for supplying additional
files of correspondence in 1981.
4The discussion in this section draws in part on Zeff [1972, pp. 129-171]
and Zeff [1984, pp. 459-462].
5Curiously, the managing director of the Controllers Institute has written
that, in January 1957, there were “several signs of a growing closer relation-
ship between the two Institutes” [Haase, 1971, p. 176].
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renamed the Financial Executives Institute) complained from
time to time that its members were not being adequately con-
sulted. The Institute’s executive committee, however, had never
appointed any industry representatives to the CAP. Its 21 mem-
bers were drawn from the ranks of public accounting practitio-
ners (including representatives from all of the major firms) and
from two to four academics. All of the committee members had
to be Certified Public Accountants. This was an era when lead-
ers of the Institute regarded CPAs in industry as having “left the
profession.”6
Jennings proposed that the Institute consider setting up a
small, full-time research organization whose function “gener-
ally should be to carry on continuous examination and re-ex-
amination of basic accounting assumptions and to develop au-
thoritative statements for the guidance of both industry and our
profession” [ibid., p. 32]. To Jennings, a practitioner, “Develop-
ment of accounting principles should be regarded as in the
nature of pure research,” and it was needed to keep up with
“the economic and social changes which affect accounting and
financial reporting” [ibid.]. To him, staffing the research orga-
nization meant, ideally, finding “five or six Carman Bloughs”7
[ibid., p. 33]. It should consult widely and solicit informed
views from interested parties, including industry, the account-
ing profession, the teaching profession, and representative of
regulatory bodies. The cost of the research organization should
be shared “in equitable proportions” by industry and the profes-
sion. Probably his most controversial suggestion was that the
basic ideas contained in the statements issued by the research
organization should be presented to the Institute’s Council for
6The Institute was slow to bring non-practicing members into positions of
importance, let alone leadership. It was not until 1998 that its first elected
chairperson came from outside of public accounting. By contrast, the Cana-
dian Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Institute of Chartered Accoun-
tants in England and Wales named their first president from outside of public
accounting in 1945 and 1968, respectively.
7Carman G. Blough was a onetime accounting academic, the first SEC
chief accountant (1935-38), a manager and partner in Arthur Andersen & Co.,
an early member of the Committee on Accounting Procedure (1938-42), and
the Institute’s full-time director of research since 1944. As director, he super-
vised a small research staff, which serviced the CAP and also many other
Institute committees, and, since 1947, he wrote a monthly column in The
Journal of Accountancy in which he dispensed his wisdom and views on ac-
counting and auditing issues of interest to practitioners of all stripes. Through
his column, he acquired a towering reputation as the ultimate authority on
such matters [Moonitz, 1982].
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approval or rejection, and that any bulletins approved by a two-
thirds majority of Council “should be considered binding upon
members of our Institute” [ibid., p. 32].
Jennings had issued the challenge. He was aware of the
desire by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that
the CAP make progress in adopting “definite rules” [King, 1951,
p. 43], and he also was sensitive to the series of hard-hitting
speeches by Leonard Spacek, the managing partner of Arthur
Andersen & Co., in which he charged that financial statements
were misleading because they reflect “the application of anti-
quated accounting principles” [1956a, p. 1] and do not reflect
the “true impact of business transactions” [1956b, p. 10].
Spacek also argued that comparability was impaired by the use
of alternative accounting principles, and that the profession
and the Institute had abdicated their responsibility to the pub-
lic by not addressing these problems.8  In a speech made in
January 1957, Spacek argued that “The profession has not ex-
hibited the independence and ability which the public is en-
titled to expect” [Spacek, 1957a, p. 24]. In the words of John L.
Carey, the Institute’s long-time executive director, Spacek ac-
cused the CAP of:
yielding to industry pressure on an important principle
without public discussion. He criticized the committee
also for failing to issue bulletins in the face of substan-
tial internal dissent. Finally he impugned the motives
of members of a special committee of the Institute ap-
pointed to investigate and report on divergencies be-
tween generally accepted principles of accounting and
the accounting practices prescribed for railroads by the
Interstate Commerce Commission [Carey, 1970, p. 77].
Spacek’s criticism of the behavior of the two Institute commit-
tees was reported in the press, and his criticism of railroad
accounting practices triggered a Congressional hearing [Rail-
road Accounting Procedures, 1957].
It was unheard of for a major figure in the accounting
profession to direct public criticism at the profession or the
Institute, and the leaders of the Institute were shocked.9  The
8For most of Spacek’s collected speeches from that period, see A Search for
Fairness [1969, pp. 1-59]. For a further discussion of Spacek’s series of critical
speeches, see Carey [1970, pp. 74-80] and Previts and Merino [1998, pp. 310-
311].
9Interview with George R. Catlett, retired partner in Arthur Andersen &
Co., October 21, 1999. Catlett was a longtime close colleague of Spacek’s in the
home office of Arthur Andersen & Co.
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Institute’s executive committee, with the evident support of
Carey, immediately authorized President Marquis Eaton to take
the extreme step of appointing a special committee to investi-
gate Spacek’s accusations. The special committee completed its
inquiry with dispatch, and in its report dated April 17, 1957, a
scant six weeks after its appointment, it found that the Institute
committees had not yielded to improper influences [Report of
Special Committee, 1957]. If Spacek earlier had little confi-
dence in the leadership of the Institute, by the Spring of 1957
he had become embittered toward the Institute. In a letter to
the Institute, Spacek took exception to the special committee’s
conduct of its investigation as well as with the reasoning in its
report [Spacek, 1957b].
The Institute’s leadership was determined to take the report
of the special committee even further. It then proposed to
Council that the Institute expel Spacek from membership, but
the effort failed [Spacek, 1989, pp. 242-243]. Thereupon, the
Institute apparently led an unsuccessful effort to get at Spacek
through the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants
[ibid., pp. 243-244]. For his part, Spacek threatened to pull
Arthur Andersen & Co. out of the Institute [ibid., p. 237]. He
viewed Carey as an apologist for permissiveness on accounting
principles [ibid., pp. 38-39], which he also associated with sev-
eral of the Big Eight firms based in New York City. For his part,
Jennings responded to Spacek’s public accusations by asserting
in his address that “Criticisms which suggest that the profes-
sion on any widescale basis has lost its independence . . . are
baseless” [Jennings, 1958a, p. 33]. The Institute’s leadership
wanted to rein in Spacek, and this may have been a major
factor behind Jennings’ call for a new approach.
But Spacek continued his crusade. In an August 1957
speech to the American Accounting Association (AAA), he advo-
cated establishment of a “court of accounting principles” within
the Institute, which was also reported in the press. In that
speech, he contended that “Our present American Institute Bul-
letin method is seriously lacking as to the reasoning and the
criteria on which the opinions are based” [Spacek, 1957c, p.
34]. Spacek believed that the [legal] case method should be
used so that “not only the accounting profession, but also in-
dustry, government, teachers, and students will know the views
that prevail [on accounting principles] and why they prevail”
[ibid.]. More important, he argued, “We now have no satisfac-
tory method of challenging what are presently regarded as ac-
cepted principles of accounting” as well as determining which
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new principles should be adopted and which alternative prin-
ciples should be eliminated [ibid.]. As criteria for making such
determinations, he believed it was essential that premises and
objectives be developed and agreed upon.
Another factor that might explain Jennings’ proposal was
the increasing belief that the AAA, a body composed primarily
of accounting academics, had been stealing the Institute’s thun-
der in establishing accounting principles [see Storey, 1964, pp.
40-52]. In 1936, 1941 and 1948, the AAA had published a series
of statements of accounting principles [Accounting and Report-
ing Standards, 1957], which the SEC’s chief accountant would
sometimes cite as authoritative support in his speeches and in
his section in the Commission’s annual report to the Congress
[see, e.g., Blough, 1937, p. 30; Werntz, 1946, p. 35; King, 1948,
pp. 52-53; Zeff and Moonitz, 1984, vol. II, pp. 202, 252]. The
AAA’s 1940 monograph by Professors W. A. Paton and A. C.
Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards,
which was issued as an elaboration of the 1936 statement, was
widely quoted and cited by practitioners and used by account-
ing academics in their university courses. The AAA published a
series of eight “supplementary” principles statements on spe-
cific accounting topics between 1951 and 1955, and in 1957 it
issued a revision of its 1948 statement. William W. Werntz, the
current chairman of the CAP, lauded the 1957 statement in an
article in The Journal of Accountancy and contrasted the series
of “integrated” AAA principles statements with the output of his
own committee, which, he wrote, had “chosen to express its
views only on certain aspects of accounting as the occasion
presented itself” [Werntz, 1958, p. 33]. The CAP had several
times decided against developing and publishing a statement of
fundamental accounting principles, and instead, composed
mostly of practical men, preferred to take up accounting issues
as they became pressing.
In 1955 and 1956, moreover, the AAA had published three
research studies on price-level changes and financial statements
[Jones 1955, 1956; Mason, 1956], which attempted to get to the
heart of the theoretical and practical problems of recognizing
the effects of inflation in financial statements. This subject was
one on which the CAP was unwilling to issue a Bulletin in the
mid-1950s, once the antipathy of the SEC’s accounting staff
toward such reform had become known [Zeff, 1972, pp. 155-
157, 165-166; and see below].
Even George O. May, the former senior partner of Price
Waterhouse & Co. and the lion of the profession, expressed the
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belief in 1958 that the Institute had been falling behind the
AAA:
The American Accounting Association from the
time of its first pronouncement has sought to relate
specific provisions to a broad concept. It would seem
that the Institute must successfully undertake a similar
task before it can claim with reason to be either the
leading authority or one of the leading authorities
upon the subject [Grady, 1962b, p. 278].
One can therefore understand why Jennings placed emphasis
on “pure research,” by which he meant “continuous examina-
tion and re-examination of basic accounting assumptions. . .”
[Jennings, 1958a, p. 32; see also Jennings, 1958b].
But perhaps the most compelling reason for a change of
approach was the persistent unwillingness of the CAP to make
difficult choices on controversial topics. The committee mem-
bers were apparently loathe to declare that certain accounting
practices that had achieved a degree of acceptance were no
longer includible among “generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples” (GAAP), which was the profession’s code terminology
for proper practice. Even though the opinions expressed in the
CAP’s Accounting Research Bulletins were not binding on
members of the Institute10  (which was, after all, a voluntary
association of CPAs licensed by the states), the committee knew
that the SEC’s accounting staff was inclined to enforce compli-
ance with its opinions. But, as Carey wrote, “except as the SEC
or the New York Stock Exchange insisted on compliance, indi-
vidual companies and auditors were at liberty to deviate if they
chose to assume the burden of justifying their departure” [1970,
p. 88]. Although housed within the Institute, the CAP was effec-
tively a creation inspired by the SEC, whose chief accountant
had made it clear in 1937 that the accounting profession should
take the initiative “to develop uniformity of procedure,” lest the
Commission do so itself [Blough, 1938, p. 190].
In the 1940s and especially in the 1950s, it became evident
that three fundamental differences among the members mili-
10Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 [Committee on Accounting Proce-
dure, 1953, p. 9] stated rather ominously that “the burden of justifying depar-
ture from accepted procedures, to the extent that they are evidenced in com-
mittee opinions, must be assumed by those who adopt another treatment.” An
almost identical caveat, but omitting the passage set off in commas, appeared
in most of the other Bulletins.
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tated against agreement within the CAP. There was a profound
difference between several of the major firms over whether a
desirable goal was eventual “uniformity” of practice among
companies, or instead a diversity of practice that would allow
company managements to choose the accounting methods that,
in their view, most suit their circumstances [see Carey, 1970, p.
88]. This was the “uniformity” v. “flexibility” debate that verita-
bly exploded into the literature in the early and middle 1960s
[see, e.g., “Uniformity in Financial Accounting,” 1965].11  Arthur
Andersen & Co. (AA), which had a significant client base in the
regulated public utility field [Spacek, 1989, pp. 8-9], was the
foremost advocate of “uniformity” [ibid., pp. 38-43; Carey,
1970, p. 127], while Price Waterhouse & Co. (PW) and Haskins
& Sells (H&S) were the two leading defenders of flexibility. The
latter two firms believed that the choice of accounting methods
should be tailored to the circumstances of individual corpora-
tions [see, e.g., May, 1943, pp. 183, 251; Kracke, 1947; Gellein,
1957, p. 91; Powell, 1964, pp. 40-41; Bevis, 1965, pp. 21-22;
Keller, 1965, p. 648].
The second fundamental difference turned on the authority
that the CAP possessed to impose significant changes on ac-
counting practice. There was a philosophical split among the
major firms over the committee’s proper role in “forcing” a
narrowing of accounting alternatives, as opposed to a more
“empirical” approach of cataloguing generally accepted prac-
tices. AA wanted there to be a strong hand to change practice,12
while PW and H&S did not see that as being within the
committee’s province [see Devore, 1958, p. 122; Powell, 1964, p.
40], as will be seen below. The views of the other major firms
were less diametrically opposed. This issue, together with the
debate over uniformity v. flexibility, were undercurrents that
periodically surfaced in the phrasing of qualified assents or dis-
sents in several of the CAP’s more controversial Bulletins.
The third fundamental difference was over the primacy of
conventional historical cost versus current value accounting or
general price-level accounting in the financial statements, espe-
cially as regards the measurement of depreciation expense.
Views within the CAP on conventional historical cost account-
11For an editorial and four articles on the subject, see the April 1961 issue
of The Journal of Accountancy.
12Spacek advocated a “court of accounting principles” because he viewed
the CAP as not being up to the task [Spacek, 1957c].
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ing13  versus general price-level accounting or a form of current
value accounting were disparate, and the few efforts within the
committee to advance the cause of current value accounting
were rebuffed by the SEC, which was an arch defender of con-
ventional historical cost accounting in the determination of net
income [see, e.g., Zeff, 1972, pp. 155-157; Walker, 1992]. Of the
major firms, AA was the principal advocate of general price-
level accounting or current value accounting [Spacek, 1956a;
1956b].14  Within PW, it depended on the partner.15  During the
1950s, Garrett T. Burns, the AA representative on the CAP from
1953 to 1959, led an effort to issue a Bulletin in favor of the
upward revaluation of assets, but, in the end, a negative signal
from the SEC’s chief accountant scuttled his initiative.16
Alvin Jennings evidently believed, with Oliver Wendell
Holmes the elder [1891, p. 11], that a consensus on the particu-
lars would come more easily once they could be traced to the
basic assumptions, or “ultimata of belief,” on which they de-
pend. In early December, the Institute’s executive committee
accepted Jennings’ challenge and set up “a committee of the
Institute to study a new approach to accounting research, as
stated in the letter of invitation.”17  The letter continued: “The
executive committee believes that the problem deserves and
requires intensive study by a committee of distinguished
members, representing so far as possible the various points of
13“Conventional historical cost accounting” is intended to describe histori-
cal cost accounting without a restatement for the changing purchasing power
of the dollar.
14Not all AA partners favored current value. Paul K. Knight, in AA’s New
York office, who represented AA on the committee from 1942 to 1953, did not
seem to be an advocate. Knight assented to Accounting Research Bulletin No.
33, “Depreciation and High Costs” [Committee on Accounting Procedure,
1947] and to a reaffirming letter from the CAP in 1948. Both utterances op-
posed departures from historical cost in the body of the financial statements.
15By the end of the 1940s, the retired but still very active George O. May
came to believe that conventional historical cost accounting was deficient, yet
John B. Inglis, PW’s representative on the CAP during its busy period from
1945 to 1951, was a conventional historical coster [see Inglis, 1974, p. 111;
Grady, 1978, p. 324]. May, as well as senior PW partners Paul Grady and (to a
lesser extent) Percival F. Brundage, came to favor the use of general price-level
adjustments, either combined with historical cost in the body of the financial
statements or in a supplementary disclosure [see May, 1949, pp. 66-68; Grady,
1952; Brundage, 1951, p. 114].
16Minutes of the meeting of September 25-26, 1958 of the Committee on
Accounting Procedure, pp. 4-5. The chief accountant at the time, Andrew Barr,
placed his views on public record [see Barr and Koch, 1959, p. 182].
17Letter from John L. Carey to the ten invited members of the committee,
dated December 11, 1957.
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view of practicing accountants, and of industry, the academic
world, and the investing public.” This was an unprecedented
breadth of membership for an Institute committee dealing with
accounting principles. It acknowledged, perhaps for the first
time, that representatives of industry and the investing public
should have a voice in the establishment of principles. It was
made clear in the letter that Institute President Jennings wished
“to emphasize the fact that the scope of the committee’s activity
is not to be restricted to a consideration of his proposal. Rather
it is hoped that the committee will make an independent ap-
proach to the basic problems to which Mr. Jennings was at-
tempting to point out at least one possible means of solution.”
The suggested title of the committee was “Committee to Study
a New Approach to Accounting Research.”
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE
Jennings chose Weldon Powell, the senior technical partner
in the New York executive office of H&S, as chairman of the
committee. Powell had been serving on the Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure since 1954. He was a member of the
“gradualist” school, which favored an evolutionary change in
accounting principles and methods, with considerable discre-
tion being given to company managements to choose the meth-
ods most responsive to their circumstances [see, e.g., Powell,
1965a, 1965b]. He was highly respected for his thoughtful man-
ner and principled views, and he was “an acknowledged author-
ity on accounting theory” [Carey, 1970, p. 92]. The other mem-
bers invited to serve, all of whom accepted, were as follows:
Andrew Barr, the SEC chief accountant.
Carman G. Blough, the Institute’s director of research.
Dudley E. Browne, comptroller of Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, Burbank, California.
Arthur M. Cannon, vice president and treasurer, Stan-
dard Insurance Co., Portland, Oregon.
Marquis G. Eaton, senior partner in Eaton & Huddle,
San Antonio, Texas.
Paul Grady, partner in the New York executive office of
PW.
Robert K. Mautz, professor of accounting, University
of Illinois.
Leonard Spacek, managing partner of AA, Chicago.
William W. Werntz, partner and member of the board
of directors of Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart,
New York.
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Alvin Jennings, as Institute president, was a member ex officio
of the committee. One supposes that Barr was regarded as the
representative of “the investing public” on the committee. All of
the committee members were CPAs.
It was, as Carey wrote, a “high-powered committee” [1970,
p. 93], composed of strong personalities. Andrew Barr had to
obtain the Commission’s approval to be able to serve on the
committee: it was the first time that a sitting SEC chief accoun-
tant became a member of an Institute committee. Obviously,
the work of the Special Committee was important to Barr and
to the Commission. Both Carman Blough and William Werntz
had been SEC chief accountants, and Werntz was in his second
year as chairman of the Committee on Accounting Procedure.
Carman Blough, the Institute’s director of research, and his
small staff had been servicing the Committee on Accounting
Procedure (as well as many other Institute committees) since
1944, and his name was printed on every Accounting Research
Bulletin since No. 25, which was issued in April 1945. Since
1947, he had been writing a column in the monthly Journal of
Accountancy, in which he presented his views on what consti-
tuted proper accounting and auditing practice. Blough was the
profession’s most respected authority on “generally accepted
accounting principles” [see Carey, 1970, p. 87; Moonitz, 1982].
Dudley Browne was probably the first member from indus-
try to serve on a high-level Institute committee, and he was
there to forge a stronger link between the Institute and the
Controllers Institute of America. Browne was board chairman
and immediate past president of the Controllers Institute. Dur-
ing his presidency, Browne did much to improve relations be-
tween the two Institutes, especially on accounting principles
[Haase, 1971, p. 176]. But there was still the feeling that the
Controllers Institute was on the “outside” of the process by
which accounting principles were established.
Arthur Cannon was a surprise choice. He had been an ac-
counting professor at the University of Washington for some
ten years prior to becoming an executive in an insurance com-
pany in Portland, Oregon. He wrote numerous articles, was an
energetic and a persuasive speaker, and had been a vice-presi-
dent of the AAA and president of the Washington State Society
of CPAs. In addition, he had ably edited The Accounting
Review’s book review section from 1950 to 1957, and in 1954 he
launched The Journal of Accountancy’s lively and excellent
“What to Read/Current Reading.” It was in this last capacity
that Cannon would have come to the attention of John L.
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Carey, the Institute’s powerful executive director and publisher
of the Journal. But it was probably Perry Mason, Blough’s assis-
tant at the Institute, who recommended Cannon for the com-
mittee. Some years earlier, Cannon had spent a year at the
University of California, Berkeley, in an aborted start for a
Ph.D. Mason was then a professor on the Berkeley faculty, and
he was impressed with Cannon.18  At 46, Cannon was the second
youngest member of the committee.
Marquis Eaton was the immediate past president of the
Institute, and he was widely admired and applauded for his
innovativeness and leadership in that office [Carey, 1970, pp.
294-296]. Unfortunately, he died suddenly on February 23,
1958. The executive committee did not appoint a successor.
Paul Grady was a protégé of George O. May, the doyen of
the profession and former senior partner of PW [see Grady,
1962b]. Under Grady’s leadership in the mid-1940s, the
Institute’s auditing procedures committee issued the first
authoritative statement of “generally accepted auditing
standards.” Like Powell, Grady was a member of the “gradual-
ist” school on accounting principles [see Grady, 1965, esp. pp.
32-34]. Grady was formerly a partner in Arthur Andersen & Co.
and was the founding partner’s choice as his successor. But
Grady and Arthur E. Andersen had a falling out, and he was
dismissed from the firm in 1942. At that time, Leonard Spacek
was also a rising partner in the firm [Grady, 1978, pp. 55-56;
A Vision of Grandeur, 1988, pp. 77, 79], and apparently subse-
quent relations between the two were tepid.
Robert Mautz was a prolific author on accounting and au-
diting and had chaired the committee that prepared the 1957
revision of the AAA’s series of statements on accounting prin-
ciples [see Mautz, 1957]. It was probably because of this latter
role that he was named to the committee. At 42, he was the
youngest member of the committee.
Leonard Spacek would have been the most controversial
appointment to the committee. He had never before served on
an Institute committee, and in speeches and articles he had
been assailing the accounting profession and the Institute over
the lack of definition of accounting principles. As noted above,
the Institute had less than a year earlier convened a special
18E-mail message from Loyd Heath, dated December 20, 1999, and tele-
phone interview with Kermit O. Hanson, July 22, 2000. During that general
period at the University of Washington, Heath was a member of the account-
ing faculty and Hanson was the dean of the school of business administration.
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investigative committee to look into allegations of improper
behavior by members of two Institute committees, a charge
leveled by Spacek in a speech to a chapter of the Controllers
Institute. Carey reported that “A wave of indignation greeted
this speech” [1970, p. 77]. But Jennings wanted Spacek on the
committee so that his criticisms would be channeled toward
constructive change, and also that he would become a party to
whatever reform was reported out of the committee. Like
Arthur E. Andersen before him, Spacek wanted nothing to do
with the Institute, but Jennings, whom Spacek came to respect,
persuaded him to accept the invitation.19
William Werntz, a lawyer, had joined the SEC’s legal staff
in 1935 and served as chief accountant from 1938 to 1947,
when he joined the newly formed public accounting firm of
Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, in New York, and then became
a CPA.
Several of the committee members had some salient experi-
ences in common. Barr, Grady and Powell had been classmates
at the University of Illinois and had studied under Professor
A. C. Littleton, who was a staunch defender of historical
cost accounting and an exponent of inductively deriving theory
from regularities in practice [see Littleton, 1961].20  Mautz also
was a student of A. C. Littleton’s, but some 15 years later. The
University of Illinois’ department of accountancy has, for many
years, been reputed as having one of the best bachelor’s and
master’s programs in the country [Bedford, 1997, pp. ix, 50-51],
and quite a few leaders of the accounting profession were edu-
cated there. Moreover, Barr, Blough, Cannon, Grady, Powell
and Werntz had all been tapped by the AAA to serve as vice
presidents, and Blough also had served as AAA president.
Beginning in 1945, the AAA had a policy of electing one
non-academic vice president each year in recognition of his
achievements in the profession. At the time of his vice presi-
dency, Cannon was a full-time academic. In addition, Barr,
Blough and Werntz had been accounting instructors for short
periods early in their careers. Finally, four of the committee
members had seen service on the Committee on Accounting
Procedure: Blough (1938-42), Eaton (1945-46), Powell (since
1954), and Werntz (since 1950). It is worthy of note that Blough
19Interview with George R. Catlett, October 21, 1999.
20Grady’s and Powell’s writings clearly indicate that they subscribed to
Littleton’s inductive approach. See, e.g., Grady [1962a, pp. 46-47] and Powell
[1961, p. 29].
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was involved with the committee as either a member or the
principal staff liaison for all but two years of its history as the
issuer of Accounting Research Bulletins.
By contrast to the inductive derivation of principles that
marked Grady’s and Powell’s thinking, Spacek strongly believed
that accounting principles should be derived deductively from
“objective standards” [see Spacek, 1958b, pp. 81, 82; 1958c, p.
91] and, as will be seen, this difference of view between him
and Powell would later cause friction. Spacek was the only
committee member, apart from Eaton, without a university de-
gree. A blunt-spoken Midwesterner, he did not mix well with
the profession’s New York establishment.
THE COMMITTEE REPLIES TO
POWELL’S QUESTIONNAIRE
In a letter dated January 9, 1958, Weldon Powell, the chair-
man, wrote to the other nine members of the committee to lay
out the plan of work. He suggested that they do some prepara-
tory work, by reading Jennings’ address (1958a) and four re-
cently published articles:
Samuel J. Broad’s “Applicability of Accounting Prin-
ciples” [1957],
Marquis Eaton’s “Financial Reporting in a Changing
Society” [1957],
Oswald W. Knauth’s “An Executive Looks at Accoun-
tancy” [1957],
and
May’s “Generally Accepted Principles of Accounting”
[1958].
He also distributed the typescript of Leonard Spacek’s “ac-
counting court” address of August 1957 [Spacek, 1957c].
In order to learn how professional bodies in different fields
carried out research, Powell then asked several of the commit-
tee members to “direct inquiries to a few other organizations
interested in research” and report back on their experience. The
organizations were the American Enterprise Institute (on which
Barr was to report), the American Accounting Association (Can-
non), the National Bureau of Economic Research (Grady), and
the Practicing Law Institute (Werntz). Powell said he would
prepare a report on the National Industrial Conference Board.
(In the event, only a few of these reports were completed and
circularized to the committee.)
Powell called on Blough to “summarize for us the history of
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the Committee on Accounting Procedure — its genesis, its ac-
complishments, its shortcomings, its present position, and so
on.” He also asked the members to consider whether the com-
mittee should canvass the views of accountants, businessmen,
lawyers, educators, people in government, labor leaders, and
others. He said that Perry Mason (a former academic), who was
the Institute’s associate director of research, would service the
committee. Finally, he said he would propound a list of ques-
tions “to find out the extent to which there is a consensus, or
lack of it, among us on some of the fundamental issues involved
in the development and application of accounting principles.”
In a second letter written the following day, Powell asked
the members to give their views on the following 13 questions
by February 1, which are reproduced below, verbatim, from his
letter:
1. To what extent do you think that accounting is
essentially utilitarian in nature?
2. How important do you think it is that there be
uniformity of accounting principles among busi-
ness corporations?
3. Do you think that it is practicable to enforce uni-
formity of accounting principles among business
corporations?
4. Do you consider uniformity of accounting prin-
ciples among business corporations to be more im-
portant or less important than consistency in the
application of accounting principles by each of
such corporations?
5. To what extent do you believe that adequate dis-
closure by each business corporation of the ac-
counting principles followed by it is an acceptable
substitute for uniformity among business corpora-
tions?
6. If you favor the promotion of uniformity among
business corporations, what agency or combina-
tion of agencies do you think should have the pri-
mary responsibility for it? (Some possibilities are
state governments, through uniform statutes, the
SEC, the Internal Revenue Service, the courts, an
organization of stock exchanges, an organization
sponsored by corporate managements, an organi-
zation of professional accountants, an organiza-
tion of educators, and an organization including
representatives of some of these groups and of la-
bor unions and the public.)
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7. Do you think that [an] organized effort to develop
accounting principles should confine itself to
broad postulates, or that it should comprehend
something more?
8. To what extent do you believe that the provisions
of law and the requirements of regulatory author-
ity should affect ordinary accounting and report-
ing?
9. Do you think that we should concern ourselves
with the development of accounting principles for
public business corporations only or for other per-
sons [i.e., entities] as well?
10. What, if any, features of the organization and work
of the present committee on accounting procedure
trouble you?
11. Do you consider the proposal of the President, as
outlined in his article in the Journal of Accoun-
tancy for January 1958 [Jennings, 1958a], to be
practicable?
12. What, if any, alternative proposal do you have to
suggest?
13. What other points, if any, would you like to have
the committee consider at this time?
This was indeed a comprehensive set of questions, but only two
dealt with Jennings’ “research organization” proposal. Five of
the 13 questions dealt with the simmering controversy over
“uniformity” versus “flexibility” (or “diversity”) of accounting
principles, on which Powell, Grady, Browne and Spacek held
strong views.
In a memo dated February 7, 1958, Carman Blough replied
to Powell’s request that he discuss the accomplishments and
shortcomings of the Committee on Accounting Procedure.
Blough recited four criticisms that had been made of the
committee’s performance (rather than undertaking to criticize
the committee himself), which I summarize below:
1. That the committee is too slow to produce results. Implicit
in his discussion was the fact that his small research depart-
ment was servicing too many Institute committees to pro-
vide sufficient staff support. A contributing factor, he said,
was the size of the committee, but a smaller committee
would necessarily include fewer representatives of the
smaller firms and individual practitioners. Blough wrote, “It
must be seriously questioned whether the rank and file of
the profession would accept the recommendations of a small
group of large firm representatives.”
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2. That the “caliber of members on the committee has been . . .
deteriorating.” Committee members, he said, have been
known to “feel compelled to go back to their firms for in-
structions before taking a position on a matter . . . [meaning
that] partners who do not have the advantage of the discus-
sions that take place in the committee meetings tend to
make the decisions.” Partly, he believed that this reflected
the fact that, “since the committee first started on its present
basis, most firms have developed procedures for clearing
technical questions within their own organizations which
were not common then.” Also, it was “hard to keep a firm’s
top policy man on the committee indefinitely. . . .”
3. That “The charge has been made [that] client influences are
felt, in the considerations of the committee, more than they
should be.” He believed, however, that, “While it has been
clear, from time to time, that a position supported by some
member of the committee was one which was being fol-
lowed by an important client of his firm, it has usually been
impossible to assert that it did not represent his independent
considered judgment. Very seldom has it seemed that a pro-
cedure was being defended to satisfy an important client.”
4. That “too many members of the committee are too reaction-
ary in their attitudes.” But, he added, “that when a man has
had enough experience and background to justify his mem-
bership on the committee, he has reached an age when it is
only natural to look at new ideas pretty carefully before sup-
porting them. . . . Accordingly, established procedures are
given a strong benefit of doubt.”
Blough concluded by saying that “Possibly the greatest objec-
tion to the work of the committee grows out of the tendency of
a good many CPAs to object to anything which prevents them
from adopting any procedure they consider appropriate in the
circumstances.”
The members’ replies to Powell’s 13 questions were inter-
esting. On question 10, concerning features of the present op-
eration of the Committee on Accounting Procedure that trouble
them, Perry Mason summarized the responses as follows (with
the principal advocate of the position indicated in brackets):
Bulletins are too brief [Barr, Grady]. The committee is
too large [Grady, Powell]. The calibre of the member-
ship has deteriorated [Cannon]. The staff may be inad-
equate [Grady, Werntz]. The committee settles only im-
portant specific problems and does not concern itself
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with pure theory or research [Mautz]. The committee
is too slow [Powell]. The committee does not work
closely enough with other groups [Powell]. The com-
mittee does not do enough to guide opinion in contro-
versial matters [Powell]. The committee is biased
[Spacek]. The committee compromises too much
[Spacek]. It is difficult to get members with interest
and time [Werntz] [from Mason’s memo to the com-
mittee dated March 3, 1958].
Barr and Grady both complained that the Bulletins did not give
the reasoning in support of the conclusions. Oddly, Browne did
not respond to this question, and Blough let his lengthy memo-
randum on the effectiveness of the Committee on Accounting
Procedure be his reply.
On Question 11, the committee reacted to Jennings’ pro-
posal. Five members thought the suggestion that the Institute’s
Council should approve, or could veto, the research organi-
zation’s pronouncements was impracticable. Several members
liked the heavier emphasis on research, but they were con-
cerned that the proposed research organization would lose
touch with practical issues. In general, the committee was am-
bivalent toward the proposal.
In Question 7, Powell broached the evocative term, “broad
postulates.” (A concise summary of the evolution of the term
“postulate” in the accounting literature, to which George O.
May made a significant contribution, is given in an appendix.)
Paul Grady, a close colleague of May’s, was a partisan of the
postulates approach. In his reply to Question 12, on alternatives
to Jennings’ proposal, he argued for (1) “a qualified group” that
would identify and explain “the broad postulates or premises of
determining business income,” (2) a “research staff to carry out
accounting research projects,” and (3) an Institute committee to
prepare “bulletins on accounting practice which flow from the
research projects or arise from other demonstrated needs of the
profession.”21  Of course, Spacek had been speaking publicly in
favor of the need for the profession to establish the “premises”
and “objectives” of financial reporting. In reply to Question 7,
virtually all of the members favored initial attention to broad
postulates or, in the case of Spacek, to “objective standards,”
and that a study of their implications for principles or practices
should follow.
21With this three-part recommendation, Grady came close to anticipating
the principal outlines of the Special Committee’s final report.
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The replies to Powell’s Questions 2-6 on uniformity re-
vealed the substratum of philosophical division that was, as
suggested above, impeding the work of the Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure. The representative of the Controllers Insti-
tute on the Special Committee, Dudley Browne, was implacably
opposed to uniformity. In reply to Question 2, he wrote, “I
regard uniformity as a device designed to reduce accounting
from a profession to a clerical process,” and he said “I am
inclined to favor adequate disclosure over uniformity” in reply
to Question 5. Eight years later, Browne declared:
I maintain that divergent [accounting] practices are
both the outgrowth and reflection of our economic sys-
tem and that the effort to eliminate or reduce them is
not a service either to our accounting system or to the
economic system it serves. Such goals of restricting
[management] choice and seeking uniformity are more
rightfully concepts of totalitarian worlds [Browne,
1966, p. 42].22
Apart from Browne, Powell was the least won over by an
argument for uniformity. He saw uniformity as “desirable but
not essential.” He added: “As a practical matter it is elusive. It is
not a panacea. There probably should be more than one right
way of doing any number of things, and business men should
have the opportunity of experimenting with different ap-
proaches to their problems.” The very fact that he asked, in
Question 4, whether uniformity of accounting principles was
more or less important than consistency in the application of
accounting principles suggested his low regard for the former.
Blough pointedly replied: “These are not alternatives.” After
suggesting that “the trend within a company is often more im-
portant than its comparison with other companies,” he added:
“However, that is no reason for failing to get as much compara-
bility as practicable.” Cannon replied, “Uniformity encompasses
consistency. The one makes data comparable between different
businesses; and the other makes data comparable from year to
year.” Mautz replied: “Consistency in application is a prerequi-
site to uniformity of principles. It is not a substitute for unifor-
mity. They are about equally important.” Werntz wrote, “In
22In his article, Browne interpreted principles as meaning “rules of action,”
or practices. As to fundamental principles, he wrote: “We can of course expect
general agreement and uniformity in the broad and basic principles such as
honesty, for example, or full and frank disclosure” [1966, p. 41].
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broad general areas uniformity is more important. As to de-
tailed practices, consistency is more important.”
Powell’s was clearly a minority position. He replied that
“Consistency from year to year is very important. . . . Business
enterprises vary from one to another in a number of respects
anyway, and it has never troubled me that there are some dif-
ferences in accounting.” Even Grady, who replied that it is
“very important to have consistency,” added: “I favor more uni-
formity so long as we do not indulge in misrepresentation.”23
On the subject of whether adequate disclosure of the ac-
counting principles followed would be an acceptable substitute
for uniformity among business corporations (Question 5), Can-
non and Mautz said “no.” Most of the others believed that dis-
closure was adequate until greater uniformity was achieved.
SEC Chief Accountant Barr and two of his predecessors in that
position (Blough and Werntz) made it clear, as Barr said, that
“Disclosure of an unsound practice is not substitute for the
adoption of sound principles,”24  a view that Spacek espoused as
well. Spacek counseled that “The accountant should have the
right to criticize a generally accepted accounting principle in
his certificate, if he will take responsibility for supporting his
opinion” — a practice that his firm had already adopted for
price-level depreciation [see Zeff, 1992, pp. 457-459; Accounting
Research Division, 1963, pp. 211-217].
Hence, based on the replies to most of Powell’s questions,
there was a considerable difference of views on both the points
of substance and approach. The first five of Powell’s questions
dealt with the attributes of good accounting, rather than
directly addressing the mission given to the Special Committee,
namely, consideration of “a new approach to accounting re-
search.” Powell and a few others on the committee were ini-
tially of the view that perhaps the Special Committee should
actually propose the norms of sound accounting, including the
23Seven years later, Grady set forth a list of “basic concepts to which
accepted accounting principles are oriented,” which included a concept en-
titled “diversity in accounting among independent entities.” Although he said
that this concept does not imperil the objective to “narrow the areas of differ-
ence in accounting” and to promote greater comparability in financial state-
ments, he concluded that “It does, however, place the objective within realistic
limits which fall considerably short of uniformity” [Grady, 1965, p. 35].
24This was a restatement of the SEC’s long-standing administrative policy
on financial statements, which was announced by the Commission in Account-
ing Series Release No. 4, issued in April 1938 (when Blough was the chief
accountant).
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broad postulates. Nonetheless, the full range of questions posed
by Powell was a useful beginning to the committee’s work,
because it focused the members’ attention on the important
issues.
THE COMMITTEE’S FIRST MEETING
The Special Committee’s first meeting was held on March
23-24, 1958, in New York City. All of the members of the com-
mittee, plus Mason, were in attendance. Jennings and Carey
met with the committee at lunch. The minutes of the meeting
were not really a record of the discussions but instead consisted
of a summary of the suggestions that were broached, without
attribution to any members by name. Fortunately, the author is
in possession of a confidential internal memorandum written
on April 8, 1958 by one of the committee members, which re-
views the proceedings in greater detail.
As the committee had not been given a formal name, it was
agreed that it would be called the Special Committee on Re-
search Program.
Powell asked the members to comment on the written an-
swers to his questionnaire, most of which had been distributed
prior to the meeting. Several members criticized Browne’s cat-
egorical rejection of uniformity.
At an early point in the meeting, the committee came to the
belief that the Committee on Accounting Procedure should be
reorganized so that its members would be the most capable and
talented men from the profession. The practice of balancing the
committee geographically, and having one representative from
all of the big firms, would be abandoned. Views differed ac-
cording to whether the reorganized entity would continue to be
the Committee on Accounting Procedure or would become a
review board or an accounting court. But there was general
agreement that the process for establishing accounting prin-
ciples should remain within the profession and under the con-
trol of the Institute.
When discussing the issues that the new entity should ad-
dress, Spacek reiterated his credo that the accounting prin-
ciples adopted had to be fair to various segments of the public,
including stockholders, management, consumers, and labor
[see Spacek, 1957c, p. 37]. Mason disputed how it could be
determined that an accounting principle was fair to all of these
groups. Cannon intoned that George Meany, president of the
AFL-CIO, had criticized the use of accelerated depreciation in
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financial statements, and had argued that depreciation should
represent the fair cost of using up property from the point of
view of labor, as well as stockholders and consumers.25
Grady then proposed George O. May’s postulates for con-
sideration, and Barr recommended that the broad postulates
should include the principles enunciated by the AAA commit-
tees in prior years. There seemed to be general agreement that
the Committee on Accounting Procedure had not done enough
to “narrow areas of difference and inconsistency in accounting
practices,” a principal objective that the committee had itself
enunciated.26  Powell surprised some of the members by ventur-
ing the view that he would not support an Accounting Research
Bulletin that would change accounting procedures unless he
knew his clients were in favor of the change. A dispute soon
developed over deferred tax accounting, bringing out the differ-
ence in views between three of the Big Eight firms over the
propriety of deferred tax accounting as well as the acceptability
of alternative methods. Spacek, who favored deferred tax ac-
counting and a greater degree of uniformity, said there was
only one answer. Grady and Powell, whose firms believed that a
required use of deferred tax accounting was unjustifiable and
were reluctant to force uniformity, believed you could sign an
unqualified audit report either with or without deferred tax
accounting. Barr said that, in his book, the auditor could not
sign both reports.
There followed a discussion of how long a period of experi-
mentation should be allowed before a Bulletin designating one
of two alternative accounting methods as preferable would se-
cure industry acceptance. A few members believed that the SEC
would not wait for industry to acquiesce, because it had the
power to prescribe accounting practices under the securities
acts.27
25This reference to Meany’s view on corporate depreciation allowances also
appeared in an article by Spacek in the May-June 1958 issue of the Harvard
Business Review [Spacek, 1958b, p. 80].
26It seems that the earliest expression of this objective was in Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 43, Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research
Bulletins [Committee on Accounting Procedure, 1953, p. 8]. This passage
seems likely to have been drafted by Carman Blough, the committee’s research
director and a former SEC chief accountant.
27Until this point, the rendering of the proceedings during the committee’s
first meeting is based on the aforementioned confidential internal memoran-
dum written by one of the members of the Special Committee.
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The minutes of the meeting reproduced a series of “sugges-
tions” made by members of the committee for the new research
program. Among them was the following, which doubtless was
urged by Spacek:
There should be a “right way” to handle any given
transaction, by reference to a basic principle. It was
suggested that a showing that a given principle was fair
to management, to the stockholder, to labor, and to the
consumer would constitute an objective standard for
the establishment of accounting principles.
Powell regarded the committee’s first meeting as explor-
atory. In a communication to the Institute’s Council in April, he
conceptualized the direction in which the committee was
headed, and he reported that agreement had been reached on
several points:
We think the Institute should take a firm lead in the
development and promulgation of accounting prin-
ciples, and we believe a change in the present approach
to this matter is needed. We think the research pro-
gram should be a planned one. Possibly the first step
could be the determination of the basic principles or
postulates upon which accounting procedures are
based, as a framework of reference for the solution of
detailed problems; next might come the preparation of
a fairly broad set of coordinated but not detailed prin-
ciples, similar to the statements of the American Ac-
counting Association; and finally could follow a consid-
eration of more detailed matters, such as those covered
by the present accounting research bulletins, but in
relation to the basic broad principles. . . .
We are in agreement . . . that any new approach
should provide for greater staff participation in re-
search, more effort to ascertain and lead public opin-
ion in uncertain and controversial areas, and closer
attention to means of obtaining general acceptance of
pronouncements on accounting matters, than there has
been in the past.
Powell’s concern that the acceptance by industry of any major
changes in the choices of accounting principles or practices is
made clear at the end of the foregoing quotation. He was cer-
tainly not one who believed that such changes, including espe-
cially a move toward uniformity, could be forced.
Spacek was elated after the committee’s first meeting. In a
speech the following month, he said, “This committee, in my
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opinion, is making excellent progress towards its objectives”
[1958a, p. 67].
THE COMMITTEE’S SECOND MEETING
The second meeting was held in Chicago, on May 12-13,
1958. All of the members attended. Jennings and Carey, who
had lunch with the committee at the first meeting, were not
present. The quotations in this section are drawn from the min-
utes of the meeting.
At the beginning of the second meeting, the committee ap-
proved two important amendments to the minutes of the first
meeting. Both dealt with the sensitive issue of promoting uni-
formity. The summary minutes of the March meeting, which
had been drafted by Mason and probably overseen by Blough,
reported, among a series of suggestions made by one or more
members, that “The research program should be more than fact
finding. It should include conclusions and recommendations
which could result in the enforcement of uniform standards.”
The second sentence was amended to read: “It should include
conclusions and recommendations directed toward the
strengthening of accounting principles or standards.” It was
also stated in the minutes from the first meeting that “It is not
possible to achieve complete uniformity and comparability in
accounting and reporting, but much improvement can be
made.” The second clause in the sentence was amended to read:
“but it is desirable to narrow the areas of difference.” Except
for these amendments, the March minutes were written to re-
flect Secretary Mason’s view, as edited by Chairman Powell, of
the emerging consensus of the committee’s agreement on the
shape of the new program.
At this second meeting, this emerging consensus began to
look very much as it would in the committee’s final report.
Contrary to Jennings’ suggestion in his 1957 address [1958a]
that the cost of a new research organization should be shared
by industry and the profession, the committee decided that
“The research organization is [to be] kept within the framework
of the American Institute. Outside accounting organizations
would not participate directly but would be consulted and kept
informed of all research activities.”
Two types of publication were envisioned:
Tentative, informative, thoroughly developed and
documented studies, including conclusions reached,
would be prepared by the research group and be issued
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on its own authority. The purpose of these studies is to
expose ideas for comment, help to mold opinion, and
pave the way for more formal and more authoritative
statements of generally accepted accounting principles.
The second type would be “Authoritative statements of gener-
ally accepted accounting principles, similar in standing to the
present accounting research bulletins, and based upon studies
made by the research group, [which] would be issued by a
special ‘Board’ set up for that purpose.” These statements were
to be “based principally upon the publications of the research
group.” Indeed, the committee agreed that “An immediate
project would be the preparation of a statement of basic postu-
lates and standards on which all other pronouncements would
be based.”
Previously, the literature available to Institute members
had consisted, in the main, of articles by practitioners and aca-
demics arguing one or another side of a controversial account-
ing issue, which were published in The Journal of Accountancy
or The Accounting Review, as well as the series of monographs
and principles statements published by the American Account-
ing Association. In addition, the Institute’s research staff had,
between 1940 and 1953, published a series of short papers on
controversial accounting topics [see Zeff and Moonitz, 1984,
vol. II].28  With this proposal, the Special Committee sought to
stimulate the production of a series of research studies that
would synthesize the best of the literature and thus promote a
broader understanding and agreement on accounting principles
among the Institute membership.
Several names were suggested for the “Board”: Accounting
Procedures Board, Board on Accounting Principles, and Board
on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The last of these
three received the most support. The term “board” was appar-
ently intended to increase the authority and standing, beyond
just committee status, of the body issuing pronouncements. The
board would be “somewhat smaller” than the Committee on
Accounting Procedure and would be elected by the Institute
membership or by Council, rather than appointed by the presi-
dent. In the selection of board members, the committee agreed
28This recitation omits an occasional monograph or book as well as the
“official” literature composed of Accounting Research Bulletins and the SEC’s
Accounting Series Releases.
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that “Emphasis would be placed upon competence rather than
representation of particular groups or geographic areas.”
The committee agreed that “Only a very few seasoned and
widely accepted pronouncements would be adopted by the
membership of the Institute (or the Council) and thereby would
become mandatory upon the members.” In fact, only in 1918
and 1934 did the Institute membership ever vote to approve or
disapprove any accounting rules or principles [Zeff, 1972, pp.
115-116, 125], and the six rules or principles approved in 1934
were repeated in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 1 [Commit-
tee on Accounting Procedure, 1939] as well as in chapter 1 of
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 [Committee on Account-
ing Procedure, 1953]; four of the six continue to be applicable
today. None of the contents of any other Accounting Research
Bulletins were ever submitted either to Council or to the
Institute’s membership for approval.
“The general goal,” the Special Committee agreed, “should
be to make the expression of generally accepted accounting
principles more complete, to continue to narrow the areas of
difference, and to increase the authority and acceptance of the
pronouncements.”
Importantly, the committee added that “All recommenda-
tions should be founded on a statement of basic postulates and
standards, but attempts should be made to keep the results
flexible and not freeze accounting procedures into a set of rigid
rules.” Thus, the concern about limiting companies’ freedom of
action was clearly expressed. It is not clear from the minutes
whether the “postulates” were to be normative or descriptive,
and it is likely that the issue was not raised. The addition of
“standards” makes the foundation appear to be more yielding
than if “postulates” were used alone.
An appendix to the minutes supplied details of the new
organization. It is not known whether the contents of the ap-
pendix were actually discussed and agreed in the committee
meeting or were interpolated by Chairman Powell and Perry
Mason. The appendix provided for a board membership of 18,
compared with 21 serving on the Committee on Accounting
Procedure, and they all were to be members of the Institute,
and therefore CPAs. It was stated in the body of the minutes
that a proposal that pronouncements be approved by a simple
majority, instead of by the current two-thirds, was defeated.
While it was not stated in the appendix whether all of the Big
Eight firms would be represented on the board, it was probably
assumed that they would, and a requirement of a two-thirds
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majority would prevent the Big Eight firms’ representatives,
were they to be in agreement, from being outvoted by the other
ten members. The board members were to be selected for stag-
gered three-year terms “on basis of competence, primarily,
rather than representation of particular groups or geographical
areas.” They would select their own chairman. They would be
elected by the Institute membership or by Council rather than
be appointed by the president.
The appendix called for an accounting research staff com-
posed of a director, three to five senior members and three
junior members, plus two secretaries — representing a massive
increase over the staff support for the Committee on Account-
ing Procedure. Further, the committee decided “Contact with
accounting practice would be maintained through the use of
advisory committees which would work closely with the re-
search staff.” The committee consensus was that an advisory
committee should not have veto power over the publication of a
research study, but that the director should make the final deci-
sion.29
It was also stated in the body of the minutes that “it would
not be appropriate for the director of the research program to
edit a column in The Journal of Accountancy, as is now done by
the Director of Research.” There was only one Carman Blough.
The committee agreed that the accounting research staff
would not be concerned with issues relating to auditing or
managerial (or cost) accounting. The scope of its research ac-
tivities would be the same as that for the Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure.
The committee considered the possible use of public hear-
ings, or of board meetings that might be attended by represen-
tatives of outside groups, but they believed that, “while expres-
sions of opinions of non-members of the Board should be
welcomed and solicited, they should be restricted to written
memoranda.” “It was pointed out,” the minutes went on, “that
publication of research studies in advance of the preparation of
statements by the Board would do much to take care of the
problem of informing and securing the cooperation of outside
groups.”
29The issue of whether to publish a research study actually arose four years
later, when the director authorized publication of the research study on broad
accounting principles in the face of opposition by a number of prominent
members of the advisory committees on the postulates and principles studies
[see Zeff, 1972, pp. 175-178].
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Therefore, at its second meeting, the committee seemed to
make substantial progress toward developing a reform plan.
POWELL DRAFTS THE COMMITTEE’S REPORT,
AND SPACEK OBJECTS
After two meetings, Powell believed that the members were
in sufficient agreement that only one more meeting, scheduled
for August 1, would be needed to put the finishing touches on
its report. So he set about preparing a tentative draft report,
dated July 9, 1958, which he exposed to President Alvin
Jennings and Executive Director John Carey for comment prior
to sending it, as modified by their comments, to the other mem-
bers of the committee.
In Perry Mason’s letter covering the draft, dated July 11, he
cited the principal differences between Powell’s draft and the
plan developed at the committee’s meeting in May. At Carey’s
suggestion, Powell decided that “Commission” would replace
“Board” for the name of the new entity that was to issue the
authoritative statements of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples, and that a steering committee, to be known as the Board
of Managers, would supplant the Institute’s executive commit-
tee as the body to oversee the financial administration of the
research organization. The Board of Managers would be com-
posed of Carey and four members chosen by Council. Powell
also decided that the Commission’s chairman would be chosen
by the Institute’s executive committee, and not by the Commis-
sion itself. Also, the director of accounting research would be
selected by the Board of Managers instead of by Council. In
addition, Powell risked treading on sensitive toes by allowing
some of his philosophical views to seep into the draft (as will be
seen).
After reading Powell’s draft report, Leonard Spacek erupted.
As noted above, he harbored a deep distrust of Carey and of the
three firms that had been providing much of the Institute’s
leadership — PW, H&S and LRB&M — and he sent Powell a
bluntly worded, six-page letter of criticism. In his letter, dated
July 17, 1958, Spacek accused Powell of having omitted and
misrepresented substantive views on which the committee had
agreed, and he berated Powell for having sought Jennings’ and
Carey’s views, for, he said, they were not members of the com-
mittee. In his reply to Spacek, dated July 22, Powell wrote that
“the July 9 draft reflects the substance of the conclusions
reached at the two meetings of our Committee, as I understand
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them. I did not knowingly include anything substantive that was
not discussed, or omit or misrepresent anything substantive that
was discussed.” Jennings, who had been sent a copy of Spacek’s
letter, himself replied that, as Institute president, he was a mem-
ber ex officio of every Institute committee, but he had scrupu-
lously attempted not to influence the deliberations or report of
the committee [letter, August 19, 1958]. Even though he re-
spected Jennings, Spacek wanted the committee to be as free as
possible of the taint of the Institute establishment, although he
was well aware that Powell (H&S) and Paul Grady (PW) were
senior partners of two of the most influential firms in Institute
affairs.
In his letter of July 17, Spacek also criticized Powell for not
emphasizing the centrality of postulates or “objective stan-
dards” in the new program. In his draft report, Powell had
written:
The general purpose of the Institute in the field of
financial accounting should be to advance the written
expression of what constitutes generally accepted ac-
counting principles, for the guidance of its members
and of others. This means something more than a sur-
vey of existing practice. It means inquiry to determine
acceptable practice, and effort to narrow the areas of
difference and inconsistency in practice.30
To Spacek, that sounded more like description than prescrip-
tion. He reminded Powell that, at its March meeting, the com-
mittee had decided that “There should be a ‘right way’ to handle
any given transaction, by reference to a basic principle.” In fact,
the committee had not made such a decision: it was merely
minuted as a “suggestion,” but Spacek believed that it was fun-
damental to the process of developing sound accounting.
Powell’s passage on narrowing the areas of difference and in-
consistency in practice agreed almost verbatim with a passage
in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 [Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure, 1953, p. 8]. As such, it probably sounded
to Spacek as a continuation of the ancien régime. It is interest-
30The phrase, “narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency in prac-
tice,” was code terminology. As noted above, this wording appeared in the
introduction to Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 [Committee on Account-
ing Procedure, 1953, p. 8], and it can be traced to Accounting Research Bulle-
tin No. 1 [Committee on Accounting Procedure, 1939, p. 2]. For many years,
the SEC’s chief accountant had been adjuring the Committee on Accounting
Procedure to follow this course. See Pines [1965, p. 748].
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ing to note that, in the committee’s final report, Powell’s “ac-
ceptable practice” was replaced by “appropriate practice.”
The next paragraph in Powell’s draft, reflecting his philo-
sophical leaning, was as follows:
In accomplishing this purpose, reliance should be
placed on persuasion rather than on compulsion. The
Institute cannot impose accounting principles by fiat.
At the same time, it can, and it should make every
effort to lead in the thinking on unsettled and contro-
versial issues.
Spacek objected that the committee had not said that “reliance
should be placed on persuasion rather than on compulsion.” In
reply to Spacek, Powell wrote, “Maybe the Committee did not
say it, but, as I remember the discussion, we meant it. If we did
not, we can change it.” In fact, the committee eventually ap-
proved this wording for inclusion in its final report. A review of
the minutes for the March meeting shows that, following
Spacek’s espousal of the need for an “objective standard for the
establishment of accounting principles,” it was stated that
“There appeared, however, to be differences of opinion [within
the committee] as to how far the elimination of alternative
practices could be carried.” Another of the “suggestions” min-
uted during the meeting was that “The research program
should be more than fact finding. It should include conclusions
and recommendations which could result in the enforcement of
uniform standards.” The source of this point was probably also
Spacek.
Powell had stated in an early section of his draft report
that:
Thought should be given at the beginning and from
time to time thereafter to the forward planning of the
accounting research program and related activities, to
the end that accounting principles are developed on a
coherent and consistent basis and pronouncements are
made in an orderly and timely manner. This does not
mean the detailed codification of accounting prin-
ciples. It does mean the study of the postulates, few in
number, upon which accounting practices are based,
followed by the formulation of a fairly broad set of
coordinated but not detailed principles, as a frame-
work of reference for the solution of detailed problems.
The consideration, then, of detailed matters, such as
those covered by the present accounting research bul-
letins, should be undertaken in relation to the postu-
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lates and broad principles previously expressed. Insti-
tute pronouncements should have reasonable flexibil-
ity, and should avoid rigidity.
Spacek complained that Powell had omitted any reference in
his draft to “objective standards” (Spacek’s preferred term), and
he suspected that Powell’s description of the operation of the
Commission sounded as if it were to behave like the old Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure, in which the members advo-
cated accounting practices without regard to a governing set of
objectives or basic norms. The phrase “upon which accounting
practices are based” probably grated at Spacek, because it
would have implied to him that the postulates would be in-
ferred, or inductively derived, from established practice (in the
Littletonian sense), rather than prescribed on the basis of “ob-
jective standards.” That phrase was not repeated in the
committee’s final report. Spacek would also have bridled at the
juxtaposition of “reasonable flexibility” and “rigidity,” as if the
proponents of uniformity favored actual rigidity [see Spacek,
1958c, pp. 85-86]. The term “rigidity” did not appear in the
committee’s final report.
The March meeting of the committee had apparently been
regarded as exploratory and not as the occasion for defining the
terms of a reform proposal. Under the heading, “Goal of the
Research Program,” in the minutes drafted by Perry Mason, all
of the nine enumerated statements of view were characterized
as “suggestions,” not as agreed positions. Spacek probably re-
called the points that he made during the meeting, in his typi-
cally forceful manner, without recalling whether disagreement,
or contrasting views, had been expressed, and he was convinced
that the statements of view in the minutes corresponding with
his own views had been agreed. (He also complained in his
letter of July 17 that the minutes had not represented the views
of the committee. Whether, at the May meeting, he had pro-
posed amendments to the minutes of the March meeting that
failed to secure committee support is not known.) Had Spacek
not suspected the Institute’s leaders of a Machiavellian plot,
namely, that they were determined to preserve the status quo
under the flag of reform, his bill of exceptions to Powell’s draft
report could probably have been resolved through amicable
correspondence and without vituperation. But Spacek’s accusa-
tory manner was to vent his disagreements with those who ran
the profession, and this was no exception.
Apparently, none of the other committee members com-
mented in writing on Powell’s draft. Spacek’s letter, which
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detailed many concerns in addition to those mentioned above,
was sharply worded, and Powell, ever the gentleman, felt in-
jured by the tone of his remarks. Spacek intended no personal
affront; it was in his nature to speak and write bluntly. His
reaction to the draft was undoubtedly colored by his distrust of
the Institute and its leadership. Another factor would have been
the tense relationship between his firm and several others in
the Big Eight, including Powell’s, arising from Arthur Andersen
& Co.’s crusade to persuade the Committee on Accounting Pro-
cedure (CAP) to revise its Bulletin 44, issued in 1954, which
stated that income tax allocation was not required when com-
panies used the declining-balance method of depreciation for
income tax purposes and the straight-line method for financial
accounting purposes. Arthur Andersen & Co. favored income
tax allocation when such differences arose [see, e.g., Spacek,
1956a, p. 6; Spacek, 1956b, p. 12], and, due mainly to the ef-
forts of Garrett T. Burns, the firm’s representative on the CAP,
Bulletin 44 was finally revised in July 1958, requiring income
tax allocation when different depreciation methods are used (as
above). Neither H&S nor PW liked income tax allocation, and
Powell was then serving on the CAP. Powell and the PW repre-
sentative on the CAP filed a qualified assent, which read more
like a dissent, in which they disagreed with the requirement for
income tax allocation [Committee on Accounting Procedure,
1958, pp. 5-A]. As has been noted above, H&S and PW were
advocates of permissiveness, while AA was not.
THE COMMITTEE’S FINAL MEETING
The committee’s third and final meeting was held on Au-
gust 1, 1958, in New York City. All of the members but Carman
Blough, who was ill, were in attendance. Although it was an all-
day meeting, the three double-spaced pages of minutes revealed
very little of the tenor of the discussion, virtually all of which
was devoted to the points in Powell’s July 9th draft of the final
report. A number of minor amendments were made to the min-
utes of the May meeting.
The committee decided that it would not itself undertake to
set forth the postulates or principles of accounting. Instead, the
minutes stated that:
The majority of the committee felt that, while the
report should contain a statement of the basic consid-
erations and philosophy underlying the need for a revi-
sion of the Institute’s research program, [the com-
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mittee’s] principal function would be to present a plan
for an organization which would accomplish the de-
sired improvement in research activities and would re-
sult in defining and determining generally accepted ac-
counting principles.
It seems likely that Spacek constituted the minority.
The committee disapproved of the use of a Board of Man-
agers, as suggested by Carey, and it decided to recommend that
the new research program be financed through efforts of the
members of the accounting profession, and not from outside
the profession. Most of the other changes were said to be of an
editorial nature.
SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE
Four days after the August 1st meeting, Perry Mason sent
the committee members a rewritten draft of the final report
(dated August 5), which was attached to the minutes of the
meeting. The section at the outset of the report, entitled “Basic
considerations,” was modified and amplified. It was there that
the philosophical differences over flexibility v. uniformity rose
to the surface. Following the meeting, the committee members
proceeded to exchange correspondence on various points in the
draft with which they were at odds, and they reflected as well
on decisions taken at the meeting. From this subsequent ex-
change of letters, it becomes clear that the committee had
voted, evidently by a narrow majority, to delete a sensitive pas-
sage, “This [i.e., the development of accounting principles on a
coherent and consistent basis] does not mean the detailed codi-
fication of accounting principles,” from Powell’s earlier draft.
Grady, Powell and Blough, in correspondence, expressed regret
at the committee’s decision and recommended that its sub-
stance be restored [letters dated August 6, 7 and 12, respec-
tively]. Barr believed that the sentence probably would fit better
in the new draft than the old, but he did not press the matter
[letter dated August 15]. Mautz said he would not object to the
reinstatement of the sentence [letter dated August 15]. Cannon
was willing to see it reinstated, but he felt that the point had
been made adequately elsewhere in the draft [letter dated Au-
gust 11]. Spacek, who had been the strongest proponent of the
deletion during the committee meeting, defended the
committee’s decision [letter dated August 13], and Werntz
agreed with him [letter dated August 15]. The deleted sentence
was not restored. But a new paragraph in the August 5th draft,
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which survived into the final report, probably covered the same
ground:
Rules or other guides for the application of accounting
principles in specific situations, then, should be devel-
oped in relation to the postulates and principles previ-
ously expressed. Statements of these probably should
be comparable as to subject matter with the present
accounting research bulletins. They should have rea-
sonable flexibility.
The members continued to trade suggestions on the name
of the entity to succeed the Committee on Accounting Proce-
dure (and the Committee on Terminology). Paul Grady wrote to
the committee members that he disliked the title, “Commission
on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,” which the com-
mittee had just affirmed at its meeting. He said that “the word
‘Commission’ has a strong governmental regulatory connota-
tion which I believe should be avoided” [letter dated August 6].
He related that “one of the principal criticisms which I have
heard from businessmen in relation to Accounting Research
Bulletins is that the Institute seems to be setting itself up as a
regulatory body from which there is no appeal.” He said that
“the public relations aspect of this matter is important and that
‘Board’ sounds somewhat less regulatory in character than
‘Commission’.” Grady’s suggestion of board instead of commis-
sion met with general approval, although Spacek, always suspi-
cious of Grady’s (and Powell’s) motives, reminded his col-
leagues that the accounting profession “has regulatory aspects
in its operation,” although he was indifferent as between
“board” and “commission” [letter dated August 13].
Grady said he favored “Accounting Research Board,” thus
continuing to place emphasis on “research,” as had Alvin
Jennings in his December 1957 address [1958a], and perhaps
because he was serving on a body with the title, Special Com-
mittee on Research Program. In rapid order, Powell, Blough
and Browne wrote that they agreed with Grady’s preferred title
[letter from Powell dated August 7; letter from Mason dated
August 12, conveying Blough’s view; and letter dated August 12
from Browne]. Spacek disagreed with “Accounting Research
Board,” as he argued that research was only one part of the
responsibilities of the new board, which, he said, was to pro-
vide adequate leadership in the development of generally ac-
cepted accounting principles [letter dated August 13]. In a letter
dated August 18, Werntz said he was also not happy with “Ac-
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counting Research Board,” “as I do not like the connotation of
‘Research’ in the title.” He preferred “Board on Accounting
Principles,” adding: “I think it is unnecessary to include the
words ‘generally accepted’ since ‘generally accepted’ really
comes about from the action of others” [letter dated August 18].
Blough (modifying his view) and Cannon agreed with Werntz’s
preference [letters from Mason dated August 19 and from Can-
non dated August 20]. As the tide began to turn from “research”
to “principles” in the title of the new board, Powell wrote that
he did not think that the term “generally accepted accounting
principles” had to appear in the new board’s title so long as the
board’s pronouncements were characterized as “statements on
generally accepted accounting principles” [letter dated August
15]. To some members, it was important that the name or pub-
lished utterances of the new board be linked explicitly to the
standard wording in the auditor’s opinion.
Following the exchange of views, the committee’s final re-
port was revised under Powell’s direction, and it was dispatched
to the Institute’s Council in September.31  The final report gave
Accounting Principles Board as the name of the new entity, and
it is likely that Powell, Mason or Carey had made the selection.
Reflecting Powell’s strong preference, the final report referred
to the new board’s pronouncements as “statements on generally
accepted accounting principles.”32  The draft also affirmed that,
unlike the CAP (whose members were chosen from year to year
by the Institute president), the members of the new board
would be nominated by the executive committee and elected by
Council. Blough later wrote, “It is anticipated that this will give
the board even greater stature than was accorded the commit-
tee on accounting procedure” [1960, p. 8].
One minor crisis was averted at the eleventh hour. In a
letter to Powell dated August 15, Spacek gave notice that he
wanted to attach a “comment” to the report, and he submitted a
preliminary draft of the comment. He believed strongly that he
31The report was published in The Journal of Accountancy two months later
[1958].
32Powell’s choice of preposition was apparently deliberate. Had the state-
ments been “of generally accepted accounting principles,” they would have
arguably possessed a more fundamental character. The comparable preposi-
tion for auditing pronouncements (adopted by the Institute in 1973) has also
been “on”: Statements on Auditing Standards. The term “generally accepted
auditing standards” refers to the fundamental norms that were developed in
the mid-1940s and subsequently approved by the Institute’s membership in
1948.
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should speak out on two issues that troubled him. Although, in
the proposed comment, he gave “wholehearted support to the
[committee’s] report,” he felt it necessary to emphasize that the
“objective standards [a term that was not used in the report] or
postulates” must give rise to generally accepted accounting
principles that require companies to show “as profit only the
economic gain after preservation of beginning capital and that
show the extent to which the capital is subject to prior obliga-
tions. . . . ” This was a clear reference to his firm’s publicly
known view that general price changes must be explicitly fac-
tored into the derivation of net income [Spacek, 1956a; 1956b;
Zeff, 1992, pp. 457-459]. He also wanted to state that account-
ing principles should “clearly recognize the reporting needs of
the various segments of our society,” another position that he
and his firm had advanced publicly [Spacek, 1957c]. Second, he
would charge the members of the new board to make “objective
decisions with respect to generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples on the basis of established postulates or standards with-
out being biased because of decisions already made in their
own practice.” He was greatly concerned that the new board
would continue as had the CAP, some of whose members, he
believed, had sacrificed principle for expediency, by counte-
nancing questionable practices supposedly to defend the inter-
ests of major clients. He said that he had less confidence than
did his colleagues on the Special Committee that the members
of the new board would “subordinate their prior views to the
objective standards or postulates.”
None of the other members of the committee would have
liked the idea of Spacek’s writing such a comment, and Cannon
succeeded in persuading him not to do so. In a letter to Spacek
dated August 28, Cannon argued that his point concerning
profit being based on economic gain goes beyond the charge to
the committee, which was to propose a new organization, not
to settle in advance the problems that might come before it.
Cannon also argued that the section on “Basic considerations”
in the committee’s draft report dealt with his anxiety over the
meaning of accounting principles. Finally, in regard to Spacek’s
concern over the objectivity of the future members of the new
board, Cannon wrote, “that’s a risk anyone takes when he sets
up an organization,” and that “we have to assume that the
motives of others are no less honorable than our own. . . . ”
After discussing Cannon’s arguments with him by telephone,
Spacek wrote Powell that he wished to withdraw his concurring
comment [letter dated September 5].
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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
The report of the Special Committee on Research Program
marked a major turning point in the Institute’s role in establish-
ing generally accepted accounting principles. The committee
succeeded in bridging significant philosophical differences
among several of the major public accounting firms and their
strong-willed leaders, and its report held out the promise of
reinvigorating the process of establishing accounting principles.
The Journal of Accountancy, which is published by the Institute,
hailed the report and made clear “that the inspiration for it
came from within the profession, rather than from outside
pressure” [“Accounting Research and Accounting Principles,”
1958, p. 28]. The Institute’s Council adopted the report in April
1959, and the Accounting Principles Board (APB) was launched
on September 1, 1959,33  almost one year after the special com-
mittee submitted its report. Paul Grady wrote that “Accounting
firms responded with generous pledges of almost one million
dollars to support the newly augmented research program”
[1972, p. 18].
The Institute’s executive committee selected Weldon Powell
to be chairman of the board. But, in a controversial move, it
decided that all of the Big Eight accounting firms, apart from
Powell’s firm, would be represented on the board by their na-
tional managing partner, not a technical partner. Carey recalled
that the reasons for this action were “both to emphasize its
authority (prestige) and to speed up decision-making” [letter to
the author dated July 2, 1970].34  George O. May, who was being
kept apprised of developments by Paul Grady, wrote to Institute
President Louis H. Penney to criticize that decision. May ar-
gued that “the Board would operate more effectively if mem-
bers chosen from the very large field were sources rather than
channels of opinion.”35
33The Committee on Accounting Procedure and the Committee on Termi-
nology went out of existence on August 31, 1959.
34Carey’s second reason alluded to an experience of the CAP, when some
partners serving on the committee were known to seek advice from their firm’s
executive office prior to casting their vote.
35May observed that neither he nor Walter A. Staub, Samuel J. Broad and
other chairmen of the Committee on Accounting Procedure were the executive
head of their firm. Letter from May to Penney, dated April 2, 1959, in the
George O. May collection at Price Waterhouse & Co., New York City.
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Penney elaborated on the executive committee’s expecta-
tion for the APB as follows:
It is not intended that this Board will be a working
committee in the sense that the Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure has been. As we visualize the pro-
gram, the Board is to be largely a policy making orga-
nization and in addition it will from time to time very
likely have to make decisions regarding the selection of
certain courses of action from two or more alterna-
tives. Some of those decisions may be difficult. For
that reason the Executive Committee approved the
theory of selecting for the Board some of the executive
heads of some of the better organized accounting firms
because those individuals, generally speaking, have
broad accounting experience and are accustomed to
making decisions on the basis of facts submitted to
them by responsible technicians [letter from Penney to
Hassel Tippit, dated April 3, 1959].
The executive committee’s conception of the role of the
APB as a senatorial body would most certainly not have been
the one envisioned by the members of the Special Committee.
Nor was it an accurate forecast of the actual role of the APB.
Paul Grady has written that the executive committee’s decision
“was a sad error in judgment, which I strongly opposed at the
time” [letter from Grady to the author dated September 28,
1970]. In the end, the managing partners of seven other Big
Eight firms were invited to serve on the APB,36  but two of the
firms, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. and Arthur Andersen &
Co., declined to do so. They both replied that their senior tech-
nical partner, John Peoples and Russell Morrison, respectively,
should represent their firm on the new board. Peat Marwick’s
Managing Partner William M. Black replied that his existing
obligations prevented him from freeing the time to serve on the
board [letter from Black to Penney, dated March 27, 1959]. AA’s
Managing Partner Leonard Spacek replied that Morrison was
“better qualified than I,” and, furthermore, he wanted to con-
tinue to speak out publicly on the deficiencies in accounting
principles and practices. He also said that “it would be inappro-
priate for me to serve on the Board, particularly in view of my
reservations as to the entire program, which I wanted to voice
[in a comment appended to the Special Committee’s report] but
36As noted above, Weldon Powell, the senior technical partner at Haskins
& Sells, had already accepted the appointment as APB chairman.
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finally agreed to withdraw in the interest of showing solidarity”
[letter from Spacek to Penney, dated March 27, 1959]. But the
executive committee continued to insist that Black and Spacek
should represent their firms. Consequently, during 1959-60, the
APB’s first year, it had 18 members, including representatives
from only six of the Big Eight firms.
The following year, Institute President J. S. Seidman, a
partner in a middle-sized New York City firm, persuaded
Spacek to join the APB [letter from George R. Catlett to the
author dated November 29, 2000]. Peat Marwick’s Black, not
wishing to be the lone holdout, also joined the board [letter
from Black to the author dated October 19, 1970]. Thereupon,
the size of the board was increased from 18 to 21 to accommo-
date them.
Also in 1960, the Institute appointed Maurice Moonitz, an
accounting professor at the University of California, Berkeley,
as the first director of accounting research. His unit was delib-
erately called “the accounting research division,” in order to
assure that, unlike Blough’s research department, it would not
be commandeered by other committees of the Institute.
The program of accounting research and the work of the
APB, as a result of the Special Committee’s report, were thus
ready to begin in earnest.
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APPENDIX
A Concise Summary of the Evolution of the Term
“Postulate” in the Accounting Literature
The term “postulate” was not frequently used in the accounting
literature in the 1950s, but, as is well known, Maurice Moonitz’s Ac-
counting Research Study No. 1, published in 1961 under the aegis of
the Accounting Principles Board, was entitled The Basic Postulates of
Accounting [1961]. During the 1960s, numerous authors discussed the
“postulates” approach to developing accounting principles [see, e.g.,
Chambers, 1963, Vatter, 1963; Gordon, 1964; Buckley et al., 1968],
and it might therefore be instructive to explore the provenance of this
term in the accounting literature. Paton [1922, p. 472] entitled a chap-
ter “The Basic Postulates of Accounting,” in which he enumerated
seven “underlying propositions upon which accounting is based.”
Paton’s use of the term was carried forward in the “tentative statement
of accounting principles” issued by the American Accounting
Association’s executive committee, of which Paton was a member, in
1936. The executive committee used the term “postulates” to describe
“certain basic propositions of accounting which embody standards of
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adequacy and reasonableness in the presentation of corporate finan-
cial statements.”37  What the AAA committee called postulates, how-
ever, were in reality what it regarded as statements of proper practice.
George O. May continued the use of “postulates” but with a very
different meaning. In 1937, May, who was to become chairman of the
Institute’s Committee on Terminology, argued that the term “prin-
ciples” should be defined, quoting a dictionary definition, as “A gen-
eral law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action; a settled
ground or basis of conduct or practice. . . .” He rejected its definition
as “A fundamental truth or proposition on which many others de-
pend. . . .” [ibid., p. 423]. Three years later, his terminology committee
said: “Initially, accounting rules are mere postulates derived from ex-
perience and reason. Only after they have proved useful, and become
generally accepted, do they become principles of accounting” [Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure, 1940, p. 60; see also May, 1943, p.
38]. To May, therefore, postulates were principles (in reality, prac-
tices) that had not yet won general acceptance. But in the late 1940s
he redefined postulates as working assumptions or guiding proposi-
tions. In a monograph written for the Study Group on Business In-
come, May identified two “postulates or canons of income accounting”
[May, 1949, p. 23] which fell somewhere between “the foundation on
which accounting concepts of income rest” and “problems of a con-
ceptual character encountered in the determination of business in-
come” [ibid., p. 21]. His two postulates were “the going concern con-
cept” and “that the income statement of a year should be regarded as a
part of a continuous and integrated series” [ibid.]. Three years later, in
the Study Group’s report, which May largely drafted, it was stated that
“Income accounting necessarily rests on a framework of postulates
and assumptions; these are accepted and acceptable as being useful,
not as demonstrable truths; their usefulness is always open to recon-
sideration” [Report of the Study Group on Business Income, 1952, p.
19; see also May, 1948]. Three postulates were cited: monetary, per-
manence (i.e., going concern), and realization. The monetary postu-
late was “that fluctuations in the value of the monetary unit, which is
the accounting symbol, may properly be ignored” [Report of the Study
Group on Business Income, p. 20].
Eric L. Kohler, in the first edition of his A Dictionary for Accoun-
tants, gave the following definition of postulate: “Any of a series of
axioms or assumptions constituting the supposed basis of a system of
thought or an organized field of endeavor” [1952, p. 323]. He also
wrote that “If a principle is accepted without evidence of proof, it may
be called an axiom, assumption, or postulate” [ibid., p. 335]. Finally,
in 1957, Oswald W. Knauth, a distinguished company executive and
37Although the AAA committee used the term “postulates” only once,
Gilman [1939, chap. 14] referred to all 20 of the committee’s propositions as
postulates.
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public servant who had been associated with May in the original draft-
ing of the 1952 Study Group report [1952, p. v], reiterated the three
postulates from the report in an article published in The Journal of
Accountancy. Knauth’s article was one of those that Powell asked the
committee members to read.
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ACCOUNTING FOR JUSTICE:
ENTITLEMENT, WANT AND
THE IRISH FAMINE OF 1845-7
Focal text: R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York:
Basic Books, 1974).
Abstract: The evolution of modern accounting consists essentially of
a series of pragmatic responses to the needs of capital. Accounting
is implicated, therefore, in the maintenance and creation of societies
in which relations are primarily defined in terms of property, how-
ever it is distributed, and justice is determined by the sanctity of
property rights. Accounting historians are encouraged to broaden
the compass of their research to include the association between
accounting and justice which is already well recognised in the criti-
cal accounting literature. Theories of justice, especially those of
19th century political theorists such as Bentham and Senior, and
more recently that of Nozick, are used to explore the close associa-
tion between property, accounting and justice at the time of the
Irish potato famine of 1845-7.
INTRODUCTION
Societies are founded on some understanding of justice,
however objectionable the dominant meanings of justice may
be perceived by those not favoured. All laws of government
emanate from this essential feature of social relations for no
government will survive without the assistance of significant
force if it is not able to convince a sufficient number of citizens
that their society is just. For David Hume, Aristotle and Adam
Smith justice was first among all the virtues. Smith stipulated
that “(j)ustice . . . is the main pillar that upholds the whole
edifice. If it is removed . . . the immense fabric of human soci-
ety . . . must in a moment crumble into atoms” [1976, Section
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II, Chapter ii, parts 4 and 6]. Smith did not have in mind the
distributive justice which we now associate with the achieve-
ment of social justice, notably that portrayed by Marshall
[1992]. Rather, Smith adopted a Lockean stance and identified
justice with the absence of any harm to either an individual’s
person or to their property; “preservation of property being the
end of government” [Locke, 1884, Book II, Chapter IX, section
138, also Chapter XIX, section 222]. Thus, the foundation of
justice in capitalist societies is securing property rights [Smith,
1976, Section VII, Chapter ii, part 10; see also Carter, 1989,
p.9]. Any threats to property rights, suggested Hume, were
equivalent to an attack on the sacred laws of God, the result of
which would be tyranny and the destruction of society [Hume,
1960, Book II, section 2, paragraph 2]. The intention of this
paper is not to promote one form of justice over another, rather
to show how accounting is compatible with, and essential to, an
interpretation of justice derived from the rights of property. It
is accepted that meanings attributed to justice are not absolute
but instead are the products of particular social contexts.
The intimate association between property rights and jus-
tice has long been recognised in theories of justice from
Aristotle [1905] to Thomas Aquinas [1969], through to the writ-
ings of political theorists such as Rousseau and Bentham dur-
ing the 18th and 19th centuries and most recently the highly
influential work of Robert Nozick [1974]. Nozick’s entitlement
theory of justice, which owes much to Adam Smith and the
utilitarianism of Bentham, proposes that distributions of
wealth are just if people are entitled to their holdings as a result
of being acquired through the exercise of the initial capacities
with which they were born or if their property was transferred
to them justly as a result of freely entered into exchanges
[Nozick, 1974, pp.150-153, 1993, p.286; see Sen, 1981, p.2 for a
similar approach1 ]. Nozick rejects the idea of the state taking
responsibility for achieving social justice if this relies upon a
conception of distributive justice in which voluntarism is cor-
rupted. The state, according to Nozick [1974, p.ix; 1993, p.285],
should limit itself to ensuring that entitlement rights, once con-
firmed as just, are secure. The dependency that Nozick sees
between justice, markets and the sanctity of entitlements de-
rived from property offers an attractive lens through which ac-
counting historians can examine the relationship between
1Sen defined entitlements as “the set of alternative commodity bundles
that a person can command” [Watts 2001, p.130].
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accounting and matters of justice. Indeed, a close study of
theories of justice, especially those which have been influential
over the past three centuries, offers accounting historians a
powerful critical means to probe the social roles served by ac-
counting. Although Nozick’s ideas are not canvassed in detail
for the purposes of the present paper, his theme of just entitle-
ments resonates with persuasive authenticity when examining
the role of accounting technologies in the context of the Irish
famine of 1845-7. During this period of great suffering, ac-
counting played an essential role in confirming the conditions
under which property entitlements were determined to be just
and in providing an apparatus for the state to laager these en-
titlements. Theories of property and justice, therefore, have
much to contribute to accounting history.
The work of accounting historians has consistently, if not
always manifestly, recognised the association between rever-
ence for the rights attached to property and the role of account-
ing. Cost accounting practices which are meant to discipline
the workforce to enhance the efficiency of production, and
thereby contribute to ever greater accumulations of property,
have been especially attractive to accounting historians [Hoskin
and Macve, 2000; Fleischman and Tyson, 1996; see Carnegie
and Potter, 2000 for a survey of the subjects preferred by ac-
counting historians]. The intimate determinacy between prop-
erty entitlements, justice and accounting, however, has yet to
establish a presence in the accounting history literature, despite
the prominence given to matters of social justice in the critical
accounting literature [Miller, 1990; Miller and O’Leary, 1987].
Accounting historians, notably Foucauldians [Hoskin and
Macve, 1986] and labour process theorists [Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991], have identified the oppressive consequences
for labour of the close association between property and ac-
counting. Yet, they have done so almost exclusively in terms of
onerous regimes of control rather than as matters of justice. As
citizens, accounting historians have an obligation to contribute
far more than providing justifications for, and explanations of,
accounting practices, whether located in the factory or in the
offices of government. Matters of justice are of great conse-
quence, as is the obligation of accounting historians to give
these prominence in their work. Of particular relevance to this
paper is the ability of accounting history to provide a persua-
sive means of demonstrating the social consequences of the
highly individualised approach of capitalism to government in
which property rights are paramount.
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Recent work by Fleischman and Tyson [2000] and Funnell
[1998] has edged accounting history away from more utilitarian
considerations to examine the effects when accounting is used
to serve ideologically racist ends. Still, the concern of these
papers is not expressly that of justice. This paper takes the pro-
cess further into the domain of justice, an area not explicitly
identified in the survey by Carnegie and Potter [2000] as having
penetrated accounting history to any significant degree. The
themes addressed are meant to encourage accounting histori-
ans to widen the compass of their interests to include the fun-
damental relationship between property, justice and accounting
in various social contexts in different historical epochs. The
paper acknowledges that accounting has served legal/political
systems which “more often than not . . . (have) served oppres-
sive, unjust, inhumane social arrangements” [Lyons, 1993, p.ix;
Neu, 2000]. It also demonstrates in the context of the Irish
famine of 1845-7 the intimate connection noted by Miller
[1990] and Miller and Rose [quoted in Neu, 2000, p.270] be-
tween the political rationalities of government and the tech-
nologies by which they are implemented.
Given the hortative intent of this paper, there is not the
opportunity to provide a detailed rendition of accountings dur-
ing the Irish famine. Instead, the focus is on the motives and
consequences of the regimes of accounting which were essen-
tial to the implementation of government policy as it concerned
the Irish. Accounting, as used by the British Government and
its administrators, is shown to have been implicated in the
prosecution of a particular, privileged form of justice which
gave pre-eminence to the interests of property, irrespective of
the desperation of the Irish poor. The only moral basis for de-
termining entitlements to relief outside the Poor Law was the
possession of property. Study of the Irish famine illustrates
how the moral agency of accounting is determined and legiti-
mated by prevailing economic and political structures and not
by any internal logic or calculus. Laws, as Rousseau [1973,
p.166] astutely observed, “are always of use to those who pos-
sess and harmful to those who possess nothing”.
After a discussion of the relevance of accounting to matters
of justice, attitudes towards property rights and poverty in the
19th century are shown to have constituted a moral discourse
of justice which was underpinned by accounting technologies.
The Irish potato famine of 1845-7 and government responses to
it under Peel and then Russell are used to illustrate the propo-
sition that in a capitalist society the form of justice which
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accounting can serve is that based upon property entitlements.
Indeed, accounting is essentially and substantially a technology
for enforcing these entitlements. The basis upon which the
government at Westminster determined who was eligible for
assistance during the famine and who would be excluded was
determined by the prevailing belief that government should not
intrude itself in the affairs of business, nor should government
take from the owners of property to provide for those, devoid of
property, whose destitution was a confession of their lack of
virtue. Only in this way would justice be served.
THE JUSTICE OF ACCOUNTING
Theories of justice are either based upon principles of per-
sonal freedom and individual rights, in which economic deserts
and merit determine entitlements, as epitomised by Nozick’s
entitlement theory of justice, or upon social effects where rights
are claimed on the basis of need and fairness [see Nozick, 1974,
p.90 and section II; Rawls, 1972]. The importance of the latter
conception of distributive justice was recognised in the late
18th century by Paine [1969, p.90] for whom it was inconceiv-
able that an individual had entered society “to become worse
than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had be-
fore”. J.S. Mill, who when writing had the benefit of drawing
upon the experiences of the Irish famine, also warned how a
society founded upon rules “by which it may protect its mate-
rial interests . . . will do nothing . . . for the spiritual interests of
society” [quoted in Goodin, 1995, p.12].
Accounting has had much to say about the justice of
deserts and lawful entitlements derived from the possession
of property — the concern of 19th century political econo-
mists (see below) — but has contributed little to interpreta-
tions of justice based upon need. Indeed, ensuring justice in
capitalist societies is the fundamental intent of accounting,
although only those interpretations of justice that are
grounded in property rights which have been secured and
consummated by the market exchanges praised by Adam
Smith. Accounting evolved from, and exists because of, the
needs of property arising out of its accumulation, protection
and legitimation. The morality that accounting promotes in a
capitalist economy, that is its interpretation of right and
wrong, merit and desert, is that associated with property en-
titlements. Accounting technologies have not been designed
to decide whether a given allocation of property and entitle-
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ments are either socially or morally defensible or to compen-
sate for social and economic inequalities, rather to recognise,
embrace and to protect these in the interests of those who
hold property. Accountants are not paid to be agents of so-
cial change. On the contrary, they are employed to take ad-
vantage of existing social relations and inequalities. There-
fore, any virtue that may be attributable to accounting arises
mainly from its success in serving the interests of property.
Ultimately, accounting involves “the communication of a set
of values, of ideals, of expected behaviour, of what is ap-
proved and disapproved” [Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p.448].
This allows accounting to play a highly influential role in
institutionalising particular, privileged values and beliefs.
The instrumental role of accounting is fundamental to the
indifference of the double-entry accounting calculus to the dis-
tribution of property and its associated entitlements which
double-entry accounting catalogues and makes visible. Its pri-
mary concerns are: an accurate rendition of a particular prop-
erty distribution, irrespective of any equity considerations; ad-
judicating between competing property claims and the
identification of either enhancements or diminutions of equity
in property. Debates in accounting history over the importance
given by Sombart, Weber and Tawney to double-entry book-
keeping in the rise of capitalism accept that any significance it
may have had was derived from its ability to serve the acquisi-
tive instincts of the propertied classes [Yamey, 1949; Winjum,
1972]. Therefore accounting, as a technology that perpetuates
existing entitlements, protects against actions other than those
consistent with, and sanctioned by, the relations of power that
accounting serves. Indeed, the objective, blind justice which
accounting is meant to serve has made it attractive to property
holders. This, as Cooper and Sherer [1984, p.208] have re-
minded us, does not deny that this amounts to accounting in-
formation being manipulated to favour particular interests to
enhance the distribution of property rights which they favour.
In this sense, accounting is certainly neither neutral nor objec-
tive. It is political because the consequences of accounting have
the ability to “benefit some groups in society and to the detri-
ment of others” [Cooper and Sherer, 1984, p.208]. The latter is
especially so when it comes to matters of justice and recogni-
tion by the state of entitlements which individuals claim for
themselves.
As an implement of power used to sustain inequality and
entrenched privilege based upon property entitlements,
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accounting was harnessed during the Irish famine of 1845-7 to
impoverish the existence of many and to deny opportunities for
redemption. Accounting provided the means to exclude, silence,
condemn and dismiss the urgent entreaties of those without the
necessary property to legitimate their claims on the state. Dur-
ing the famine, accounting technologies were essential to the
British Government’s determination to follow a policy of mini-
mal, reluctant interference for fear of upsetting the market,
alienating owners of property and, so they thought, threatening
the very foundations of society.
NINETEENTH CENTURY ATTITUDES TOWARDS
PROPERTY AND POVERTY
Advocacy of laissez-faire government by liberals in the 19th
century amounted to the protection of the interests of property
against any state imposts. According to Bentham, the state ex-
isted to “maintain the distribution . . . (of property) as it is actu-
ally established. It is this which under the name of justice, is
regarded as . . . (its) first duty” [Bentham, 1871, p.119]. Nassau
Senior, as did Locke [1884, Book II, section 222], saw “the great
object and the great difficulty in government is the preservation
of individual property” [Senior, 1868, p.1]. Similarly, Hobbes
believed that “Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man
his own” [Hobbes, 1968, Part I, Chapter XV, pp.201-2, emphasis
in the original]. Individuals’ rights could only guaranteed as
long as property rights were treated as sacred and recognised as
the foundation of society. Thus, Bentham [1960, Book II, Part I,
Section X] defined property in terms of “a relation betwixt a
person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the
free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of jus-
tice . . .”2  (emphasis in the original). Property and justice were
inseparable, for property consisted of “those goods, whose con-
stant possession is establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by
the laws of justice. . . . ‘Tis very preposterous, therefore, to
imagine that we have any idea of property, without fully com-
prehending the nature of justice . . . (for) the origin of justice
2According to Honore [1961, pp.112-113] property ownership comprises
“the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the
income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights of
incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harmful
use”.
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explains that of property” [Bentham, 1960, Book III, Part II,
Section II].3
Most of the more odious consequences of the self interest
motivated by the attractions of property, however, were of little
concern to political theorists who were highly influential in the
19th century, especially Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Hobbes,
Joseph Townsend and Nassau Senior, all of whom were unani-
mous in their praise of the virtues of untrammelled property
rights. Bentham was indifferent to how ‘the good’ created by
self-interested behaviour was distributed throughout society
and was unconcerned about the inevitable resulting inequali-
ties. Instead, inequalities were accepted by Bentham as part of
the natural order, arising as they do from the differential distri-
bution of abilities throughout the population [see Nozick, 1993,
p.286-289].
The morality of actions for utilitarians was only to be
judged according to their impact on the overall wellbeing or
happiness of society, not the pain experienced by one group of
individuals. Justice was the outcome of the enforcement of a
common set of procedural rules enshrined in law which gov-
erned the behaviour of all. Justice was not determined by the
fairness of the outcomes but by the fairness of the processes or
rules which are followed along the way. Denying one group
their rightful possession of property, acquired according to
these rules, was the illegitimate exercise of government powers
and was unjust.
Whereas poverty in the 19th century was widely regarded
as the absence of the means of entitlement, the consequence of
“fraud, indolence, and improvidence” [Report of the Poor
Law Commission 1834, cited in Ashcraft, 1995, p.46], property
was the result of foresight, moral rectitude and evidence of
a virtuous life. Accordingly, the poor had no entitlement
rights; they could expect nothing. Society was under no obliga-
tion to protect non-existent rights. Bentham, whose influence in
the 19th century Macpherson [1978, pp.39, 50] describes as
“immense”, argued that we can only expect to be treated as we
have acted; good for good, evil for evil [see Bentham in Berger,
1984, p.158]. To talk about natural rights, therefore, was a
3At the time that the American Constitution was being finalised, James
Madison drew attention to the way in which “those who hold and those who
are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society … The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of
modern legislation” [The Federalist Papers, Number 10].
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‘nonsense’. Only those who do well deserved to be treated well.
These views were given a sympathetic, if somewhat extreme,
rendition at the height of the Irish famine by The Economist [30
January 1847] which protested against the ongoing expense of
providing relief, irrespective of how inadequate it may have
been. Relief should not aim to avoid deaths at any cost, for “if
left to the natural law of distribution, those who deserved more
would obtain it”. Thus, in order that the poor did not unfairly
burden property owners, it was essential that relief went only to
the deserving poor [Irish Poor Laws, 1 and 2 Vic. c.56, July
1838]. The undeserving poor, that is those who were seen by
government to be poor because of their indolence and immoral-
ity, were to be identified and excluded from any assistance
which did not involve work on their part. Like everyone, they
had the ability to redeem themselves from their state of moral
and economic want through their own industry and providence.
Hard work and diligence allowed paupers to rise out of their
state of dependence and assume the right to control their own
life.
Towards the end of the 18th century, Frederick Eden had
denounced any attempts to alleviate the suffering of the poor at
the expense of property as a case of humanity exceeding good
sense which contradicted the fundamentals of political
economy [Eden, 1797; see Eden in Cowherd, 1977, p.xiv; also
Senior, 1868, p.178]. Social measures which sought to redress
economic disadvantage, thought Bentham, should only be con-
templated while ever they do “not interfere with security; in
which it does not thwart the expectations which the law itself
produced, in which it does not derange the order already
established” [quoted in Macpherson, 1978, p.43]. That is, social
reforms could be tolerated as long as property rights were not
threatened. This view was shared with Hobbes who, over a
century earlier, had also concluded that without order to pro-
tect property rights “there is no place for Industry; because the
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the
Earth . . . And the life of man, solitary poore, nasty, brutish, and
short” [Hobbes, 1968, Part I, Chapter XIII, p.186].
The stimulus to work which poverty provided, according to
Malthus, was “absolutely necessary to promote happiness of the
great mass of mankind” [quoted in Boyer, 1990, p.56; for simi-
lar thoughts see Burke in Ashcraft, 1995, p.55]. Joseph
Townsend in 1786 denounced poor relief as unnatural. He re-
minded his readers that:
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. . . hope and fear are the springs of industry . . . In
general it is only hunger which can spur and goad . . .
(the poor) on to labour. They say that . . . no man, even
though by his indolence, improvidence, prodigality and
vice, he may have brought himself to poverty, shall
ever suffer from want . . . (Some) must want [quoted in
Boyer 1990, p.52; see also Senior’s views in Bowley,
1967, p.291].
Edwin Chadwick, who along with Nassau Senior made the
greatest contributions to the 1834 English Poor Law Report,
described poverty as “the natural, the primitive, the general and
unchangeable state of man; and as labour is the source of
wealth, so is poverty of labour. Banish poverty, you banish
labour” [quoted in Cowherd, 1977, p.245; see also Senior, 1868,
p.187]. Significantly for those who would later starve in Ire-
land, Senior and Chadwick were as one in their admiration for
the redemptive powers of property [Senior quoted in Bowley,
1967, pp.239-240]. When famine struck in 1845, the fate of the
Irish poor, therefore, was sealed as much by prevailing eco-
nomic doctrine as by the perfidy of nature. Tragically, it was
also dramatically exacerbated by the rigid, unyielding bureau-
cratic behaviour of relief personnel which was induced by the
minutiae of the accounting controls required by their master,
the British Treasury.
THE IRISH POTATO FAMINE 1845-7
Origins and Consequences: Famines, as Malthus [1798] was only
too eager to confirm, have been a regular occurrence through-
out history and over most parts of the globe. Ireland’s perilous
dependency on the potato had seen repeated food shortages of
varying severity and extent. The 1830s were particularly known
for food crises occasioned by crop failures somewhere in Ire-
land [Woodham-Smith, 1962, p.38; O’Rourke, 1902, pp.30, 34].
None, however, had approached the severity of that which ex-
tended over Ireland between 1845-7. By the end of the 1840s
over one million Irish had perished from hunger and associated
disease and another two million had emigrated to escape the
misery. A measure of the extent of the tragedy which was
visited upon Ireland, and the commonplace of death, can be
gauged from a report in the Cork Southern Reporter in 1846.
The newspaper’s correspondent described seeing in a cabbage
garden “the bodies of Kate Berry and her two children very
lightly covered with earth, the hands and legs of her large body
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entirely exposed, the flesh entirely eaten off by the dogs, the
skin and hair of the head lying within a couple of yards of the
skull” [quoted in O Grada, 1989, p.42].
The first hint of the appearance of yet another threat to the
potato crop came in a report from the Isle of Wight in August
1845 which warned that the potato blight, which had recently
ravaged potato yields in North America, had now hit England.
By September the fungus Phythophthoria infestans was in Ire-
land [Black, 1960, p.10; O’Rourke, 1902, pp.48-54]. Responses
by the British Government to the famine occurred in two
phases; the first during the government of Sir Robert Peel,
which lost office in July 1846 after repealing the Corn Laws,
and that of its successor, the government of Lord John Russell.
Unfortunately for the Irish, Peel’s unusual preparedness to in-
tervene early in the crisis with the secret purchase of Indian
corn meal from North America was not carried forward by
Lord Russell [British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP), 1846
[735], Vol.XXXVII, p.21; Black, 1960, p.114]. The opposition of
Russell towards most forms of government-sponsored relief for
Ireland, especially any action which threatened the profits of
merchants, was made very clear in a letter from Sir George
Grey, a minister in Russell’s Cabinet, to a British official in
Ireland who had sought additional funding. Grey had “the
strongest objection to any grant from the Public Treasury in aid
of or as a substitute for the rate for the relief of the poor” [Sir
George Grey to Mr Twisleton, 21 December 1846, BPP 1847,
Vol.LV, pp.12-13; see also Trevelyan to Routh, BPP 1846, [735],
Vol.XXXVII, p.26].
Immediately after the replacement of the Peel Government
was announced in July 1846, the Treasury's most senior officer
in the field in Ireland, who as a Treasury employee had been
trained to “cheesepare, to save a farthing wherever a farthing
could be saved” [Woodham-Smith, 1962, p.58], was directed by
the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, Charles Trevelyan, that
all relief arrangements in place “should be stopped or you run
the risk of paralysing all private enterprise . . . The only way to
prevent the people from becoming habitually dependent on
Government . . . is to bring the operations to a close” [Trevelyan
quoted in Woodham-Smith, 1962, p.89]. A second crop failure
in 1846 was again met by Trevelyan’s determination to make
sure that the government did not interfere with the operation of
markets, even if these were for basic foodstuffs [Trevelyan to
Coffin, 3 April 1846, BPP, 1846, [735], Vol.XXXVII, p.101].
Significantly, Peel had been very aware of opposition in the
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Treasury to any forms of government-sponsored relief and had
encouraged those entrusted with the relief effort not to be frus-
trated by the Treasury [see Sir James Graham in O’Neil, 1957,
p.214].
Despite the scale of the famine, as the death toll mounted
throughout 1846 and 1847 large amounts of agricultural prod-
ucts were still being exported from Ireland to meet demand in
England, which was also suffering from food shortages arising
from the potato blight. This merely continued the existing set of
arrangements which saw between 1843 and 1845 over 463,000
tons of food exported, irrespective of persistent food shortages
in many regions of Ireland [O Grada, 1989, p.33; Editorial, The
Waterford Freeman, 3 October 1946, in Kissane, 1995, pp.54-55;
BPP, 1850, Vol.XVII, p.423]. As with any unfettered market in
which products migrate to where the highest price is promised,
during the Irish famine no impediments existed to the search
for equilibrium between demand and supply. Abject need
which, in the absence of financial means, could not be trans-
lated into an economically enforceable entitlement, had no rel-
evance to the most efficient disposition of food supplies, as
opposed to distribution based upon humane considerations.
The strict rendition of the principles of 19th century politi-
cal economy, which both the governments of Peel and Russell
insisted on moralistically applying, meant that the only entitle-
ments which were morally and economically defensible were
those exercised in and derived from market exchanges [see Sen,
1981, pp.161, 162]. Those able-bodied who could meet the
qualifications of entitlement, that is they had sufficient money
to buy food, would be fed while others would starve. Accord-
ingly, widespread starvation may have been initiated by the
potato blight but famine was induced by the absence of the
necessary means to exercise purchasing power in the market
and, therefore, in a society dominated by the rights of property
and market utopianism, the absence of entitlement. Liberal
capitalism according to Watts [2001, p.127] had become a “gi-
gantic killing machine”.
Relief, the British Treasury and Centres of Calculation: The re-
sponses of the British Government to the famine, especially
from late 1846, were conditioned primarily by the prevailing
economic antipathy towards virtually all forms of government
intrusion in the operation of markets. All demands on the
public purse were to be strenuously resisted. This sacred task
was entrusted to the Treasury, which from the earliest evidence
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of impending widespread starvation in 1845 was already in at-
tendance in Ireland. Although the Treasury accepted that the
Irish could not be left completely to their fate, it went to ex-
traordinary lengths to make sure that food went only to those
amongst the desperate who had met the necessary property
qualifications of entitlement. All the time, Treasury officers
were to ensure that their accounting reports provided the nec-
essary evidence that these entitlements, and only these, had
been met. To ensure that all payments “were duly accounted for
and properly vouched”, the Treasury established very early that
“accounts of every description of expenditure connected with
the expected relief should be . . . promptly rendered to the Com-
missioners of Audit (at the Audit Office) at the close of every
month” [Trevelyan to Routh, January 1846, BPP, [735],
Vol.XXXVII, pp.16,17]. The close association between the Audit
Office in London and the Treasury's agents the Commissariat
was strengthened with the appointment of auditors from the
Audit Office to Ireland [Treasury Minute, 9 October 1846,
Trevelyan to Routh, 10 October 1846, BPP, 1847 [761], Vol.LI,
pp.134, 137].
All monies for the purpose of relief had to go through the
Treasury and be accounted for by the Treasury which, espe-
cially after the passage of the Audit Act, 1846 was ascendant in
all matters of financial control. An examination of the immense
array of Treasury documents, which stipulate the need for a
seemingly endless number of accounting checks and account-
ing reports essentially as protections against unauthorised
spending, unmistakably reveals the primary concern of the
Treasury during the famine to be financial rectitude [see par-
ticularly good examples in BPP, 1847-48, Vol. XXIX, p.956ff
and 1846, Vol.XXXVII, p.615ff]. As the government’s financial
gatekeeper, the Treasury made sure that the officials authorised
to spend any monies did so according to regulations and ac-
counted for them in a punctilious fashion. Through its account-
ing reports the Treasury was able, in terms of Miller’s [1990,
p.318] description, to govern at a distance through their centres
of calculation located at Commissariat depots, principal
amongst which were those at Cork and Limerick. Treasury
regulations and accounting reports provided a constant and ev-
ery present means of disciplining behaviour. Through the work
of the Commissariat, whose later actions in the Crimean War
(1854-6) were to become infamous [Funnell, 1990], the
Treasury was able to exert an intimate and suffocating control
over all relief measures, including those initiated by private
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charities. The numerous accounting reports required by the
Treasury epitomised Foucault’s systems of disciplinary surveil-
lance by giving visibility to the smallest aspects of the
Commissariat’s operations, thereby constraining any tendencies
to respond to the emergency other than on the sure grounds of
indifferent, meticulous instrumentalism. Treasury policies and
the prejudices of the government were ineffectual without the
means by which they could be prosecuted. Thus, accounting
provided the technologies to enforce the exclusion of those who
were condemned as undeserving of assistance. Entitlements
justified on economic grounds were the natural domain of ac-
counting calibrations.
The Commissariat was the primary means by which the
British army was provisioned both in Ireland and wherever else
it operated. Woodham-Smith [1962, p.58] described it as “a
civilian department of clerks” which became involved in civilian
affairs only in the most extreme circumstances. In all matters
pertaining to its operations, the allegiance of the Commissariat
was firstly to the Treasury, to whom all staff would be held
personally liable for all expenditures, stores and monies. The
first concern of the Commissariat, therefore, was a rigid adher-
ence to Treasury rules, conventions and wishes, most of which
found expression in accounting reports. Far too frequently this
put Commissariat officers at odds with their own consciences
which, in the distressing circumstances in which they worked,
may have compelled them to show more compassion [see com-
ments by Commissary General Routh in Woodham-Smith,
1962, p.91]. When Trevelyan announced the appointment of
Routh as Commissary General in November 1845, he made it
very clear that his primary duty was to:
. . . consider, and to call attention to, . . . the financial
bearings of the measures which may be proposed for
this purpose, . . . the object in view being to provide
and dispense any supplies of food which it may be-
come necessary to afford, according to such arrange-
ments as will impose the smallest possible ultimate bur-
den on the public . . . You will be careful, however, not
to be a party to any promise of public money . . . unless
under express authority from the Treasury [Trevelyan to
Routh, BPP, 1846, [735], Vol.XXXVII, pp.21-22, em-
phasis added].
The purpose of the Commissariat food depots was to aug-
ment food supplies available from private contractors. The
Treasury specifically prohibited Commissariat food stores from
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being opened in areas in which private suppliers already
existed. The Commissariat was to take particular care not to go
into competition with private firms or, if this was unavoidable,
to ensure that the prices that it charged were slightly above
those of its competitors [Treasury Minute, 31 August 1846, in
O’Rourke 1902, p.170, see also p.222 and Treasury Minute of 29
September 1846, on p.226]. Only when private supplies had
been exhausted would there be a call for its stores. In a letter
from Trevelyan to Commissary General Routh in late 1846,
Routh was told that “the Chancellor of the Exchequer will on
no account permit you to undertake to provide food for any
portion of the eastern district of Ireland . . . No exigency how-
ever pressing, is to induce you to furnish supplies of food for any
districts except those for which you have already undertaken”
[quoted in O’Neil, 1957, p.224, emphasis added].
The moral character of poverty and the moral effects of
assistance, as previously noted, readily and conveniently justi-
fied harsh policies of exclusion from sources of relief. Adminis-
trators of poor relief during the famine were admonished to be
vigilant to ensure that those assisted were not merely the desti-
tute who in usual circumstances perennially afflicted Ireland.
Only those who had been cast into a state of need solely as a
consequence of the failure of the potato crop could be regarded
as candidates for assistance. This required that a firm stand be
taken “against the prevailing disposition to take advantage of
the crisis” [Trevelyan to Routh, February 1846, BPP, 1846,
[735], Vol.XXXVII, p.18]. The aim was never to eliminate pov-
erty, the natural state of many. When in 1846 soup kitchens
were proposed by several Union Boards of Governors, Edward
Senior, Assistant Poor Law Commissioner, refused to allow
them on the basis of moral consequences. It was wrong to feed
“the whole body of the poor, in return for no work, subject to
no test, with a better and more expensive description of food
than they have ever been accustomed to” [correspondence of
Edward Senior, 28 October 1846, BPP, 1847, Vol.LV, p.24].
Nassau Senior, a highly influential political economist, saw
poverty to be the result of “misconduct” and not “misfortune”, a
position he shared with Ricardo, Mill, Malthus and Bentham,
all of whom favoured the abolition of the poor laws and poor
relief [see Checkland and Checkland, 1974, pp.29-31]. Accord-
ing to Nassau Senior:
. . . the duty of the Government is simply to keep the
peace, to protect all its subjects from the violence and
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fraud and malice of one another, and, having done so,
to leave them to pursue what they believe to be their
interests in the way which they deem advisable [quoted
in Bowley, 1967, p.242].
Sir Charles Wood’s relentless determination, as Chancellor
of the Exchequer, and that of his energetic subordinate
Trevelyan, to ensure that the vaults of the nation would not be
breached by the desperate poor and starving betrayed an im-
plicit faith in the ability of ‘natural’ market processes to deal
with most problems involving the supply of material needs. In a
letter to the progressive Irish landowner Lord Monteagle, Wood
said that “the more I see of government interference the less I
am disposed to trust it, and I have no faith in anything but
private capital employed under individual charge” [quoted in
Black, 1960, p.39]. Wood’s uncompromising stand on spending
public funds, as befitted a senior representative of the Treasury,
lead Woodham-Smith [1962, p.87] to observe that he “united
love of liberty with reverence for property . . . Humanitarianism
was not among his undoubted virtues”. In a similar vein Taylor
[1976, p.75] concluded that:
. . . it is easy to understand how Trevelyan and the rest
thought that they were doing their duty. They were
handling human beings as ciphers on a bit of paper.
They looked up the answers in a textbook of economics
without ever once setting eyes on the living skeletons of
the Irish people. . . . (These) enlightened men feared
that their whole social structure would topple down if
men and women were given food they could not pay
for.
The moral inflexibility of the Treasury during the famine
saw it treat starving individuals as financial burdens on the
public purse which were to be minimised by restrictive qualifi-
cations for entitlement to relief, irrespective of the frantic re-
ports coming from its officers in the field. The only representa-
tion of the calamity in Ireland relevant to the Treasury was that
which was to be found in the accounting for costings, invento-
ries, receipts and loans. The mounting death toll, many of
whom died in close proximity to the Commissariat depots,
could be seen as vindication that the Treasury’s policies were
working as intended. Their work was not to save everyone in
need, only those who by economic entitlement could afford to
pay, which gave them the moral right to sustenance, or had
been brought under the mean protection of the Poor Laws as a
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result of physical or mental infirmity. During the emergency,
while the hungry who did not meet these qualifications for as-
sistance could be heard crying outside the depot gates, the
Treasury was effectively carrying out its work.
Thus, at regular intervals a strict accounting for the
amount of food provided by the Commissariat required a me-
ticulous reconciliation against lists of those eligible for assis-
tance. One official in Ireland reassured Trevelyan that he would
not let the “pressure of the people” deflect him from “purging
the lists of all persons not requiring assistance” and that he was
“determined never to flag, though the country is in a dreadful
state” [BPP, 1847, Vol.L, p.293]. Uncalculating compassion had
no place in Treasury policies and practices which were the ad-
ministrative manifestation of the prevailing, intolerant attitude
towards the Irish poor and the righteous appreciation of the
virtues of property ownership. While entitlements were deter-
mined by property qualifications and the need to minimise en-
croachments on property rights, accounting was nothing less
than a technology which served policies and practices which
were indifferent to physical want and any conceptions of justice
other than those derived from property.
CONCLUSION
The Irish famine exposed the ultimate consequences for a
society based upon a conception of justice where entitlements
were defined entirely in terms of the rights of property holders
and where the primary function of the state and its agencies,
notably the Treasury, was to protect these rights. As a technol-
ogy which evolved in response to the needs of property, ac-
counting was indispensable to policies of relief which served
the interests of property. The interdependence between entitle-
ment and justice, introduced in this paper through Robert
Nozick’s work, meant that the legitimacy of claims on the com-
passion of the state was determined according to the moral
worth afforded to each individual by their property and not
need. Pleas for rescue by the able-bodied on the basis of abject
need were dismissed as illegitimate demands on the rights of
the virtuous. The teachings of prominent political economists,
notably Bentham, Senior and Locke, which advocated minimal
government interference in the lives of citizens, both prepared
the ground for government responses and provided a ready
supply of justifications for all but the most uneasy consciences.
Justice, as sanctioned by 19th century utilitarians and
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confirmed by Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice, could only
ever mean defence of entrenched interests.
The Irish died in large numbers during the potato famine
because they did not have the means to acquire legal entitle-
ment to food, not because there was a complete absence of
food. The unrelenting indifference with which those in desper-
ate need were regarded by senior British administrators intent
on minimising government obligations was compounded when
the government placed all responsibility for administering and
delivering relief in the hands of the Treasury. At all times, the
financial consequences for the public purse of any actions to
ameliorate distress were to be given pre-eminence by the Trea-
sury and its servants in the field. Most important to the Trea-
sury in the dispensing of relief was meticulous stewardship of
public resources by ensuring that all money and stores could be
rigorously accounted for and that assistance went only to the
eligible who met prevailing morality and economic tests. En-
forcement of these proscriptions by the Treasury was made pos-
sible through a myriad of finely detailed accounting controls
which sought to protect public property from the impertinent
demands of the dying and private property from improper gov-
ernment levies or interference with the market. Whether in
deciding upon the extent of the government’s contribution to
relief, the mode of relief or the qualifications for relief, account-
ing information figured prominently in providing justifications,
legitimation and the means to control the relief effort.
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WERE ISLAMIC RECORDS PRECURSORS
TO ACCOUNTING BOOKS BASED ON
THE ITALIAN METHOD? A COMMENT
Abstract: Some readers might have interpreted Zaid [2000] as claim-
ing that the accounting practices of the Islamic State already used
or directly led to double entry. This comment puts Zaid’s paper into
the context of prior literature and points out that no evidence is
offered in that literature or by Zaid to dispute an Italian origin for
double entry. Nevertheless, there are clear influences from the Mus-
lim world on some antecedents to Western accounting developments
and on some features of pre-double-entry accounting in the West.
INTRODUCTION: ZAID’S HYPOTHESIS
Zaid [2000, p. 89] argues that “the development of account-
ing records and reports in the Islamic State have most likely
contributed to the development and practice of accounting in
the Italian Republics as documented by Pacioli in 1494”. Zaid
would seem to be seeking to identify the influence of the prac-
tices of the Islamic State on one or other of the following Ital-
ian developments:
1. various pre-double-entry accounting records and
reports, or
2. the accounting records and reports specifically re-
lated to the practice of double entry.
Readers might well infer from the reference to “as documented
by Pacioli” that Zaid is suggesting Interpretation 2. Such an
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inference might be confirmed when Zaid [p.74] states, without
questioning it, that (according to ten Have) it is “received wis-
dom” that Italians borrowed the concept of double entry from
the Arabs. Zaid also refers to “the Italian Method” [title]. The
main feature that distinguishes “the Italian Method” of record-
ing described by Pacioli [1494] from that of previous Western
systems is double entry.
Zaid has confirmed1  that he has no evidence that Islamic
records were kept in double entry in the period examined in his
paper and that, despite the above references, he did not intend
to claim Islamic influence over the development of the system.
It is vital to establish this because a mass of literature would be
overturned if Zaid had proposed and provided support for In-
terpretation 2. Not only do standard texts [e.g. Edwards, 1989,
p.48; Chatfield and Vangermeersch, 1996, p.218] now assume
an Italian origin for double entry, but scholars have expended
great effort on explaining why it developed there when it did
and how it spread from these origins [e.g. Bryer, 1993;2  Mills,
1994].
The purposes of this comment are to try to summarise the
literature relating to the Islamic influence on accounting in or-
der to put Zaid’s paper into that context and to correct any
misinterpretation of the paper that some readers may have rea-
sonably made.
PRIOR LITERATURE
Double-entry bookkeeping (or, at least, substantial ele-
ments of it) can be found in use by Italian merchants in
Provence in 1299-1300 [Lee, 1977] and in London in 1305-8
[Nobes, 1982] and in the records of the commune of Genoa in
1340 [de Roover, 1956]. It can be seen evolving in Italy in
records earlier than this [Yamey, 1947; de Roover, 1956; Lee,
1973]. It is the later Venetian version of the system that Pacioli
describes in a small section of his Summa.
There is widespread acceptance that many of the necessary
conditions for the development of double entry (as suggested by
Littleton, 1966) were established in the Muslim world earlier
than in Italy and that they probably moved from the former to
the latter. Parker [1989] examines this in detail. Incidentally,
the suggestion that Hindu/Arabic numbers are important for
1Correspondence between O.A. Zaid and the author of 14 March 2001.
2As Macve (1996, footnote 14) notes, Bryer argues that double-entry re-
flects things about Northern Italy other than the needs of capitalism.
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double entry (as in many references noted by Parker, 1989,
p.110) can be countered by referring to the use of Roman nu-
merals in the Farolfi and Gallerani records [Lee, 1977; Nobes,
1982].
Parker [1989] identifies medieval Jewish traders as the ma-
jor intermediaries for taking Muslim ideas to Italy. He leaves
open the question [p.112] of whether there was direct influence
on accounting practices rather than on the antecedents of those
practices (such as paper, arithmetic and money). Commenting
on this, Scorgie [1994, p.141] refers to evidence that Jewish
bankers in Cairo used a bilateral form of accounts in the elev-
enth and twelfth centuries, thus predating Italian use.
Albraiki [1990] provides some evidence that certain book-
keeping features needed for the development of double entry
were invented in the Islamic world, but no evidence of direct
transfer to suggest that they were not also separately invented
in Italy. Albraiki examines sources relating particularly to tax
records in the Islamic world from the ninth to twelfth centuries.
They show the development of bilateral accounts and of dual
entries for certain transactions. There is also balancing of ac-
counts. However, there seem to be no trial balances of the
whole system, nor balance sheets.
Hamid et al. [1995] also describe in detail the registers of a
tax department of a 10th-century Muslim administrative office.
They conclude that the environment was suitable for the devel-
opment of double entry but that “[i]t cannot be concluded from
this tentative enquiry that double-entry was practised” [p.331].
ZAID’S EVIDENCE
Like Hamid et al. [1995], Zaid [2000] describes (from sec-
ondary sources) some of the accounting records of the Islamic
state. He identifies four types of journal, three types of other
accounting book and two types of report. Some of these can be
identified in Hamid et al.’s list [p.325] of nine “registers”. Zaid’s
categorisation of the records adds some clarity, but it would
have been useful to readers if Zaid had acknowledged and com-
mented on the similarities and differences between the two out-
lines.
As noted above, Zaid does not suggest that he is offering
evidence that any of the Islamic records were kept in double
entry. The fact that certain accounts had two columns (e.g. for
tax liabilities and tax payments) [p.82], classified expenses
according to type [p.84] or totalled revenues and expenses by
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month [p.85] would neither confirm nor deny the existence of
double entry.
Zaid notes [p.86] that “the concept of the balance sheet as a
separate statement . . . was not common”. There seems to be no
evidence of the balance sheet in the sense of a periodic balanc-
ing list of debit balances and credit balances from a recording
system (including some form of owner’s equity). By contrast,
Zaid reports [p.86] that for particular purposes “some balance
sheet items were included”.
The most specific of Zaid’s suggestions [p.81] of borrowing
by Italian merchants from Islamic merchants concern Pacioli’s
admonition to start accounts with “In the Name of God” and
his use of the term “journal”. However, pious inscriptions can
be found in Italy throughout the centuries leading up to the
appearance of double entry [Lopez and Raymond, 1955, pp.
146, 170-178, 188, etc; Yamey, 1974, pp. 143-144]; they were
applied to other documents, not just to accounting.
As for the word “journal” (or Venetian “zornal”), Zaid sug-
gests [p.81] that this “may be based on the translation of the
Arabic word Jaridah”, although later [p.89] the suggestion be-
comes a statement that the word “is the literal translation of the
Arabic word “Jaridah””. However, the English word “journal”
has, as one of its meanings, the same meaning as the English
word “diurnal”; and a large dictionary of English [e.g. OED,
1970, p.1069] will show that the English word “journal” derives
from the French “journal”, related to the Italian “giornale”, and
that it goes back (like the English word “diurnal”) to the late
Latin adjective “diurnalis” and the ancient Latin adjective
“diurnus” (both meaning diurnal or daily). In ancient Rome, a
diary or day-book was a “diurnum”. This pre-dates Islam by
many centuries.
ZAID’S USE OF OTHER AUTHORS
Zaid’s introductory reference to ten Have (see above) might
mislead readers into thinking that it is now generally accepted
by scholars that double entry was borrowed by the Italians.
However, ten Have himself [1976, p.11] rejects the idea of any
proof:
It cannot be demonstrated that the Arabs in this period
had already developed the double-entry system; thus
there is no proof the Italians borrowed from the Arabs.
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out com-
pletely.
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Zaid [p.74] cites Woolf [1912, p.54] as a further reference
for the unlikelihood of accounting progress in Italy “at the
time”. Since this reference comes in the same paragraph as
Zaid’s quotation from ten Have, readers might infer that Woolf
was referring to the period leading up to the appearance of
double-entry in Italy. However, Woolf is referring to the period
from 500 AD to 1000 AD. Woolf himself [pp.105-106] ascribes
developments in accounting (up to the appearance of double
entry) to the Italians.
Zaid [p.81] also tries to support the idea of Islamic influ-
ence by suggesting that Ball [1960, p.209] saw Pacioli’s Summa
as based on the work of Leonardo of Pisa who had translated
Arabic writings, and that Chatfield [1968, p.45] saw Pacioli as
“a translator of what existed in other cultures”. Of course, these
references by Zaid to Pacioli are not really relevant to his thesis.
Examination of the content of a book of 1494 cannot help us
much in determining the foreign influences on the development
in Italy of accounting records and reports which occurred 200
or more years earlier.
Anyway, Zaid’s references are likely to mislead readers
again. Ball referred to Pacioli relying particularly on Leonardo
of Pisa for other arithmetic matters, not for accounting. When
it comes to accounting (both before and after the appearance of
double entry), Ball [1960, p.187] is quite clear:
The history of modern mercantile arithmetic in Europe
begins then with its use by Italian merchants, and it is
especially to the Florentine traders and writers that we
owe its early development and improvement. It was
they who invented the system of book-keeping by
double entry.
There is nothing in the Chatfield [1968, p.45] reference
which corresponds to Zaid’s description. However, on p.45 of
another Chatfield [1974] book, there is a reference to Pacioli
drawing on the work of other Italian writers, but no reference
to other cultures. Elsewhere, Chatfield [1974, pp. 32 and 34]
specifically refutes the idea of non-Italian invention of various
accounting practices (again both before and after double entry):
Bilateral accounts developed in northern Italy between
1250 and 1440 . . . They were not the product of any
earlier civilization . . . [p.32]. Though claims are made
for an earlier invention of double entry in other places
. . . in fact the Italian system was from the beginning
essentially different from any which preceded it [p.34].
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Perhaps the more recent scholarship cited earlier in this
comment casts some doubt on the certainties of Ball and
Chatfield, but this merely reinforces the point that Zaid should
not have used them in support of his thesis.
CONCLUSION
Zaid’s paper could be interpreted as suggesting Islamic in-
fluence on pre-double-entry Italian accounting records and re-
ports (Interpretation 1) or directly on double-entry itself (Inter-
pretation 2). Elsewhere Zaid refutes the latter.
Assuming Interpretation 1, Zaid offers no new evidence
about the state of Islamic accounting in the period before Ital-
ian double entry, and does not link his description to prior
descriptions. He offers no evidence of actual transfer of ac-
counting technology to Italy. The most precise suggestions of
borrowings (notably the word “journal”) seem to be clearly un-
founded.
Three authors (ten Have, Ball and Chatfield) called in aid
by Zaid make it clear that they would either have been opposed
to or could not have offered any evidence to support either
Interpretation.
In sum, influences from Arabia on mathematics and on
some other antecedents of accounting developments in the
West are undoubted. It has also been clear for many years that
several features of pre-double-entry accounting were used in
the Muslim world before they were used in the West. Further,
direct influences on some elements of Western accounting are
plausible, although no evidence is offered by Zaid or others on
this. Finally, there is still no evidence that double entry was
first developed outside Italy. At present, it still seems that it was
Italians who were the authors of the earliest surviving records
kept as full double-entry systems; Italians who wrote the earli-
est surviving descriptions of double entry; and, above all, it is in
sets of Italian records that the gradual evolution of the elements
of double entry, towards a full system, can be seen in the 13th
and 14th centuries.
REFERENCES
Albraiki, S.S. (1990), The Muslim Contribution to the Development of Account-
ing (University of Kent, unpublished PhD thesis).
Ball, W.W.R. (1960), A Short Account of the History of Mathematics (New York:
Dover Publications), as reprinted from earlier editions, e.g. that by
Macmillan, London, 1908.
221
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2001, Vol. 28, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2001
213Comment: Nobes: Islamic Records . . . The Italian Method?
Bryer, R.A. (1993), “Double-entry bookkeeping and the birth of capitalism:
accounting for the commercial revolution in medieval Northern Italy,”
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 4: 113-140.
Chatfield, M. (1968), Contemporary Studies in the Evolution of Accounting
Thought (Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company).
Chatfield, M. (1974), A History of Accounting Thought (Hinsdale, Illinois:
Dryden Press) reprinted in 1977 by Robert E. Krieger, New York.
Chatfield, M. and Vangermeersch, R. (1996), The History of Accounting: An
International Encyclopedia (New York: Garland).
de Roover, R. (1956), “The Development of Accounting prior to Luca Pacioli
according to the Account-Books of Medieval Merchants,” in A.C. Littleton
and B.S. Yamey (eds), Studies in the History of Accounting (London: Sweet
& Maxwell).
de Ste Croix, G.E.M. (1956), “Greek and Roman Accounting,” in A.C. Littleton
and B.S. Yamey (eds), Studies in the History of Accounting (London: Sweet
& Maxwell).
Edwards, J.R. (1989), A History of Financial Accounting (London: Routledge).
Hamid, S., Craig, R. and Clarke, F. (1995), “Bookkeeping and accounting con-
trol systems in a tenth-century Muslim administrative office,” Accounting,
Business and Financial History, Vol.5, No.3: 321-333.
Have, O. ten (1976), The History of Accounting (Palo Alto, CA: Bay Books).
Lee, G.A. (1973), “The Development of Italian Bookkeeping, 1211-1300,” Aba-
cus, December : 137-155.
Lee, G.A. (1977), “The Coming of Age of Double Entry: The Giovanni Farolfi
Ledger of 1299-1300,” The Accounting Historians Journal, Fall: 79-95.
Lopez, R.S. and Raymond, I.W. (1955) Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean:
Illustrative Documents (New York: Columbia University Press).
Macve, R.H. (1985), “Some Glosses on “Greek and Roman Accounting””, His-
tory of Political Thought, Spring [reprinted in Edwards, J.R. (ed.) (2000)
The History of Accounting: Critical Perspectives on Business and Manage-
ment, London & New York: Routledge, Vol.II: 66-97].
Macve, R.H. (1996), “Pacioli’s Legacy,” in Lee, T.A., Bishop, A.C. and Parker,
R.H. (eds.) Accounting History from the Renaissance to the Present: A Re-
membrance of Luca Pacioli (New York: Garland): 3-30.
Mills, G.T. (1994), “Early accounting in Northern Italy: the role of commercial
development and the printing press in the expansion of double-entry from
Genoa, Florence and Venice,” The Accounting Historians Journal, Vol.21,
No.1: 81-96.
Nobes, C.W. (1982), “The Gallerani Account Book of 1305-1308,” The Account-
ing Review, Vol. 57, No. 2: 303-310.
OED (1970), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (London: Oxford University
Press).
Pacioli, L. (1494), Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni e
Proportionalita (Venice: Paganinus de Paganinis).
Parker, L.M. (1989), “Medieval traders as international change agents: a com-
parison with twentieth century international accounting firms,” The Ac-
counting Historians Journal, Vol.16, No.2: 107-118.
Scorgie, M. (1994), “Medieval traders as international change agents: a com-
ment,” The Accounting Historians Journal, Vol.21, No.1: 137-143.
Woolf, A.H. (1912), A Short History of Accountants and Accounting (London:
Gee).
Yamey, B.S. (1947), “Notes on the Origin of Double-entry Bookkeeping,” The
Accounting Review, Vol. 22: 263-272.
222
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/12
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2001214
Yamey, B.S. (1974), “Pious inscriptions; confused accounts; classification of
accounts: three historical notes,” in H. Edey and B.S. Yamey, Debits, Cred-
its, Finance and Profits (London: Sweet & Maxwell).
Zaid, O.A. (2000), “Were Islamic Records Precursors to the Accounting Books
Based on the Italian Method?,” The Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27,
No.1: 73-90.
223
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2001, Vol. 28, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2001
Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 28, No. 2
December 2001
RESPONSE
Omar Abdullah Zaid
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA
“WERE ISLAMIC RECORDS
PRECURSORS TO ACCOUNTING BOOKS
BASED ON THE ITALIAN METHOD?”
A RESPONSE
Abstract: Offers a response to Nobes’ comment on Zaid [2000]. Fo-
cuses on Nobes’ interpretation of the arguments presented by Zaid,
his contentions about ‘pious inscriptions’ and the use of the term
‘journal’. Calls for broader thinking on the history of double entry
bookkeeping and for more research on possible antecedents in the
Islamic state.
Four aspects of Nobes’ comment will be addressed in this
response: Nobes’ understanding and interpretation of Zaid
[2000]; the requirement to start the books with the phrase ‘In
The Name of God’; the use of the term ‘Journal’ ; and, the read-
ers’ understanding of Zaid [2000] as perceived by Nobes.
First, the subject of Nobes’ understanding and interpreta-
tion of Zaid [2000]. Nobes suggests that: “Zaid would seem to
be seeking to identify the influence of the practices of the Is-
lamic State on one or other of the following Italian develop-
ments:
1. various pre-double-entry accounting records and
reports, or
2. the accounting records and reports specifically re-
lated to the practice of double entry.”
It will be apparent to readers of Zaid [2000] that neither of
these issues were the concern of, or addressed in, my paper.
Rather, the paper specifically examined accounting books as
Acknowledgment: The author wishes to thank the editor for his construc-
tive comments and suggestions.
Submitted May 2001
Revised August 2001
Accepted September 2001
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one of the several components of the Italian Method. The paper
did not refer to the ‘double entry system’. It appears that Nobes
understands the ‘Italian Method’ as being restricted to the
‘double entry system’. The ‘Italian Method’, as we know it is a
more comprehensive practice that should not be restricted to
meaning only ‘books’ or the ‘double entry system’. Accordingly,
Zaid [2000] was an attempt to examine the influence of the
accounting books developed in the Islamic state on the account-
ing books used in the Italian republics.
The subject of the ‘double entry system’ is a separate issue;
and requires further research and discussion about ‘who’ was
responsible for its development, and ‘where’ and ‘when’ it
emerged. At present no conclusive evidence exist as to ‘who’
developed the ‘double entry system’. All that we do know is that
it was used in the Italian republics. Although I confirm that at
present no evidence has been found that the ‘double entry sys-
tem’ was developed by Muslim scholars or others outside (or
inside) the Italian republics, the possibility of a direct or indi-
rect contribution by Muslim accounting scholars to the devel-
opment of the ‘double entry system’ through their accounting
books, accounting systems, recording procedures and reports,
cannot be ruled out. This possibility exists given the influence
of Muslim traders on the practices of their Italian counterparts.
As Wolff observed in the wider context, the condition in Europe
at the time of the early use of double entry “was temporarily at
a standstill, and we shall therefore not expect to find a visible or
appreciable progress in methods of accounting during that pe-
riod” [1912, p. 54]. This was also suggested by a number of
Western scholars and is akin to Nobes’ comment “that many of
the necessary conditions for the development of double entry
(as suggested by Littleton) were established in the Muslim
world earlier than in Italy and that they probably moved from
the former to the latter”.
As Nobes mentions in his comment, “Zaid does not suggest
that he is offering evidence that any of the Islamic records were
kept in double entry”. This statement would appear to conflict
with his earlier contention that “Zaid would seem to be seeking
to identify the influence of the practices of the Islamic State on
one or other of the following Italian developments: 1. various
pre-double-entry accounting records and reports, or 2. the ac-
counting records and reports specifically related to the practice
of double entry.” (emphasis added). If the object of Nobes’ com-
ment is to explore whether developments in accounting and
trade in the Islamic state contributed to the development of
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‘double-entry-system’, my response is that neither a direct or
indirect relationship between developments in the Islamic state
and the emergence of the double entry system can be ruled out.
This was also the opinion of a number of Western scholars
including Littleton.
A second issue addressed by Nobes concerns his statement
that “pious inscriptions can be found in Italy throughout the
centuries leading up to the appearance of double entry . . . they
were applied to other documents, not just accounting”. I agree
with Nobes’ statement that “pious inscriptions” can be found in
and outside Italy before and after Pacioli’s documentation of
the double entry system in the Italian republics. But the ques-
tion that should be raised is whether the use of ‘pious inscrip-
tions’ was a general requirement or was optional? According to
Nobes this was not a mandatory requirement. According to Al-
Mazendarany [1363] it was an explicit mandatory requirement
that the accountant starts the accounting books with the phrase
“In the Name of Allah, The Most Gracious, The Most Merciful”
and the same was later suggested by Pacioli in 1494, whether
the person is a pious accountant or not.
A third issue addressed by Nobes is the use of the term
‘Journal’. Nobes states “the English word “journal” derives from
the French ‘journal’, related to the Italian “giornal”, and that it
goes back (like the English word “diurnal”) to the Latin adjec-
tive “diurnalis” and the ancient Latin adjective “diurnus” (both
meaning diurnal or daily). In ancient Rome, a diary or day-
book was “diurnum”. This pre-dates Islam by many centuries”.
In Zaid [2000] reference is made to the word “Zornal” and the
current equivalent “Journal” not as an ‘abstract’ word but as
associated with accounting as suggested by Pacioli. Of course,
the words “Journal” or “Zornal” and “Jaridah” existed for centu-
ries before Islam but the important issue is not the words them-
selves but their use and meanings in the context of accounting.
This is the same as with many other words such as the word/
name “Mohammad”. This word was used before Islam but it
was only after Islam that it became exclusively associated with
Muslims. The words “Jaridah”, “Journal” and “Zornal” were
similarly associated with accounting although they could be
used and have meanings in different contexts. The issue here is
the closeness of the meaning and use of the word “Jaridah”
with the meaning and use of “Zornal” and “Journal”. It would
be useful if Nobes could show whether the word “Zornal” was
used in an accounting context in the Italian republics before the
Renaissance and in the practice of accounting documented in
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Pacioli’s book. The focus should not be on the “abstract” word
but its meaning and use as an integral part of practice as is the
case with “Zornal” or “Journal” and “Accounting”.
A fourth issue raised by Nobes is “the readers’ understand-
ing” of Zaid [2000]. Nobes offers comments such as: “readers
might infer”, “Readers might well infer”, and “might mislead
readers”. What may be inferred reflects Nobes’ personal opin-
ions and understanding of the history of double entry book-
keeping. It would not be conducive to academic debate if Nobes
assumed that all accounting historians were to think in the
same direction and interpret Zaid [2000] in the same way as
himself. This narrowness of view is further suggested when
Nobes states “it is vital to establish this because a mass of
literature would be overturned if Zaid had proposed and pro-
vided support for interpretation 2”.
In conclusion, the author appreciates Nobes’ comment as a
constructive contribution to the ongoing debate and unresolved
questions concerning ‘when’ and ‘where’ the double entry sys-
tem was developed and ‘who’ initiated its development.
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NOTICEBOARD
Call for
CONFERENCE PROPOSALS
2002-2004
The Academy of Accounting historians was formed in 1973. It was
granted a charter as a not-for-profit corporation in the State of Ala-
bama and, subsequently, was granted tax-exempt status in the United
States. The objectives of the Academy are to encourage research, publi-
cation, teaching and personal interchanges in all phases of Accounting
History and its interrelation with business and economic history. The
flagship publication of the Academy is The Accounting Historians
Journal. Membership in the Academy is open to persons in all coun-
tries who are interested in Accounting History. The current member-
ship (Individuals and Institutional Affiliates) totals approximately
875, representing more than 34 different countries.
As part of its mandate, the Academy of Accounting Historians holds two
research conferences per year (typically in August and November respectively).
The goals of the conferences are to provide opportunities for accounting his-
tory researchers to present their work, to raise the profile of accounting history
and to provide opportunities for networking among those interested in the
field. The conferences also serve to raise the profile of the hosting institution
and to reinforce the importance of accounting history within those institu-
tions.
Recent conferences have included:
Accounting Hall of Fame University of Ohio,
50th Anniversary Columbus, OH
International Accounting Drexel University,
History Philadelphia, PA
Writing Accounting Histories:
Genres and Constructions Santa Fe, NM
The Academy has adopted a three-year planning cycle for its conferences
and welcomes proposals for conferences through 2004. Proposals should pro-
vide a theme (perhaps tied to some accounting event of local historical signifi-
cance or to provide perspective on a contemporary issue), the names and
backgrounds of the organizers and plans for fund-raising to support the con-
ference. The Academy will provide administrative support, promotion of the
conference on its web site and through its publications, and support for fund-
raising. Conferences may be proposed for any region of the world. Proposals
will be considered at any time but early submissions will be favoured.
Proposals should be sent to the Vice-President, Conferences and Partner-
ships, of the Academy:
Professor Alan J. Richardson
School of Business
Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario
Canada K7L 3N6
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Indonesian Management & Accounting Research
Call for Papers
IMAR aims to advance the state of knowledge across the management and
accounting discipline. We invite papers in all areas of accounting, auditing,
finance, and taxation fields which will be of interest to both academics and
practitioners. Papers based on research conducted in Indonesia, Asia, the Pa-
cific and from around the world will be considered. The primary criteria for
accepting papers will be that of research quality, originality and significance.
Studies that offer analysis and discussion of education, policy and practice
implications are also particularly welcome. Papers must be written in a style
that is readable for academics and researchers and for practitioners.
IMAR wishes to publish papers that offer new perspectives and under-
standings for the management and accounting disciplines. We encourage re-
search into issues that are of both regional and international importance.
Studies can be international, national, regional, or organization specific. Meth-
odologies that employ any of single, multiple, or interdisciplinary perspectives
are welcome. Positivist, qualitative, historical and literature review studies are
all eligible for consideration. Book reviews and research notes will also be
published.
Three paper copies of completed papers must be sent to:
Dr Sofyan S Harahap, Editor in Chief
The University of Trisakti
The Institute of Publishing Faculty of Economics
Jalan Kyai Tapa. Gedung Hendrawan Sie Lt 5
Jakata 1 1440 Indonesia
Phone: (62) (21) 566 9178
Email: _ HYPERLINK“mailto:imar_usakti@fe”_imar_usaktia
@fe_.usakti.ac.id.
Or refer to Trisakti University Website: _ HYPERLINK
“http://www.trisakti.ac.id”_http://www.trisakti.ac.id_
Scope of the Journal:
Our scope includes (but is not necessarily limited to ) the following:
— Financial and management accounting
— Auditing
— Taxation
— Information systems
— Electronic commerce
— Information and decision science
— Finance and banking
— Organization behaviour
— Organizational change
— Strategic Management
— Human Resources Management
— Public sector accounting and management
— Non-for Profit Organization management and accounting
— Management control and accountability
— International management and accounting
— Cultural aspects of management, accounting and auditing
— Management and accounting history
— Ethics
— Social and Environmental Accounting and Management
— Performance Evaluation
— National and regional management and accounting
— Etc.
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Accounting, Business & Financial History Conference
17-18 September 2002
Sponsored by the Centre for Business Performance, Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England & Wales
Guest Speaker — Professor Richard Macve
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of account-
ing, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and dis-
cussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to
fully developed manuscripts. The format of the conference allows approxi-
mately 40 minutes for presentation and discussion in order to help achieve
worthwhile feedback from those attending
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently appeared in
print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by John Richard
(Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the full range of interna-
tional, refereed academic accounting, business and economic history journals.
The conference will be held, this year, at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff,
CF14 3UX, UK, from lunchtime on Tuesday, 17 September to mid-afternoon
on Wednesday, 18 September.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference dinner on
Tuesday and accommodation) is £100.
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the confer-
ence should send an abstract of their paper (not exceeding one page) to:
Julie Roberts
Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5731 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419
Email. RobertsJA1@cardiff.ac.uk
The deadline for submissions is 31 May 2002 with earlier proposals for
papers encouraged.
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference
organisers’ decision on 30 June 2002.
Centre for
Business
Performance
Thought
leadership
from the
Institute…
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Accounting History
CALL FOR PAPERS
Management Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice
Increasingly, the role of management accounting in both shaping and being
shaped by its social and institutional context is being recognised and under-
scored (Hopwood, 1994; Puxty, 1993). Management accounting as social and
institutional practice, as opposed to objective technique, is particularly dis-
cernible in historical research. Historical studies reveal how management ac-
counting serves to create and foster social and institutional arrangements
across both space and time. As historians examine management accounting in
its contexts, we shed greater light on the intertwining of accounting within
organisational and social life. Social and institutional practices do not emerge
in a vacuum. Rather, these practices emerge as a result of the impacts of
differing historical developments and point-in-time events. Across time and
space, management accounting alters the organisational terrain and is impli-
cated in relationships of power and domination. Moreover, management ac-
counting is understood increasingly as a calculative force within the
organisation, as compared to a neutral, objective documentor of events and
activities.
The objective of this special issue of Accounting History is the examina-
tion of social and institutional practice, with a view to articulating the role of
management accounting in constituting and re-constituting the organisation.
Submissions are sought which explore themes in historical perspective such
as:
• the comparative international study of management accounting technol-
ogy and discourse;
• the constitutive role of management accounting as relationships of power
and domination;
• the accountability implications of management accounting practices;
• the transformative agenda of management accounting;
• the evaluative nature of management accounting across both space and
time;
• the change across space and time in the calculative rationales and exper-
tise of management accounting.
Case studies (of a single entity or of more than one entity) are particularly
encouraged.
This special issue of Accounting history is scheduled to appear in November
2002. Submitted papers will be refereed in the usual way.
Submissions (three copies) should be forwarded by 15 February 2002 to:
Cheryl S. McWatters
Faculty of Management
McGill University
1001 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal
Quebec H3A 1 GA
CANADA
References:
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bridge: Cambridge University Press, Puxty, A.G., ( 1993), The Social and Orga-
nizational Content of Management Accounting, London: Academic Press.
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Accounting and Business Research
Volume 31 Number 2 Spring 2001
Contents
Articles
The true and fair view requirement in Sally Aisbitt 83
recent national implementations Christopher Nobes
The over-riding importance of internationalism: David Alexander 91
a reply to Nobes
Accounting information and analyst stock Gaéton Breton 97
recommendationdecisions: a content analysis Richard J. Taffler
approach
Corporate environments and international K. Hung Chan 109
transfer pricing:an empirical study of China Lynne Chow
in a developing economy framework
The effect of sequential information releases Yi-Mien Lin 125
on trading volume and price behaviour Taychang Wang
Factors associated with auditor changes: E-Sah Woo 139
a Singapore study Hian Chye Koh
Book Reviews
T.J. Baldwin, R.H. Berry, R.A. Church T.A. Lee 151
and M.V. Pitts, Cash flow and corporate
finance in Victorian Britain
Stephen A. Zeff, Henry Rand Hatfield: Michael J. Mumford 152
Humanist, scholar and accounting educator
Philip B. Chenok with Adam Snyder, Stephen A. Zeff 154
Foundations for the future: The AICPA
from 1980 to 1995
Notices 156
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Accounting and Business Research
Volume 31 Number 3 Summer 2001
Contents
Articles
The effect of a potential borrower’s reporting Richard W. Houston 163
reputation and financial condition on Michael F. Peters
commercial loan officers’ estimates of forecast
bias and subsequent loan recommendations
Information content of earnings in all J.S. Toms 175
unregulated market: the co-operative cotton
mills of Lancashire, 1880-1900
Reverse stock splits and earnings performance Nikos Vafeas 191
Commentary
Mathews, Gynther and Chambers: three Geoffrey Whittington 203
pioneering Australian theorists Stephen A. Zeff
Book Reviews
Geoffrey Poitras, The Early History of Financial Harold Bierman Jr. 235
Economics, 1478-1776
Cliff Pratten, The Taxation of Stock Market Janette Rutherford 236
Investments
Notices 238
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